The reception of relativity in the Netherlands

This article reviews the early academic and public reception of Albert Einstein's theory of relativity in the Netherlands, particularly after Arthur Eddington's eclipse experiments of 1919. Initially, not much attention was given to relativity, as it did not seem an improvement over Hendrik A. Lorentz' work. This changed after the arrival in Leiden of Paul Ehrenfest. Soon relativity was much studied and lead to controversy among a number of conservative intellectuals, as elsewhere in Europe. The tone of Dutch critics was much more mild, however. This can be understood when one considers Dutch neutrality during World War I. Einstein's political positions were generally positively perceived in Holland, which Dutch academics put to use in their efforts at international reconciliation abroad, and the presentation of theoretical physics at home

Facing the fourth foreign fighters wave: what drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the Belgian case

Exactly one year ago, the first edition of this Egmont Paper was released. Its aim was to explore the wider circumstances that could help explain the decision of thousands of, mostly young, European volunteers to journey to a faraway war theatre in the Levant. This Egmont Paper is a thoroughly revised, updated and expanded version. Several new features have been introduced. It proposes, firstly, a more systematic attempt at understanding why people with different social backgrounds feel attracted by IS, also known by its Arabic acronym Daesh. Two categories of Syria travellers (a more general term than ‘foreign fighters’) can be identified. For a first group comprises pre-existing kinship and friendship gangs. For them, joining IS is merely a shift to another form of deviant behaviour, next to membership of street gangs, rioting, drug trafficking, and juvenile delinquency. But it adds and opens a thrilling, bigger-than-life dimension to their way of life – indeed transforming them from delinquents without a future into mujahedeen with a cause. Whereas most individuals of the first group are known to the police, this is not necessarily the case for the second group. Before suddenly deciding to leave for Syria, the youngsters in this group didn’t show any sign of deviant behaviour and nothing seemed to distinguish them from their peers. But frequently they refer to the absence of a future, to personal difficulties they faced in their everyday life, to feelings of exclusion and absence of belonging, as if they didn’t have a stake in society. They are often solitary, isolated adolescents, frequently at odds with family and friends, in search of belonging and a cause to embrace. At a certain point, the succession of such estrangements resulted in anger. The relative share of both groups may differ according to national backgrounds. But, however different in background and motivations, they share common characteristics. Together these constitute the subculture on which IS’ force of attraction thrives. ‘No future’ is the essence of the youth subculture that drives the majority of Syria travellers from the West. The explanation for their decision is found not in how they think, but in how they feel. Going to Syria is an escape from an everyday life seemingly without prospects. Vulnerability, frustration, perceptions of inequity, and a feeling that by traveling to Syria they have nothing to lose and everything to gain, are common traits among both groups. Religion is not of the essence. As of lately, Europol has also begun to acknowledge the declining role of religion in the foreign fighters issue. Religion has systematically decreased as a driver of terrorism as the waves of foreign fighters succeed one another. This is indeed the second new feature of this updated Egmont Paper. On closer examination, the current foreign fighters movement represents the fourth wave of jihadi terrorism, as originally conceived by Marc Sageman in 2008. The first wave fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and became the companions-in-arms of Osama bin Laden. The second wave were often elite expatriates from the Middle East who went to the West to attend universities. Motivated by the suffering of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines, they volunteered to fight in those hotspots. But by 2004–2005, the first two waves of truly global jihadi travellers had reached their limits. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 breathed new life in the decaying jihadi terrorist scene. A new wave of radicals emerged, angered by this invasion. This wave was labelled ‘home-grown’. They entered the jihadi scene through local kinship and friendship bonds, and were often connected to the global context via the internet. By 2008-2010, the third wave too had run its course. The start of the civil war in Syria in 2012 and the emergence of potent jihadi groups in the Levant, in particular IS, once again reinvigorated a waning jihadi movement. It gave rise to a new, fourth wave of militants and wannabe foreign fighters. The fourth wave resembles its immediate predecessor by the local dynamics of the networks. Nowadays too, they are formed among friends and family who have known each other for years. Distinct from the third wave is the opportunity to again link up with one another on the battlefield, as part of a conquering terrorist and insurgent organisation: IS. As a result, technical expertise can again be acquired and skills transferred, in particular training with assault weapons. Just like the preceding waves, the fourth wave of foreign fighters too will ultimately end, mostly for the same reasons as its predecessors. But the time needed to reach this point depends also on the measures we collectively take in reacting to the phenomenon. A final new section in this update deals with these measures. Five policy recommendations are suggested that might effectively contribute to countering the current wave of foreign fighters – and protect a new generation from following suit. Firstly, reframe the debate. Unless we understand how the motivations of the fourth wave foreign fighters essentially derive from a ‘no future’ subculture and not simply from a narrative, prevention will fail. Secondly, focus on tailor-made approaches. One-size-fits-all overall deradicalisation initiatives will be of marginal use. Thirdly, separate the discussion on Islam in Europe from deradicalisation initiatives. The discussion on a ‘European Islam’ is a discussion worth to be held for its own merits, on its own terms, and with Muslims in the lead. It should not be pushed within the deradicalisation framework. Not only will this not work as envisaged, it will also harden positions, corrode an already fragile social fabric, and thus backfire. Fourthly, don’t get terrorized by terrorists. Following the July 2005 bombings in London, the London mayor Ken Livingstone reacted in simple and inclusive terms. Inclusiveness is a tough thing to come by in today’s frenzied debates. Finally, invest in intelligence (for a proper long term perspective) and encourage short-term operational information sharing. Looking for explanations for vicious behaviour doesn’t imply justifying it. The sole responsibility for the violence perpetrated by foreign fighters are the foreign fighters themselves. Each and every person is ultimately accountable for his or her actions. But understanding the context is crucial if one is to devise adequate measures and prevent yet another generation from becoming receptive to the siren songs of extremist political violence

The Cross-Dressing Terrorist, the Malaccan Mouse-Deer, and Indonesian Prison Surveillance: An Examination of Radical Indonesian Islamist Cells and Their Relationship to Prison Indoctrination, Violent Recidivism, and State Surveillance

This thesis explores the historical context that has lead Indonesian prisons to be one of the dominant locations for radical Islamic indoctrination in the archipelago. Through an exploration of several key historical stories and events, from Islams\u27 introduction to the region to the current ramifications of bombings and riots, I conclude the most viable solution to prevent further violence is the incorporation of surveillance technology within prisons

Review: Government Policy against Former Followers of International Terrorist Organizations

The purpose of this study is to analyze the legal status of citizenship of ex ISIS and analyze government policies and compare the implementation of policies with other countries. The author uses library research methods , techniques and deductive approaches , to analyze cases and regulatory problems in various phenomena . Legal information is obtained from primary, secondary, and tertiary sources. In this paper, the author applies the theory of state ownership, state responsibility, and citizens. The results of the study found that citizenship status is a fundamental right for everyone . This right cannot be exercised without a state legal framework, and the state must consider the consequences of revocation of citizenship as long as citizens want to return to being good citizens and loyal to the state. The state must protect the basic rights of individuals as regulated by domestic law and international law

The Anchor, Volume 129.19: March 9, 2016

The Anchor began in 1887 and was first issued weekly in 1914. Covering national and campus news alike, Hope College’s student-run newspaper has grown over the years to encompass over two-dozen editors, reporters, and staff. For much of The Anchor\u27s history, the latest issue was distributed across campus each Wednesday throughout the academic school year (with few exceptions). As of Fall 2019 The Anchor has moved to monthly print issues and a more frequently updated website. Occasionally, the volume and/or issue numbering is irregular

Old Myths and New Forms of Orientalism: Gauguin, Toorop, van der Leck, and Mondrian

More than fifty examples of works by Paul Gauguin, Jan Toorop, Bart van der Leck, and Piet Mondrian demonstrate the significant influence of artifacts, newly revealed since the early nineteenth century, from the ancient Orient, that is, Pharaonic Egypt and biblical lands. The individual interest of these artists is analyzed in four monographic chapters, which indicate enough similarities in their interpretation and use of the ancient motifs to constitute a new departure in Orientalism. Their particular approaches bring out as well particular biographical, symbolic, and iconographic insights into their artistic development. As a leading symbolist painter, Gauguin pioneered the revival of sacred art involving old and new myths of Orientalism, which were critical also for Toorop, van der Leck, and Mondrian. Characteristically, all four artists assimilated ancient Oriental artistic conventions as a form of primitivism a return to original purity -- to create radical images about personal and social renewal. The primordial figured also in the narrative and symbolic synthesis of their art. Stylistically, all of their work became more decorative, two-dimensional, and more compatible with the architectural plane; line and color were released from mimetic servitude, and a pictographic aspect was added. Gauguin, Toorop, van der Leck, and Mondrian all integrated ancient Oriental motifs into their work, but each to his own ends. While Gauguin appropriated Achaemenid Persian and Egyptian art, van der Leck studied Egyptian, Assyrian, and Sumerian art, and Toorop and Mondrian relied on Egyptian art. Though Gauguin discussed music as a paradigm in the new art, the musical quality of Egyptian and Assyrian (and even Sumerian) art made a greater impact on the work of the Dutch artists. Likewise, they embraced the social and mural tradition of ancient Oriental art as a model for their own attempts to reintegrate architecture with utopian art. The dissertation has answered my original question regarding the impact of ancient Oriental art on progressive artists at the turn of the century. The project has also brought surprises, in the form of many unexpected connections between artists and other members of the European intelligentsia, which merit further exploration

The creeping blight of Islamophobia in Australia

In the latter months of 2014, following events in faraway Iraq and Syria, Australia responded forcefully at home. The manufactured fear of a terrorist attack resulted in police raids, increased counter‐terrorism legislation and scare campaigns to alert the public to \u27threat\u27. Although Islamophobia rose in Australia after 2001 it has been latent in recent years. It is on the rise again with collateral damage from government measures including verbal and physical attacks on Australian Muslims. Vitriol is also directed at asylum seekers and refugees. Media, government and community discourses converge to promote Islam as dangerous and deviant.  • Linda Briskman is Professor of Human Rights at the Swinburne Institute for Social Research