948 research outputs found
Multi-attribute auctions with different types of attributes: Enacting properties in multi-attribute auctions
International audienceMulti-attribute auctions allow agents to sell and purchase goods and services taking into account more attributes besides the price (e.g. service time, tolerances, qualities, etc.). In this paper we analyze attributes involved during the auction process and propose to classify them between verifiable attributes, unverifiable attributes and auctioneer provided attributes. According to this classification we present VMA2, a new Vickrey-based reverse multi-attribute auction mechanism which, taking into account the different types of attributes involved in the auction, allows the auction customization in order to suit the auctioneer needs. On the one hand, the use of auctioneer provided attributes enables the inclusion of different auction concepts such as social welfare, trust or robustness whilst, on the other hand, the use of verifiable attributes guarantee truthful bidding. The paper exemplifies the behaviour of VMA2 describing how an egalitarian allocation can be achieved. The mechanism is then tested in a simulated manufacturing environment and compared with other existing auction allocation methods
05011 Abstracts Collection -- Computing and Markets
From 03.01.05 to 07.01.05, the
Dagstuhl Seminar 05011``Computing and Markets\u27\u27 was held
in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI),
Schloss Dagstuhl.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then
derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the
incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex
post regret, we are able to adapt statistical machine learning techniques to
the design of payment rules. This computational approach to mechanism design is
applicable to domains with multi-dimensional types and situations where
computational efficiency is a concern. Specifically, given an outcome rule and
access to a type distribution, we train a support vector machine with a special
discriminant function structure such that it implicitly establishes a payment
rule with desirable incentive properties. We discuss applications to a
multi-minded combinatorial auction with a greedy winner-determination algorithm
and to an assignment problem with egalitarian outcome rule. Experimental
results demonstrate both that the construction produces payment rules with low
ex post regret, and that penalizing classification errors is effective in
preventing failures of ex post individual rationality
Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges
In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging
technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing
online activities over public networks. As an essential market process,
auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to
their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features
between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research
and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can
provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the
auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design
incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These
opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in
both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of
existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive
state-of-the-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing
solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some
application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open
research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction
models
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