18,943 research outputs found
Making metaethics work for AI: realism and anti-realism
Engineering an artificial intelligence to play an advisory role in morally charged decision making will inevitably introduce meta-ethical positions into the design. Some of these positions, by informing the design and operation of the AI, will introduce risks. This paper offers an analysis of these potential risks along the realism/anti-realism dimension in metaethics and reveals that realism poses greater risks, but, on the other hand, anti-realism undermines the motivation for engineering a moral AI in the first place
Theory of Robot Communication: II. Befriending a Robot over Time
In building on theories of Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC), Human-Robot
Interaction, and Media Psychology (i.e. Theory of Affective Bonding), the
current paper proposes an explanation of how over time, people experience the
mediated or simulated aspects of the interaction with a social robot. In two
simultaneously running loops, a more reflective process is balanced with a more
affective process. If human interference is detected behind the machine,
Robot-Mediated Communication commences, which basically follows CMC
assumptions; if human interference remains undetected, Human-Robot
Communication comes into play, holding the robot for an autonomous social
actor. The more emotionally aroused a robot user is, the more likely they
develop an affective relationship with what actually is a machine. The main
contribution of this paper is an integration of Computer-Mediated
Communication, Human-Robot Communication, and Media Psychology, outlining a
full-blown theory of robot communication connected to friendship formation,
accounting for communicative features, modes of processing, as well as
psychophysiology.Comment: Hoorn, J. F. (2018). Theory of robot communication: II. Befriending a
robot over time. arXiv:cs, 2502572(v1), 1-2
Chief Justice Robots
Say an AI program someday passes a Turing test, because it can con-verse in a way indistinguishable from a human. And say that its develop-ers can then teach it to converse—and even present an extended persua-sive argument—in a way indistinguishable from the sort of human we call a “lawyer.” The program could thus become an AI brief-writer, ca-pable of regularly winning brief-writing competitions against human lawyers.
Once that happens (if it ever happens), this Essay argues, the same technology can be used to create AI judges, judges that we should accept as no less reliable (and more cost-effective) than human judges. If the software can create persuasive opinions, capable of regularly winning opinion-writing competitions against human judges—and if it can be adequately protected against hacking and similar attacks—we should in principle accept it as a judge, even if the opinions do not stem from human judgment
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