Mind, Matter, Morals - The Epistemic Condition in Causal Judgment

In this thesis, we explore the role of theory of mind, broadly construed, in peo- ple’s causal reasoning and inferences from causal explanations. While research in causal cognition has acknowledged the influence of agents’ knowledge states on how causal they are judged, the theoretical implications of these findings remain unclear. This thesis aims to provide an empirical and theoretical account of the essential function of epistemic states in causal thinking and inference. In chapter 2, we demonstrate how epistemic states mediate a prominent find- ing in causal cognition research — people’s preference for deviant causal agents. Various studies in causal cognition research find that people have the tendency to attribute increased causality to atypical actions. In a series of experiments, we find that this abnormal causal preference is driven by the epistemic states of the causal agents. In chapter 3, we show more generally what role causal agents’ epistemic states and epistemic actions play for people’s causal judgments. We develop and test an account that integrates epistemic states into counterfactual theories of causation: agents’ epistemic states influence the target of intervention in people’s counterfac- tual reasoning. In chapter 4, we investigate whether other people’s epistemic states not only influence causal judgments, but also play a role for the inferences we draw from their causal explanations. In sum, this thesis shows how people take into account the mental states of an agent in both causal judgment and inference. We situate these findings in the broader context of causal and counterfactual theories

Causal judgments about atypical actions are influenced by agents' epistemic states

A prominent finding in causal cognition research is people’s tendency to attribute increased causality to atypical actions. If two agents jointly cause an outcome (conjunctive causation), but differ in how frequently they have performed the causal action before, people judge the atypically acting agent to have caused the outcome to a greater extent. In this paper, we argue that it is the epistemic state of an abnormally acting agent, rather than the abnormality of their action, that is driving people's causal judgments. Given the predictability of the normally acting agent's behaviour, the abnormal agent is in a better position to foresee the consequences of their action. We put this hypothesis to test in four experiments. In Experiment 1, we show that people judge the atypical agent as more causal than the normally acting agent, but also judge the atypical agent to have an epistemic advantage. In Experiment 2, we find that people do not judge a causal difference if no epistemic advantage for the abnormal agent arises. In Experiment 3, we replicate these findings in a scenario in which the abnormal agent's epistemic advantage generalises to a novel context. In Experiment 4, we extend these findings to mental states more broadly construed and develop a Bayesian network model that predicts the degree of outcome-oriented mental states based on action normality and epistemic states. We find that people infer mental states like desire and intention to a greater extent from abnormal behaviour when this behaviour is accompanied by an epistemic advantage. We discuss these results in light of current theories and research on people's preference for abnormal causes

Students\u27 Scientific Evaluations of Water Resources

Socially-relevant and controversial topics, such as water issues, are subject to differences in the explanations that scientists and the public (herein, students) find plausible. Students need to be more evaluative of the validity of explanations (e.g., explanatory models) based on evidence when addressing such topics. We compared two activities where students weighed connections between lines of evidence and explanations. In one activity, students were given four evidence statements and two models (one scientific and one non-scientific alternative); in the other, students chose four out of eight evidence statements and three models (two scientific and one non-scientific). Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that both activities engaged students\u27 evaluations and differentially shifted students\u27 plausibility judgments and knowledge. A structural equation model suggested that students\u27 evaluation may influence post-instructional plausibility and knowledge; when students chose their lines of evidence and explanatory models, their evaluations were deeper, with stronger shifts toward a scientific stance and greater levels of post-instructional knowledge. The activities may help to develop students\u27 critical evaluation skills, a scientific practice that is key to understanding both scientific content and science as a process. Although effect sizes were modest, the results provided critical information for the final development and testing stage of these water resource instructional activities

OPTIMIZING HYBRIDISM: A CRITIQUE OF NATURALIST, NORMATIVIST AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS OF DISEASE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE

This dissertation represents an investigative critique of the philosophical approaches to defining health and disease, going beyond pure conceptual analysis and straight into historical-philosophical analysis in an attempt to unpack the very discourse which underpins the discussion. Drawing on the notion of language as a medium of social instruction, it problematizes various specific features of the debate’s intellectual format, for example pointing out that its preoccupation with linguistic precision ought to be replaced with a focus on expressing the complex multidimensional nature of disease in a relatable manner. After presenting evidence of clinical reasoning’s inherent susceptibility to bias, the thesis exposes naturalism’s historical roots as an ideologically driven counter-reaction to nineteenth century vitalism, thereby discrediting the ideal of neutrality. Despite this skeptical start, it rejects eliminativist positions that philosophical attempts to produce health/disease definitions are pointless and unnecessary, and argues that the debate needs to be maintained due to such discussions’ important implications for medical and social identities, patient narratives, the negotiation of treatment objectives, or even the effectiveness of public health programmes (as a population’s inclination to comply with state-mandated public health measures is directly influenced by the notions it holds about health and disease). This is followed by an exploration of the conceptual limitations faced by the most commonly applied strategies of defining disease, after which their advantages are re-combined in an optimized hybrid account of disease supported by a philosophical distinction between the categories of ‘symptoms’ and ‘clinical signs’. Finally, this account is tested on a wide range of problematic cases, to ensure its capacity to deliver the promised results whilst also overcoming challenging influences such as the ones posed by bias, discursively shaped diagnostic labels, or unwarranted pathologization

Responsibility Internalism and Responsibility for AI

I argue for responsibility internalism. That is, moral responsibility (i.e., accountability, or being apt for praise or blame) depends only on factors internal to agents. Employing this view, I also argue that no one is responsible for what AI does but this isn’t morally problematic in a way that counts against developing or using AI. Responsibility is grounded in three potential conditions: the control (or freedom) condition, the epistemic (or awareness) condition, and the causal responsibility condition (or consequences). I argue that causal responsibility is irrelevant for moral responsibility, and that the control condition and the epistemic condition depend only on factors internal to agents. Moreover, since what AI does is at best a consequence of our actions, and the consequences of our actions are irrelevant to our responsibility, no one is responsible for what AI does. That is, the so-called responsibility gap exits. However, this isn’t morally worrisome for developing or using AI. Firstly, I argue, current AI doesn’t generate a new kind of concern about responsibility that the older technologies don’t. Then, I argue that responsibility gap is not worrisome because neither responsibility gap, nor my argument for its existence, entails that no one can be justly punished, held accountable, or incurs duties in reparations when AI causes a harm

Knowledge and Content: A Theory of Interpretation

This thesis proposes a new theory of content: optimizing dispositions to know. According to this theory, the correct interpretation of an agent is that on which they are best disposed to know. It is a development of the Interpretationist tradition, surveyed in Chapter 1, and especially of the recent work of Robert Williams, discussed in Chapter 2, and Timothy Williamson, discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 explains the theory and argues that it combines the strengths and mitigates the weaknesses found in the ideas of Williams and Williamson. Chapter 5 explains how it delivers plausible verdicts across a range of edge cases, including BIV cases (5.A), Swampman cases (5.B), and a new ‘Vatbrain’ case combining features from both of these more traditional examples (5.C). Finally, Chapter 6 argues that focusing only on belief, and not action, leaves the theory at no disadvantage against rationality-maximizing views, either in general (6.A) or with respect to moral terms and concepts (6.B)

Mood and motivation in shopping behaviour

This thesis is concerned with the motivation of shopping behaviour. The main aim of the research is to examine internal factors that influence a person's motivation, with specific focus on how consumers' shopping goals and mood states prior to a retail encounter affect their in-store behaviour and the outcomes of the activity in terms of goal attainment and evaluations of the retail outlet. The conceptual basis for the research is provided by theories of goal-directed behaviour, which assume that people are purposive in their behaviour and that there is a synergistic relationship between cognition and motivation (Ratneshwar, 1995; Pervin, 1989). Two complementary perspectives on the motivational role of mood are linked into this conceptualisation: one that emphasises the role of associative cognitive networks and proposes that mood serves to regulate goal-directed behaviour by altering goal-relevant thought and perception (Gardner, 1985; Isen, 1984); the other that postulates that mood is a biopsychological phenomenon that registers the availability of personal resources given near-term demands and alters goal-relevant thought, perception, and motivation in accordance with this (Morris, forthcoming; Batson et al., 1992; Thayer, 1989). In order to examine the motivation of shopping behaviour, an investigation was carried out amongst visitors to craft fairs in Scotland. The research adopted a quantitative approach. The data collection was driven by five main research hypotheses and involved asking consumers to complete two parts of a questionnaire: the first part was filled in upon their arrival at the craft fair and the second part was completed just before their departure. In this way, data on the progression of goal-directed behaviour over the course of a shopping episode was captured. The main findings of the research were that: a) individuals' mood states prior to the retail encounter influenced consumers' levels of commitment to shopping goals, although the importance of mood state varied depending on the type of shopping goal in question; b) types of behaviour exhibited in the course of shopping were influenced by the types of goals that consumers identified to be important to them upon arriving at the craft fair and there was some evidence that individuals' mood states moderated the effects of their goals on their in-store behaviour; c) attainment of shopping goals was dependent on whether the relevant goals were specified as important prior to the retail encounter and in-store behaviour. Mixed evidence was obtained on the role of mood as a factor that moderates the effects of commitment to goals on attainment of goals. d) attainment of shopping goals was partly responsible for the change in a person's mood state between entering and leaving the craft fair; e) retail outcomes in terms of consumers' enjoyment of the retail encounter, their preference for and intentions to patronise the retail outlet in the future were influenced by consumers' evaluations of the extent to which they had attained their shopping goals and their mood state following the shopping episode. One of the main implications of the research is that a view of consumers as purposive in their shopping activities makes a useful contribution to the understanding of shopping behaviour and how repeat patronage can be encouraged. As far as retailers are concerned, there is a need to understand what goals consumers have in mind when they visit a store and how to facilitate behaviour directed towards the attainment of those goals in order that consumers evaluate the shopping activity as successful and leave with favourable impressions of the store. In addition, attempts to locate in an environment that helps to boost the resources that contribute to mood, rather than draining them, and to smooth the way for goal-directed shopping activities may also increase repeat patronage and ultimately customer loyalty to retailers

The Role of Normal Development in Experimental Embryology

This thesis presents an examination of the notion of ‘normal development’ and its role in biological research. It centres on a detailed historical analysis of the experimental embryological work of the American biologist Edmund Beecher Wilson in the early-1890s. My analysis establishes the centrality of the concept of normal development to the way experimental systems are produced and reproduced, and to how attributions of causality which arise from experimental work are made.This thesis presents an examination of the notion of ‘normal development’ and its role in biological research. It centres on a detailed historical analysis of the experimental embryological work of the American biologist Edmund Beecher Wilson in the early-1890s. Normal development is a fundamental concept in biology, which underpins and facilitates experimental work investigating the processes of organismal development. Concepts of the normal and normality in biology (and medicine) have been fruitfully examined by philosophers. Yet, despite being constantly used and invoked by developmental biologists, the concept of normal development has not been subject to substantial philosophical attention. In this thesis I analyse how the concept of normal development is produced and used in experimental systems, and use this analysis to probe its theoretical and methodological significance. I focus on normal development as a technical condition in experimental practice. In doing so I highlight the work that is required to create and sustain both it and the work that it enables. Variation between embryos can cause problems for scientists trying to produce valid and comparable results. In my study of Wilson’s work, I examine how the practices associated with normal development deal with the variation between embryos. In the 1890s, Wilson became increasingly interested in which causes were responsible for the processes of differentiation (the production of different cells and organs) and determination in the process of embryonic development. He performed a series of experiments on the marine invertebrate Amphioxus, which exhibits considerable variability in early development (Wilson, 1893a). Wilson carefully observed his samples and outlined a normal development based on them, which included a considerable range of variation. How Wilson treated variation was reflected in the different way in which he conceived of the process of development compared to other prominent embryologists, such as Hans Driesch and Wilhelm Roux. 4 Having introduced and assessed normal development, I use two analytical approaches to make further sense of it. Furthermore, these approaches identify why appreciating the role of normal development enables us to understand important aspects of scientific practice, such as experimental methodology and making causal attributions based on the results of experimental manipulations. The two main analytical approaches I use are James Woodward’s manipulationist theory of causation (Woodward, 2003 and 2010), and Hans- Jörg Rheinberger’s experimental systems approach (Rheinberger, 1997). The former assesses the factors involved in assessing proposed causal factors, rather than simply demarcating between causes and non-causes. The latter focuses on the way experimental set-ups are configured by scientists in ongoing series of experiments to frame phenomena of interest: “epistemic objects”. My analysis establishes the centrality of the concept of normal development to the way experimental systems are produced and reproduced, and to how attributions of causality which arise from experimental work are made

Knowledge and legal proof between modality and explanation

Dissertation outline: I begin my dissertation by charting and assessing two competing approaches to theorise about the nature of knowledge – modalism and explanationism. According to the former, knowledge equates with a belief which is true in a relevant set of possible worlds; according to the latter, knowledge is a matter of believing the truth on the basis of the right explanation. When it comes to the competition between modalism and explanationism in traditional epistemology, I reject explanationism and I endorse modalism: I move novel objections against the most recent explanationist account of knowledge and I develop a novel version of modalism. This new version of modalism consists of a different safety condition which is informed by the etiological theory of functions made popular in the philosophy of biology. I argue that it does better than both extant versions of modalism and extant versions of explanationism. I then move on to the contrast between modalism and explanationism in the context of applied legal epistemology. By emphasising a few structural connections between knowledge and legal proof, epistemologists have moved quite freely from a modalist account of knowledge to a modalist account of legal proof. A case in point is Duncan Pritchard, who proposes a modal condition for knowledge (safety) and then extends it to legal standards of proof. On this second issue, I see things differently: in legal epistemology, I endorse explanationism and I reject modalism. Accordingly, I object to influential modal accounts of legal proof and I offer an alternative explanationist account. I develop an account of legal proof as an inference to the best contrastive explanation: by drawing on up-to-date literature on abductive reasoning in the philosophy of science, I bring into focus hitherto unappreciated connections between the nature of legal proof and the structure of scientific explanation. The final upshot is a well-informed account of legal proof which does away with modal conditions and better captures the nature of juridical proof. My dissertation advances two closely related debates by emphasising a neat separation between modalism and explanationism: while the former is the right approach to theorise about the nature of knowledge, only the latter can provide a satisfactory account of legal proof. Such separation offers a new picture of the relationship between knowledge and legal proof, and it provides new insights into several debates at the intersection of traditional and applied legal epistemology