50,112 research outputs found
An Improved Two-Party Negotiation Over Continues Issues Method Secure Against Manipulatory Behavior
This contribution focuses on two-party negotiation over continuous issues. We
firstly prove two drawbacks of the jointly Improving Direction Method (IDM),
namely that IDM is not a Strategy-Proof (SP) nor an Information Concealing (IC)
method. Thus we prove that the concurrent lack of these two properties implies
the actual non-efficiency of IDM. Finally we propose a probabilistic method
which is both IC and stochastically SP thus leading to efficient settlements
without being affected by manipulatory behaviors
Efficient Methods for Automated Multi-Issue Negotiation: Negotiating over a Two-Part Tariff
In this article, we consider the novel approach of a seller and customer negotiating bilaterally about a two-part tariff, using autonomous software agents. An advantage of this approach is that win-win opportunities can be generated while keeping the problem of preference elicitation as simple as possible. We develop bargaining strategies that software agents can use to conduct the actual bilateral negotiation on behalf of their owners. We present a decomposition of bargaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto-efficient-search methods: Concession and Pareto-search strategies focus on the conceding and win-win aspect of bargaining, respectively. An important technical contribution of this article lies in the development of two Pareto-search methods. Computer experiments show, for various concession strategies, that the respective use of these two Pareto-search methods by the two negotiators results in very efficient bargaining outcomes while negotiators concede the amount specified by their concession strategy
Applications of negotiation theory to water issues
The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to waterrelated issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising the"rules of the game"that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource.Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Water and Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Conservation
Applications of negotiation theory to water issues
The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues – which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that of, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the “rules of the game” that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the key remaining gaps in the literature.Negotiation theory, Bragaining, Coalitions, Fairness, Agreements
On the Actual Inefficiency of Efficient Negotiation Methods
In this contribution we analyze the effect that mutual information has on the
actual performance of efficient negotiation methods. Specifically, we start by
proposing the theoretical notion of Abstract Negotiation Method (ANM) as a map
from the negotiation domain in itself, for any utility profile of the parties.
ANM can face both direct and iterative negotiations, since we show that ANM
class is closed under the limit operation. The generality of ANM is proven by
showing that it captures a large class of well known in literature negotiation
methods. Hence we show that if mutual information is assumed then any Pareto
efficient ANM is manipulable by one single party or by a collusion of few of
them. We concern about the efficiency of the resulting manipulation. Thus we
find necessarily and sufficient conditions those make manipulability equivalent
to actual inefficiency, meaning that the manipulation implies a change of the
efficient frontier so the Pareto efficient ANM converges to a different, hence
actually inefficient, frontier. In particular we distinguish between strong and
weak actual inefficiency. Where, the strong actual inefficiency is a drawback
which is not possible to overcome of the ANMs, like the Pareto invariant one,
so its negotiation result is invariant for any two profiles of utility sharing
the same Pareto frontier, we present. While the weak actual inefficiency is a
drawback of any mathematical theorization on rational agents which constrain in
a particular way their space of utility functions. For the weak actual
inefficiency we state a principle of Result's Inconsistency by showing that to
falsify theoretical hypotheses is rational for any agent which is informed
about the preference of the other, even if the theoretical assumptions, which
constrain the space of agents' utilities, are exact in the reality, i.e. the
preferences of each single agent are well modeled
Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues
The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues – which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that to, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the “rules of the game” that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the key remaining gaps in the literature.Negotiation theory, Water, Agreeements, Stochasticity, Stakeholders
CONSTRUCTION PARTNERING: MOVING TOWARDS THE RATIONALISATION FOR A DOMINANT PARADIGM
This paper critically reviews seminal literature on ‘traditional’ and non-market partnering exchanges, in order to identify core congruent issues, drivers and agents of change. It draws out a number of key themes to better understand why the construction industry has remained relatively unchanged; even though successive reports have tried to rectify the industry’s challenges. Acknowledging that there is no one clear definition, strategy or template for the effective implementation of partnering, findings from extant literature highlight eight dominant drivers deemed integral to augmenting project performance and profitability. So, whilst the construction industry invariably conducts its business with a smaller ratio of strategic partnerships than commonly believed, and accepting buyer dominance has predominantly remained, it is advocated that there is an exigent need to disentangle the project partnering initiative through some form of deterministic model. The case for this is presented through a relationship schema that maps the fabric, reliance and drivers for partnering success
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