33,091 research outputs found

    The EVF Model: A Novel Framework for Understanding Gambling and, by Extension, Poker

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    There are several senses in which the term gambling is used. All have liabilities, problems that have muddied the waters in scientific research, generated conflicting legal decisions, compromised debates over ethical and moral issues, and have led to uneven legislation. Here, a novel framework for the term is offered, based on two continuous variables: a) the Expected Value (EV) of any arbitrary game and, b) the inherent Flexibility (F) of that game. This EVF model produces a classification system for all the enterprises that can or have been called gambling. It is one that allows for more measured decisions to be made and provides a more coherent platform on which to deliberate the many significant issues that have been raised over the years. It also permits a sensible answer to the question of the nature of games like the stock market, opening a small business, and especially, poker

    Everyday gambling in New Zealand

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    There is a sizeable body of statistics on gambling in New Zealand which points albeit unintentionally - to the everyday status of this activity. Max Abbott and Rachel Volberg, two leading figures in the rapidly growing discipline of gambling studies, note that in 15 short years there have been no less than seven surveys on gambling in New Zealand (not including a large number of university theses). These include three assessments of people's participation in gambling by the Department of Internal Affairs, plus two surveys funded by the department focusing on problem gambling. To these can be added one conducted by a regional health authority, North Health, under contract to the Committee on Problem Gambling Management and one conducted on behalf of the Casino Control Authority. This much research on gambling should suggest to the reader that there is something about gambling that piques the interest of government bureaucrats and agencies. Here the frequency of the phrase `problem gambling' is the giveaway. In this section we will review some of the findings of this research and cover its more pathological rationale later

    Skill Signaling, Prospect Theory, and Regret Theory

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    When a risky decision involves both skill and chance, success or failure is a signal of the decision maker's skill. Adopting standard models from the career concerns literature, we show that a rational desire to avoid looking unskilled may help explain several anomalies associated with prospect theory, including probability weighting, loss aversion, and framing. Prospect theory's four-fold pattern of probability weighting predicts that decision makers favor long-shots, avoid near sure-things, buy insurance against unlikely losses, and take risky chances to win back large losses. We find that this pattern emerges because winning a gamble with a low probability of success is a strong signal of skill, while losing a gamble with a high probability of success is a strong signal of incompetence. Regarding loss aversion, a fear of looking inept provides an alternative explanation for the puzzle of why people are so risk averse for small gambles. Such behavior can arise because losing any gamble, even a "friendly bet" with little or no money at stake, reflects poorly on the decision maker's skill. Finally, we find that framing affects choices because different formulations of a question provide different information about how a decision maker's actions will be interpreted. While the theoretical predictions of skill signaling closely parallel those of prospect theory, they differ in some cases, allowing for tests between the theories. The theoretical predictions are also closely related to, but distinguishable from, those of regret theory.prospect theory; regret theory; probability weighting; loss aversion; framing

    Cumulative prospect theory and gambling

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    Whilst Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT) provides an explanation of gambling on longshots at actuarially unfair odds, it cannot explain why people might bet on more favoured outcomes. This paper shows that this is explicable if the degree of loss aversion experienced by the agent is reduced for small-stake gambles (as a proportion of wealth), and probability distortions are greater over losses than gains. If the utility or value function is assumed to be bounded, the degree of loss aversion assumed by Kahneman and Tversky leads to absurd predictions, reminiscent of those pointed out by Rabin (2000), of refusal to accept infinite gain bets at low probabilities. Boundedness of the value function in CPT implies that the indifference curve between expected-return and win-probability will typically exhibit both an asymptote (implying rejection of an infinite gain bet) and a minimum at low probabilities, as the shape of the value function dominates the probability weighting function. Also the high probability section of the indifference curve will exhibit a maximum. These implications are consistent with outcomes observed in gambling markets.

    Information and Attitudes to Risk at the Track

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    Abstract There have been many attempts, theoretical and empirical, to explain the persistence of a favorite-longshot bias in various horse betting markets. Most recently, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) have shown that the data for the US markets support a misperceptions of probability approach in line with prospect theory over a neoclassical approach of the Quandt (1986) type. However, their paper suffers from two basic difficulties which beset much of this literature. First, the theoretical model used fails to allow for the existence of horse betting markets which either display no such bias (or a reverse bias) as in Hong Kong and at least one large Australian market (Busche and Hall, 1988, Schnytzer, Shilony and Thorne, 2003 and Luppi and Schnytzer, 2008). Second, econometric testing and theoretical modeling are facilitated by the highly unrealistic assumption that the betting population is homogeneous with respect to either information or attitude to risk or (usually) both. Our purpose is to show that allowing for heterogeneous betting populations (in terms of both attitude to risk and access to information) permits the explanation for the different biases (or their absence) observed in different markets within a strictly neoclassical framework of rational bettors. We conclude with empirical support for our model.
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