308 research outputs found
How to Construct a Leakage-Resilient (Stateless) Trusted Party
Trusted parties and devices are commonly used in the real world to securely perform computations on secret inputs. However, their security can often be compromised by side-channel attacks in which the adversary obtains partial leakage on intermediate computation values. This gives rise to the following natural question: To what extent can one protect the trusted party against leakage?
Our goal is to design a hardware device that allows parties to securely evaluate a function of their inputs by feeding with encoded inputs that are obtained using local secret randomness. Security should hold even in the presence of an active adversary that can corrupt a subset of parties and obtain restricted leakage on the internal computations in .
We design hardware devices in this setting both for zero-knowledge proofs and for general multi-party computations. Our constructions can unconditionally resist either leakage or a strong form of ``only computation leaks\u27\u27 (OCL) leakage that captures realistic side-channel attacks, providing different tradeoffs between efficiency and security
A Survey of Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
In the past 15 years, cryptography has made considerable progress in expanding the adversarial attack model to cover side-channel attacks, and has built schemes to provably defend against some of them. This survey covers the main models and results in this so-called leakage-resilient cryptography
Doubly-Affine Extractors, and Their Applications
In this work we challenge the common misconception that information-theoretic (IT) privacy is too impractical to be used in the real-world: we propose to build simple and reusable IT-encryption solutions whose only efficiency penalty (compared to computationally-secure schemes) comes from a large secret key size, which is often a rather minor inconvenience, as storage is cheap. In particular, our solutions are stateless and locally computable at the optimal rate, meaning that honest parties do not maintain state and read only (optimally) small portions of their large keys with every use.
Moreover, we also propose a novel architecture for outsourcing the storage of these long keys to a network of semi-trusted servers, trading the need to store large secrets with the assumption that it is hard to simultaneously compromise too many publicly accessible ad-hoc servers. Our architecture supports everlasting privacy and post-application security of the derived one-time keys, resolving two major limitations of a related model for outsourcing key storage, called bounded storage model.
Both of these results come from nearly optimal constructions of so called doubly-affine extractors: locally-computable, seeded extractors Ext(X,S) which are linear functions of X (for any fixed seed S), and protect against bounded affine leakage on X. This holds unconditionally, even if (a) affine leakage may adaptively depend on the extracted key R = Ext(X,S); and (b) the seed S is only computationally secure. Neither of these properties are possible with general-leakage extractors
Unconditionally Secure Computation Against Low-Complexity Leakage
We consider the problem of constructing leakage-resilient circuit compilers that are secure against global leakage functions with bounded output length. By global, we mean that the leakage can depend on all circuit wires and output a low-complexity function (represented as a multi-output Boolean circuit) applied on these wires. In this work, we design compilers both in the stateless (a.k.a. single-shot leakage) setting and the stateful (a.k.a. continuous leakage) setting that are unconditionally secure against AC0 leakage and similar low-complexity classes.
In the stateless case, we show that the original private circuits construction of Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner (Crypto 2003) is actually secure against AC0 leakage. In the stateful case, we modify the construction of Rothblum (Crypto 2012), obtaining a simple construction with unconditional security. Prior works that designed leakage-resilient circuit compilers against AC0 leakage had to rely either on secure hardware components (Faust et al., Eurocrypt 2010, Miles-Viola, STOC 2013) or on (unproven) complexity-theoretic assumptions (Rothblum, Crypto 2012)
Private Circuits with Quasilinear Randomness
A -private circuit for a function is a randomized Boolean circuit that maps a randomized encoding of an input to an encoding of the output , such that probing wires anywhere in reveals nothing about . Private circuits can be used to protect embedded devices against side-channel attacks. Motivated by the high cost of generating fresh randomness in such devices, several works have studied the question of minimizing the randomness complexity of private circuits.
The best known upper bound, due to Coron et al. (Eurocrypt 2020), is random bits, where is the circuit size of . We improve this to , including the randomness used by the input encoder, and extend this bound to the stateful variant of private circuits. Our constructions are semi-explicit in the sense that there is an efficient randomized algorithm that generates the private circuit from a circuit for with negligible failure probability
Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contract Execution
Smart contracts are applications that execute on blockchains. Today they
manage billions of dollars in value and motivate visionary plans for pervasive
blockchain deployment. While smart contracts inherit the availability and other
security assurances of blockchains, however, they are impeded by blockchains'
lack of confidentiality and poor performance.
We present Ekiden, a system that addresses these critical gaps by combining
blockchains with Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Ekiden leverages a
novel architecture that separates consensus from execution, enabling efficient
TEE-backed confidentiality-preserving smart-contracts and high scalability. Our
prototype (with Tendermint as the consensus layer) achieves example performance
of 600x more throughput and 400x less latency at 1000x less cost than the
Ethereum mainnet.
Another contribution of this paper is that we systematically identify and
treat the pitfalls arising from harmonizing TEEs and blockchains. Treated
separately, both TEEs and blockchains provide powerful guarantees, but
hybridized, though, they engender new attacks. For example, in naive designs,
privacy in TEE-backed contracts can be jeopardized by forgery of blocks, a
seemingly unrelated attack vector. We believe the insights learned from Ekiden
will prove to be of broad importance in hybridized TEE-blockchain systems
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