Stopping Information Asymmetries in Government from Promoting Risk Shifting by Banks

Bank managers are said to shift risks when the downside of the profit opportunities that the bank pursues is absorbed in nontransparent fashion by the bank's creditors and guarantors. Risk shifting is facilitated by information asymmetries that tempt government officials to show creditors and taxpayers about how effectively government bureaus are controlling bank risk. The growing sophistication of financial products and financial institutions' net risk-taking positions demands a regulatory regime that—like Pinocchio's nose—can create and enforce incentives for transparency and truth-telling about the nature and value of taxpayers' implicit stake in regulated financial institutions. This paper was presented at the Financial Institutions Center's October 1996 conference on "

Surveys on Electronic Money

This paper investigates the views of electronic money operators and innovators on the possibilities and implications of e-money, especially with respect to replacing central bank money as well as technical issues regarding e-money, its implications for the financial industry and central banking. This has been done using surveys of major e-money innovators and operators, based on the assumption that these operators and innovators are likely to shape the future framework for e-money schemes. It seems that innovators and operators are quite confident about the future of e-money – despite problems and obstacles surrounding current testing – and that central banks’ monopoly of the issuance of money as a medium of exchange will no longer be unchallenged.electronic money; financial regulation; central banks; financial innovation

Corportate strategy, centralisation and outsourcing in banking: case studies on paper payment processing

This is an empirical review of IT outsourcing as an emerging tool for corporate strategy after deregulation and other phenomena changed the suitability of the global/universal bank model. Case studies of UK commercial banks are used to focus on cost management of paper and electronic processing through insourcing and outsourcing arrangements to change the size/efficiency equation in banking. The analysis discusses the corporate strategy and corr capabilities ussues behind a number of innovations and illustrates how outsourcing and other third party arrangements alters strategic balance albeit as a component of overall strategy. The paper establishes why outsourcing decisions have been concentrated in particular aspects of banking and discusses the competitive and environmental forces which have contributed to this focus.

Information technology innovations and commercial banking: A review and appraisal from an historical perspective

Technological innovation in general and information technology (IT) applications in particular, have had a major effect in banking and finance. Following Garbade and Silber (1978), this research reviews the effects on banking organisations with reference to front office or external changes as described by the nature of product and service offerings. Following Morris (1986) and Quintás (1991), the research also considers innovations in the back office or internal (operational function) changes brought about to banking organisations. Outstanding IT-based innovations are considered and grouped into four distinct periods: early adoption (1864-1945), specific application (1945-1965), emergence (1965-1980) and diffusion (1980-1995). The research then discusses the potential impact of more recent innovations (i.e. electronic purses, digital cash and Internet banking). As a result, the research provides an historical perspective on the main drivers determining adoption of technological innovation in retail banking markets.Banks, competition, IT innovation

Towards Transparency in Finance and Governance

The study of transparency is increasingly a more topical, broadly relevant, but also more under-researched enterprise. The Asian financial crisis has highlighted not only the welfare consequences of financial sector transparency, sparking a series of yet unresolved debates, but has also linked this relatively narrow problem to the broader context of transparency in governance. Its significance has broadened geographically as well as across different sectors. It has been observed that curtailment of transparency, often on scanty pretexts, is commonplace even in the highly developed countries. This suggests a broad and possibly radical reform agenda. Departing from the urgency of these observations, this paper reviews the existing literature on transparency in finance and governance, indicates remaining knowledge gaps, and offers some hypothesis on the mutual significance of the two issues. The first two sections of the paper outlines a conceptual framework for defining and measuring transparency that distinguishes among its desirable characteristics; access, timeliness, relevance, and quality. It also suggests methodologies that may produce tractable measures of transparency. Additionally, it places in context debates concerning transparency; its desirability, contingency, complexity and regulation. Reviewing critiques of objections against disclosure, the chapter advances a general preference for transparency, not only in the developing but also in the developed world. Nevertheless, it emphasizes the need to weigh the costs and benefits of more transparency in designing regulatory policy. In general, while consequences of information imperfections are well recognized, the solution is not simply a matter of more information. The third section treats the role of transparency in promoting greater financial stability, acknowledging exceptions to the general preference expressed earlier, in relation to financial stability. It treats as priority policy issues the following problems: developing institutional infrastructure, developing standards and accounting practices, improving incentives for disclosure and balancing countervailing regulations to minimize perverse incentives generated by safety net arrangements such as deposit insurance. An important suggestion is that since institutional development is gradual, relatively simple regulations such as limits on credit expansion, may be best tailored to developing countries. Implicit in this section is the notion that there are absolute limits to transparency, in particular for lack of adequate enforcement. The last section elaborates on the concomitant link between financial markets and governance, discussing select consequences of transparency for national-level and local governance, identifying some policy implications and suggesting further research issues. As illustrated by the case of Indonesia, it argues that financial reform may be predicated on broader public sector reforms. Again, because formal institutions take time to develop, it highlights three principles of reform to promote incentives for openness: harnessing private sector participation in service provision, promoting exit and contestability, and encouraging "voice" and public participation. These are now increasingly being integrated to new innovative data collection and analysis techniques, and to particular dissemination methods promoting collective action to improve governance and enhance transparency. The chapter concludes by outlining the difficulties of implementing greater participation and voice.financial liberalization, transparency, corruption, governance, banking crisis, asymmetric information, local investors, shocks, bad loans, emerging markets

Money, politics and a future for the international financial system

In developing the architecture for a financial system, the challenge is to combine deregulation and safety nets against systemic failure with effective prudential regulation and oversight. The author analyzes three approaches to choosing an adequate regulatory framework for a financial system. a) Those most worried about panic and herd behavior tend to favor relatively extensive controls on financial institutions'activities, including controls on interest rates and on the volume and direction of lending. b) Those most concerned about moral hazard advocate abolishing controls and safety nets, seeing the solution is stronger market discipline and reduced powers and discretion for regulators. c) Mainstream opinion advocates a mix of measures, to both strengthen market discipline and improve regulatory oversight. The approach a county opts for depends on 1) which monetary and exchange rate regime it chooses, 2) whether it is more concerned about moral hazard or about panic and herd behavior, and 3) how the politics of reform shape its solutions. The author suggests a scenario for development of the global financial system over the next two or three decades that assumes that the final outcome will resemble the market solution - not because that is the optimal policy choice but because of how political weakness will interact with advances in settlement technology. In the author's scenario, the world moves toward a monetary system in which fixed exchange rate systems or de facto currency competition limit the power of central banks. This limits options for discretionary and open-ended liquidity support to help deal with systemic financial crises. The costs of inflexible exchange rates are moderated by new types of wage contracts, using units of account that are correlated with the shocks a particular industry or kind of contract faces -- thus maintaining the positive aspects of monetary systems with flexible nominal exchange rates. Mistrust in monetary authorities and the emergence of private settlements lead to a return of asset-backed money as the means of payment. The disciplines on financial systems come to resemble somewhat those of historical"free banking"systems, with financial institutions requiring high levels of equity and payments systems protected only by limited, fully funded safety nets.Banks&Banking Reform,Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Financial Intermediation,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Macroeconomic Management,Financial Intermediation,Financial Economics

Risks of identity theft: Can the market protect the payment system?

Identity theft has been a feature of financial markets for as long as alternatives have existed to cash transactions. But identity theft has recently occurred on a much larger scale. Data breaches often involve the apparent loss or acknowledged theft of the personal identifying information of thousands--or millions--of people. ; Identity theft poses risks, not only to individuals, but to the integrity and efficiency of the payment system--the policies, procedures, and technology that transfer information for authenticating and settling payments among participants. Identity theft can cause a loss of confidence in the security of certain payment methods and an unwillingness to use them. Markets can cease operating or switch to less efficient payment methods. Either represents a loss of efficiency for the economy. ; Schreft looks at the nature of identity theft today and the factors underlying its mounting risks. She also explores whether markets are able to limit the risks identity theft poses to the payment system.Identity theft ; Payment systems

COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF IT INNOVATION ON BANK STRATEGY, 1985-1995

Through case study research this paper illustrates opportunities presented by IT-based technological change in British retail bank markets (1985-1995). For the managers of the Royal Bank of Scotland IT appeared to lower entry barriers, exit barriers and deliver high sustainability of competitive advantage. The strategic intent behind diversification patterns of the Royal Bank of Scotland suggested competitive considerations were at a premium because unsolicited take-over bids in the early 1980s put pressure on managers to create growth opportunities. Direct Line Insurance was a subsidiary from the Royal Bank of Scotland. Direct Line was also the first retail finance institution to establish a clear competitive advantage based on information technology. The success of Direct Line enabled an increase in the market share of British retail financial services of The Royal Bank of Scotland. Direct Line is a case of planned success that questions the extent to which banks’ competencies must change to master alternative delivery channels. The success of Direct Line also suggested more effective execution than other activities explored by managers of the Royal Bank of Scotland.Financial institutions; technological change; corporate strategy

The use of prepaid cards for banking the poor

Prepaid products can become an effective instrument for banking the poor, as they can be used for collecting microdeposits and so operate as a low-cost account. Prepaid platforms have characteristics that make them especially useful for developing low-cost microfinance business models. Indeed, customers using prepaid systems do not need bank accounts or debit or credit cards. Prepaid issuers do not need to develop or invest in new technologies, as this mechanism can be used on a range of platforms, including PCs, mobile phones, hand-held and set-top boxes. Furthermore, prepaid products are specially designed for offering services demanded by the poor, such as micropayments, microdeposits and even microcredits. Lastly, they allow users to monitor their cash flow by receiving statements (some providers offer this feature online, others provide physical statements) or accessing balances through PCs, mobile phones, hand-held and set-top boxes. Besides collecting microdeposits, prepaid products (or SVCs as they are called in the United States) offer other services that can be very valuable for serving the unbanked population. As explained in this paper, prepaid products generally lack the identification and credit requirements that effectively bar millions of individuals from opening traditional bank accounts, especially in the United States. Moreover, prepaid products can be purchased and reloaded at a growing number of locations other than bank branches, such as check cashers, convenience stores and other retailers. Prepaid instruments can also provide immediate availability of funds at a cost that, in some cases, is lower than other alternatives for unbanked consumers. Also, prepaid products are difficult to overdraw, thus reducing the likelihood of unexpected fees. Lastly, many prepaid issuers offer some sort of bill pay option, especially branded cards that enable signature-based transactions, and a significant number of them offer remittances.Prepaid card; microdeposits; mobile phone; store value card; e-money; banking the poor;