7,215 research outputs found

    Modelling interdependencies between the electricity and information infrastructures

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    The aim of this paper is to provide qualitative models characterizing interdependencies related failures of two critical infrastructures: the electricity infrastructure and the associated information infrastructure. The interdependencies of these two infrastructures are increasing due to a growing connection of the power grid networks to the global information infrastructure, as a consequence of market deregulation and opening. These interdependencies increase the risk of failures. We focus on cascading, escalating and common-cause failures, which correspond to the main causes of failures due to interdependencies. We address failures in the electricity infrastructure, in combination with accidental failures in the information infrastructure, then we show briefly how malicious attacks in the information infrastructure can be addressed

    Critical Infrastructures

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    Methodologies synthesis

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    This deliverable deals with the modelling and analysis of interdependencies between critical infrastructures, focussing attention on two interdependent infrastructures studied in the context of CRUTIAL: the electric power infrastructure and the information infrastructures supporting management, control and maintenance functionality. The main objectives are: 1) investigate the main challenges to be addressed for the analysis and modelling of interdependencies, 2) review the modelling methodologies and tools that can be used to address these challenges and support the evaluation of the impact of interdependencies on the dependability and resilience of the service delivered to the users, and 3) present the preliminary directions investigated so far by the CRUTIAL consortium for describing and modelling interdependencies

    Failures in a Critical Infrastructure System

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    The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of a critical infrastructure system, of failures and impacts that occur within it and of the resilience, which effectively reduces the risk of these impacts spreading on to dependent subsystems. The chapter presents a basic description of a critical infrastructure system and of the hierarchic arrangement of its subsystems and linkages between them. Critical infrastructure system failures, including their causes and impacts on dependent subsystems and on society as a whole, are presented in the following section. Particular focus is given to the propagation of impacts in a critical infrastructure system and the current approaches to their modeling. The chapter concludes by expounding on the resilience of critical infrastructure subsystems and its impact on the minimization of failures in critical infrastructure subsystems in circumstances involving emergencies

    Improving resilience in Critical Infrastructures through learning from past events

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    Modern societies are increasingly dependent on the proper functioning of Critical Infrastructures (CIs). CIs produce and distribute essential goods or services, as for power transmission systems, water treatment and distribution infrastructures, transportation systems, communication networks, nuclear power plants, and information technologies. Being resilient, where resilience denotes the capacity of a system to recover from challenges or disruptive events, becomes a key property for CIs, which are constantly exposed to threats that can undermine safety, security, and business continuity. Nowadays, a variety of approaches exists in the context of CIs’ resilience research. This dissertation starts with a systematic review based on PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) on the approaches that have a complete qualitative dimension, or that can be used as entry points for semi-quantitative analyses. The review identifies four principal dimensions of resilience referred to CIs (i.e., techno-centric, organizational, community, and urban) and discusses the related qualitative or semi-quantitative methods. The scope of the thesis emphasizes the organizational dimension, as a socio-technical construct. Accordingly, the following research question has been posed: how can learning improve resilience in an organization? Firstly, the benefits of learning in a particular CI, i.e. the supply chain in reverse logistics related to the small arms utilized by Italian Armed Forces, have been studied. Following the theory of Learning From Incidents, the theoretical model helped to elaborate a centralized information management system for the Supply Chain Management of small arms within a Business Intelligence (BI) framework, which can be the basis for an effective decision-making process, capable of increasing the systemic resilience of the supply chain itself. Secondly, the research question has been extended to another extremely topical context, i.e. the Emergency Management (EM), exploring the crisis induced learning where single-loop and double-loop learning cycles can be established regarding the behavioral perspective. Specifically, the former refers to the correction of practices within organizational plans without changing core beliefs and fundamental rules of the organization, while the latter aims at resolving incompatible organizational behavior by restructuring the norms themselves together with the associated practices or assumptions. Consequently, with the aim of ensuring high EM systems resilience, and effective single-loop and double-loop crisis induced learning at organizational level, the study examined learning opportunities that emerge through the exploration of adaptive practices necessary to face the complexity of a socio-technical work domain as the EM of Covid-19 outbreaks on Oil & Gas platforms. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches have been adopted to analyze the resilience of this specific socio-technical system. On this consciousness, with the intention to explore systems theoretic possibilities to model the EM system, the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) has been proposed as a qualitative method for developing a systematic understanding of adaptive practices, modelling planning and resilient behaviors and ultimately supporting crisis induced learning. After the FRAM analysis, the same EM system has also been studied adopting a Bayesian Network (BN) to quantify resilience potentials of an EM procedure resulting from the adaptive practices and lessons learned by an EM organization. While the study of CIs is still an open and challenging topic, this dissertation provides methodologies and running examples on how systemic approaches may support data-driven learning to ultimately improve organizational resilience. These results, possibly extended with future research drivers, are expected to support decision-makers in their tactical and operational endeavors

    Protecting critical infrastructure in the EU: CEPS task force report

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    2sĂŹCritical infrastructures such as energy, communications, banking, transportation, public government services, information technology etc., are more vital to industrialized economies and now than ever before. At the same time, these infrastructures are becoming increasingly dependent on each other, such that failure of one of them can often propagate and result in domino effects. The emerging challenge of Critical (information) Infrastructure Protection (C(I)IP) has been recognized by nearly all member states of the European Union: politicians are increasingly aware of the threats posed by radical political movements and terrorist attacks, as well as the need to develop better response capacity in case of natural disasters. Responses to these facts have been in line with the available resources and possibilities of each country, so that certain countries are already quite advanced in translating the C(I)IP challenge into measures, whereas others are lagging behind. In the international arena of this policy domain, Europe is still in search of a role to play. Recently, CIIP policy has been integrated in the EU Digital Agenda, which testifies to the growing importance of securing resilient infrastructures for the future. This important and most topical Task Force Report is the result of in-depth discussions between experts from different backgrounds and offers a number of observations and recommendations for a more effective and joined-up European policy response to the protection of critical infrastructure.openopenAndrea Renda; Bernhard HaemmerliRenda, Andrea; Bernhard, Haemmerl

    Quantitative dependability and interdependency models for large-scale cyber-physical systems

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    Cyber-physical systems link cyber infrastructure with physical processes through an integrated network of physical components, sensors, actuators, and computers that are interconnected by communication links. Modern critical infrastructures such as smart grids, intelligent water distribution networks, and intelligent transportation systems are prominent examples of cyber-physical systems. Developed countries are entirely reliant on these critical infrastructures, hence the need for rigorous assessment of the trustworthiness of these systems. The objective of this research is quantitative modeling of dependability attributes -- including reliability and survivability -- of cyber-physical systems, with domain-specific case studies on smart grids and intelligent water distribution networks. To this end, we make the following research contributions: i) quantifying, in terms of loss of reliability and survivability, the effect of introducing computing and communication technologies; and ii) identifying and quantifying interdependencies in cyber-physical systems and investigating their effect on fault propagation paths and degradation of dependability attributes. Our proposed approach relies on observation of system behavior in response to disruptive events. We utilize a Markovian technique to formalize a unified reliability model. For survivability evaluation, we capture temporal changes to a service index chosen to represent the extent of functionality retained. In modeling of interdependency, we apply correlation and causation analyses to identify links and use graph-theoretical metrics for quantifying them. The metrics and models we propose can be instrumental in guiding investments in fortification of and failure mitigation for critical infrastructures. To verify the success of our proposed approach in meeting these goals, we introduce a failure prediction tool capable of identifying system components that are prone to failure as a result of a specific disruptive event. Our prediction tool can enable timely preventative actions and mitigate the consequences of accidental failures and malicious attacks --Abstract, page iii
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