9,548 research outputs found
An Assessment of the Economic Effects of COFCO
International Relations/Trade,
Corruption and firm behavior
This paper investigates how corruption affects firrm behavior. Firms can engage in two types of corruption when seeking a public service: cost-reducing "collusive" corruption and cost increasing "coercive" corruption. Using an original and unusually rich dataset on bribe payments at ports matched to firrm-level data, we observe how firms respond to each type of corruption by adjusting their shipping and sourcing strategies. "Collusive" corruption is associated with higher usage of the corrupt port, while "coercive" corruption is associated with reduced demand for port services. Our results suggest that firms respond to the opportunities and challenges created by different types of corruption, organizing production in a way that increases or decreases demand for the public service. Understanding how firms respond to corruption has important implications for how we conceptualize, identify and measure the overall impact of corruption on economic activity
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The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications
On June 30, 2007, United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab and South Korean Foreign Trade Minister Kim Hyung-chong signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS FTA would be the largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date and would be the second largest (next to North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA) in which the United States participates. South Korea is the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States and the United States is South Korea’s third largest trading partner. Various studies conclude that the agreement would increase bilateral trade and investment flows.
The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment issues and, therefore, could have wide economic implications for both the United States and South Korea. The KORUS FTA includes issues on which the two countries achieved early agreement, such as the elimination on tariffs on trade in most manufactured goods and the partial liberalization in services trade. The agreement also includes provisions on a number of very sensitive issues, such as autos, agriculture, and trade remedies, on which agreement was reached only during the final hours of negotiations.
If the agreement is to enter into force, Congress will have to approve implementation legislation. The negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that the Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The authority allows the President to enter into trade agreements that receive expedited congressional consideration (no amendments and limited debate). The White House has not indicated when it will send the draft implementing legislation to Congress. (The TPA sets no deadline for the President to do this.)
While a broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the agreement, the KORUS FTA faces opposition from some groups, including some auto and steel manufacturers and labor unions. In addition, the agricultural community and some Members of Congress have withheld support for the agreement until South Korea lifts its restrictions on imports of U.S. beef. Some U.S. supporters view passage of the KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the South Korea market. Opponents claim that the KORUS FTA does not go far enough in opening up the South Korean market and is a lost opportunity to resolve long running concerns about South Korean barriers. Other observers have suggested the outcome of the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a whole.
Differences between the White House and the Democratic leadership in the Congress over the implications of the KORUS FTA have made the timing and even the likelihood of the President’s submission and the Congress’s subsequent consideration of implementing legislation uncertain. This report will be updated as events warrant
Price Discrimination and Fairness Concerns
We analyze the profitability of third degree price discrimination under consideration of consumers' fairness concerns within an experiment and explain the results
within a theoretical framework. We find that with an increase in the price differential negative reciprocal reactions by disadvantaged consumers become stronger compared to positive reciprocal reactions by advantaged consumers.
Consequently, the profit maximizing price differential lies below the one predicted to be optimal by standard theory. Further, profitability increases when consumers who are regarded as poorer are charged lower prices compared to
when the wealth of the different consumer groups is unknown
Working Paper 63 - Trade, Trade Liberalisation and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence
There can be little doubt that, historically, trade has acted as an important engine ofgrowth for countries at different stages of development, not only by contributing to a moreefficient allocation of resources within countries, but also by transmitting growth from onepart of the world to another. There are static and dynamic gains to be had from tradebetween countries but there is nothing in the theory of trade that says that the gains areequitably distributed. Also, there is nothing in the theory of Customs Unions that says thatthe gains from trade will be equitably distributed between members. Indeed, the CustomsUnion as a whole may be welfare-reducing if trade diversion exceeds trade creation. Recentresearch suggests that regional trade agreements, reduce growth and investment, butgeneralised trade liberalisation in the form of unilateral tariff reductions (or the reduction ofnon-tariff barriers to trade) improves growth performance. Export growth relax the balanceof payments constraint on demand by providing the foreign exchange to pay for the importcontent of higher levels of consumption, investment and government expenditure. Mostdeveloping countries are constrained in their growth performance by a shortage of foreignexchange and could therefore grow faster with more exports.
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The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications
[Excerpt] On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean trade officials signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS FTA would be the second-largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date, after the agreement with the European Union (EU). It would be the second-largest (next to North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA) in which the United States participates. South Korea is the seventhlargest trading partner of the United States and the United States is South Korea’s third-largest trading partner.
Various studies conclude that the agreement would increase bilateral trade and investment flows. The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment issues and, therefore, could have substantial economic implications for both the United States and South Korea. The agreement will not enter into force unless Congress approves implementation legislation. The negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210).
Under TPA the President has the discretion on when to submit the implementing legislation to Congress. President Bush did not submit the legislation because of differences with the Democratic leadership over treatment of autos and beef, among other issues. Early in his Administration, President Obama indicated the need to resolve those issues before he would submit the implementing legislation. On December 3, 2010, after a series of arduous negotiations and missed deadlines, President Obama and President Lee announced that their negotiators reached agreement on modifications in the KORUS FTA, and that they were prepared to move ahead to getting the agreement approved by the respective legislatures. The White House is expected to send implementing legislation to the 112th Congress and that it would like to see Congress approve the agreement by July 1 of this year.
The modifications are in the form of changes in phase-out periods for tariffs on autos, a new safeguard provision on autos, and concessions by South Korea on allowing a larger number of U.S. cars into South Korea under U.S. safety standards than was the case under the original KORUS FTA provisions. The issue of full U.S. beef access was not resolved because of the political sensitivity of the issue in South Korea. In 2008, when President Lee reached a separate agreement with the United States to lift South Korea’s ban on U.S. beef imports, massive anti-South Korean government protests forced the two governments to renegotiate its terms. The U.S. beef sector has largely supported the KORUS FTA.
A broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the KORUS FTA . With the modifications in the agreement reached in December, this group also includes the three Detroit-based auto manufacturers and the United Auto Workers (UAW) union. It still faces opposition from some labor unions and other groups, including Public Citizen. Many U.S. supporters view passage of the KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the South Korean market, while opponents claim that the KORUS FTA does not go far enough to break down South Korean trade barriers or that the agreement will encourage U.S. companies to move their production offshore at the expense of U.S. workers. Other observers have suggested the outcome of the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a whole, as well as on U.S. Asia policy and U.S. trade policy, particularly in light of an FTA signed in by South Korea and the EU that is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2011
Liberalizing trade in services : a survey
Since the mid 1980s a substantial amount of research has been undertaken on trade in services. Much of this is inspired by the World Trade Organization or regional trade agreements, especially the European Union, but an increasing number of papers focus on the impacts of services sector liberalization. This paper surveys the literature, focusing on contributions that investigate the determinants of international trade and investment in services, the potential gains from greater trade (and liberalization), and efforts to cooperate to achieve such liberalization through trade agreements. It concludes that there is increasing evidence that services liberalization is an important source of potential welfare gains, but relatively little research has been done that can inform the design of international cooperation-both trade agreements and development assistance-so as to more effectively promote development objectives.Economic Theory&Research,Trade and Services,Free Trade,Transport Economics Policy&Planning,ICT Policy and Strategies
Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias: An Empirical Investigation
Corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce trade. This paper estimates the reduction, using a structural model of import demand in which transactions costs impose a price markup on traded goods. We find that inadequate institutions constrain trade far more than tariffs do. We also find that omitting indexes of institutional quality from the model leads to an underestimate of home bias. Using a broad sample of countries, we find that the traded goods expenditure share declines significantly as income per capita rises, other things equal. Cross-country variation in the effectiveness of institutions offers a simple explanation of the observed global pattern of trade, in which high-income, capital-abundant countries trade disproportionately with one another.
Rethinking International Subsidy Rules. Bertelsmann Working Paper 28/02/2020
Geo-economic tensions and global collective action problems call for international cooperation to revise and de-velop rules to guide both the use of domestic subsidies and responses by governments to cross-border competition spillover effects. Current WTO rules that divide all subsidies into either prohibited or actionable cate-gories are no longer fit for purpose. Piecemeal efforts in preferential trade agreements and bi- or trilateral configurations offer a basis on which to build, but are too narrow in scope and focus. Addressing the spillover ef-fects of subsidies could start with launching a work program at the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO to mobilize an epistemic community concerned with subsidy policies, tasked with building a more solid evidence base on the magnitude, purpose and effects of subsidy policies
The Trade Reducing Effects of Market Power in International Shipping
Developing countries pay substantially higher transportation costs than developed nations, which leads to less trade and perhaps lower incomes. This paper investigates price discrimination in the shipping industry and the role it plays in determining transportation costs. In the presence of market power, shipping prices depend on the demand characteristics of goods being traded. We show theoretically and estimate empirically that shipping firms charge higher prices when transporting goods with higher product prices, lower import demand elasticities, and higher tariffs, and when facing fewer competitors on a trade route. These characteristics explain more variation in shipping prices than do conventional proxies such as distance, and significantly contribute to the higher shipping prices facing the developing world. Markups increase shipping prices by at least 83 percent for the mean shipment in Latin American imports. Our findings are also important for evaluating the impact of tariff liberalization. Shipping firms decrease prices by 1-2 percent for every 1 percent reduction in tariffs.
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