Societal constitutionalism : alternatives to state-centred constitutional theory

Englische Fassung: Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-centred Constitutional theory? ("Storrs Lectures 2003/04" Yale Law School) In: Christian Joerges, Inge-Johanne Sand und Gunther Teubner (Hg.) Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance. Hart, Oxford 2004, 3-28. Und in: Ius et Lex 2004, S.31-50. Französische Fassung: Constitutionalisme sociétal et globalisation: Alternatives à la théorie constitutionelle centrée sur l'État. Themis 2005 (im Erscheinen) Italienische Fassung: Costituzionalismo societario: alternative alla teoria costituzionale stato-centrica. In: Gunther Teubner, Costituzionalismo societario. Armando, Roma 2005 (im Erscheinen). Spanische Fassung: Globalización y constitucionalismo social: alternativas a la teoría constitucionalista centrada en el Estado". In: Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez (Hg.), Teoría de sistemas y Derecho penal: Fundamentos y posibilidades de aplicación. Granada: Comares, 2005 (im Erscheinen) und in: Cancio Meliá und Bacigalupo Saggese (Hg.) Derecho penal y política transnacional. Barcelona: Atelier, 2005 (in Erscheinen)und in: Gunther Teubner, El Derecho como sistema autopoiético de la sociedad global, herausgegeben von Carlos Gómez-Jara Diez. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2005 (im Erscheinen) und Lima: ARA Editores, 2005 (im Erscheinen) Polnische Fassung: Konstytucjonalizm spoleczny: Alternatywy dla teorii konstitucyjnej nakierowanej na panstwo. Ius et Lex 3, 2004, S.5-27

Cybersecurity: mapping the ethical terrain

This edited collection examines the ethical trade-offs involved in cybersecurity: between security and privacy; individual rights and the good of a society; and between the types of burdens placed on particular groups in order to protect others. Foreword Governments and society are increasingly reliant on cyber systems. Yet the more reliant we are upon cyber systems, the more vulnerable we are to serious harm should these systems be attacked or used in an attack. This problem of reliance and vulnerability is driving a concern with securing cyberspace. For example, a ‘cybersecurity’ team now forms part of the US Secret Service. Its job is to respond to cyber-attacks in specific environments such as elevators in a building that hosts politically vulnerable individuals, for example, state representatives. Cybersecurity aims to protect cyberinfrastructure from cyber-attacks; the concerning aspect of the threat from cyber-attack is the potential for serious harm that damage to cyber-infrastructure presents to resources and people. These types of threats to cybersecurity might simply target information and communication systems: a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on a government website does not harm a website in any direct way, but prevents its normal use by stifling the ability of users to connect to the site. Alternatively, cyber-attacks might disrupt physical devices or resources, such as the Stuxnet virus, which caused the malfunction and destruction of Iranian nuclear centrifuges. Cyber-attacks might also enhance activities that are enabled through cyberspace, such as the use of online media by extremists to recruit members and promote radicalisation. Cyber-attacks are diverse: as a result, cybersecurity requires a comparable diversity of approaches. Cyber-attacks can have powerful impacts on people’s lives, and so—in liberal democratic societies at least—governments have a duty to ensure cybersecurity in order to protect the inhabitants within their own jurisdiction and, arguably, the people of other nations. But, as recent events following the revelations of Edward Snowden have demonstrated, there is a risk that the governmental pursuit of cybersecurity might overstep the mark and subvert fundamental privacy rights. Popular comment on these episodes advocates transparency of government processes, yet given that cybersecurity risks represent major challenges to national security, it is unlikely that simple transparency will suffice. Managing the risks of cybersecurity involves trade-offs: between security and privacy; individual rights and the good of a society; and types of burdens placed on particular groups in order to protect others. These trade-offs are often ethical trade-offs, involving questions of how we act, what values we should aim to promote, and what means of anticipating and responding to the risks are reasonably—and publicly—justifiable. This Occasional Paper (prepared for the National Security College) provides a brief conceptual analysis of cybersecurity, demonstrates the relevance of ethics to cybersecurity and outlines various ways in which to approach ethical decision-making when responding to cyber-attacks

Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice

The term dual-use characterizes technologies that can have both military and civilian applications. What is the state of current efforts to control the spread of these powerful technologies—nuclear, biological, cyber—that can simultaneously advance social and economic well-being and also be harnessed for hostile purposes? What have previous efforts to govern, for example, nuclear and biological weapons taught us about the potential for the control of these dual-use technologies? What are the implications for governance when the range of actors who could cause harm with these technologies include not just national governments but also non-state actors like terrorists? These are some of the questions addressed by Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice, the new publication released today by the Global Nuclear Future Initiative of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The publication's editor is Elisa D. Harris, Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. Governance of Dual-Use Technologies examines the similarities and differences between the strategies used for the control of nuclear technologies and those proposed for biotechnology and information technology. The publication makes clear the challenges concomitant with dual-use governance. For example, general agreement exists internationally on the need to restrict access to technologies enabling the development of nuclear weapons. However, no similar consensus exists in the bio and information technology domains. The publication also explores the limitations of military measures like deterrence, defense, and reprisal in preventing globally available biological and information technologies from being misused. Some of the other questions explored by the publication include: What types of governance measures for these dual-use technologies have already been adopted? What objectives have those measures sought to achieve? How have the technical characteristics of the technology affected governance prospects? What have been the primary obstacles to effective governance, and what gaps exist in the current governance regime? Are further governance measures feasible? In addition to a preface from Global Nuclear Future Initiative Co-Director Robert Rosner (University of Chicago) and an introduction and conclusion from Elisa Harris, Governance of Dual-Use Technologiesincludes:On the Regulation of Dual-Use Nuclear Technology by James M. Acton (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)Dual-Use Threats: The Case of Biotechnology by Elisa D. Harris (University of Maryland)Governance of Information Technology and Cyber Weapons by Herbert Lin (Stanford University

The future of Cybersecurity in Italy: Strategic focus area

This volume has been created as a continuation of the previous one, with the aim of outlining a set of focus areas and actions that the Italian Nation research community considers essential. The book touches many aspects of cyber security, ranging from the definition of the infrastructure and controls needed to organize cyberdefence to the actions and technologies to be developed to be better protected, from the identification of the main technologies to be defended to the proposal of a set of horizontal actions for training, awareness raising, and risk management

East Lancashire Research 2008

East Lancashire Research 200

False Comfort from Nuclear Analogies : How International Trade Restrictions Apply to Cyberspace

This thesis evaluates the international legal framework of trade restrictions in the context of cyberspace. Certain cyber goods are recognized as dual-use goods based on their potential military applications. Thereby, the existing legal framework for governing the trade of sensitive goods is extended analogically to apply to cyber goods. The first research question presented in this paper is whether international law includes a legal basis for using trade policy as a measure for security governance in cyberspace. To answer this research question, the paper evaluates how security interests are regarded in trade policy. This evaluation is conducted by analysing the nature of security interests with the constructivist method and reviewing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with the de lege lata approach. The second research question evaluates whether trade policy is a suitable model for governing threats in the cyberspace. This research question covers the evaluation of existing non-proliferation focused trade policies, mainly the Wassenaar Arrangement, and grounds for applying the same approach to cyber goods. This evaluation also includes observing the nature of cyber goods and the cyber goods industry with a socio-legal method. Dual-use nuclear goods are used as a reference point in a comparison between cyber goods and conventional dual-use goods. The purpose of the thesis is to examine the implications of applying trade policy as a security measure in cyberspace. The choice of extending an existing legal framework instead of establishing a separate framework specifically for cyberspace may have a broader impact on the legal status of cyberspace. The paper evaluates whether the current legal approach to governing dual-use cyber goods takes into account the nature of cyberspace in an adequate manner. This paper concludes that international trade law provides a legal basis for imposing trade restrictions for cyber goods based on security interests. However, the analogical extension of the non-proliferation focused trade policy framework does not fully adapt to the nature of cyber goods and the cyber goods industry. Thereby, the current model for the governance of dual-use cyber goods may result in negative effects in the industry by restricting trade without providing equivalent benefit in the form of decreasing cyber risks. The possible solutions proposed based on the research conducted in this paper include incorporating views and practices of private sector stakeholders as an essential input in any regulation related to cyberspace, establishing a separate cyber convention for properly defining the legal status of cyberspace, and promoting global initiatives for cyber resilience

Future Implications of Emerging Disruptive Technologies on Weapons of Mass Destruction

This report asks the questions: What are the future implications of Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) on the future of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) warfare? How might EDTs increase the lethality and effectiveness of WMDs in kinetic warfare in 2040? How can civic leaders and public servants prepare for and mitigate projected threats? Problem  In the coming decade, state and non-state adversaries will use EDTs to attack systems and populations that may initiate and accelerate existing geopolitical conflict escalation. EDTs are expected to be used both in the initial attack or escalation as well as a part of the detection and decision-making process. Due to the speed of EDTs, expected confusion, and common lack of human oversight, attacks will also be incorrectly attributed, which has the capacity to escalate rapid geopolitical conflict to global military conflict, and ultimately, to the use of nuclear WMDs. The use of EDTs in the shadow of nuclear WMDs is also expected to create an existential threat to possible adversaries, pushing them to “lower the bar” of acceptability for using nuclear WMDs. EDTs will enable and embolden insider threats, both willing and unknowing, to effect geopolitical conflict on a global scale. In addition, the combination of multiple EDTs when used together for attacks will create WMD effects on populations and governments. Furthermore, EDTs will be used by adversaries to target and destabilize critical infrastructure systems, such as food, energy, and transportation, etc. that will have a broader effect on populations and governments. EDTs will enable adversaries to perpetrate a long-game attack, where the effect and attribution of the attack may not be detected for an extended period -- if ever. Solution  To combat these future threats, organizations will need to conduct research and intelligence gathering paired with exploratory research and development to better understand the state of EDTs and their potential impacts. With this information, organizations will need to conduct collaborative “wargaming” and planning to explore a range of possible and potential threats of EDTs. The knowledge gained from all of these activities will inform future training and best practices to prepare for and address these threats. Organizations will also need to increase their investments in EDT related domains, necessitating countries to not only change how they fight, but also evolve their thinking about deterrence. Expanded regulation, policy making, and political solidarity among members will take on an increasingly more significant and expanded role. Broader government, military, and civilian cooperation will be needed to disrupt and mitigate some of these future threats in conjunction with broader public awareness. All of these actions will place a higher value on cooperation and shared resiliency among NATO members