70 research outputs found
How to Build Fully Secure Tweakable Blockciphers from Classical Blockciphers
This paper focuses on building a tweakable blockcipher from a classical blockcipher whose input and output wires all have a size of bits. The main goal is to achieve full security. Such a tweakable blockcipher was proposed by Mennink at FSE\u2715, and it is also the only tweakable blockcipher so far that claimed full security to our best knowledge. However, we find a key-recovery attack on Mennink\u27s proposal (in the proceeding version) with a complexity of about adversarial queries. The attack well demonstrates that Mennink\u27s proposal has at most security, and therefore invalidates its security claim. In this paper, we study a construction of tweakable blockciphers denoted as that is built on invocations of a blockcipher and additional simple XOR operations. As proven in previous work, at least two invocations of blockcipher with linear mixing are necessary to possibly bypass the birthday-bound barrier of security, we carry out an investigation on the instances of with , and find highly efficient tweakable blockciphers , , , that achieve provable security. Each of these tweakable blockciphers uses two invocations of a blockcipher, one of which uses a tweak-dependent key generated by XORing the tweak to the key (or to a secret subkey derived from the key). We point out the provable security of these tweakable blockciphers is obtained in the ideal blockcipher model due to the usage of the tweak-dependent key
Tweakable Blockciphers for Efficient Authenticated Encryptions with Beyond the Birthday-Bound Security
Modular design via a tweakable blockcipher (TBC) offers efficient authenticated encryption (AE) schemes (with associated data) that call a blockcipher once for each data block (of associated data or a plaintext). However, the existing efficient blockcipher-based TBCs are secure up to the birthday bound, where the underlying keyed blockcipher is a secure strong pseudorandom permutation. Existing blockcipher-based AE schemes with beyond-birthday-bound (BBB) security are not efficient, that is, a blockcipher is called twice or more for each data block. In this paper, we present a TBC, XKX, that offers efficient blockcipher-based AE schemes with BBB security, by combining with efficient TBC-based AE schemes such as ΘCB3 an
Generic Attack on Iterated Tweakable FX Constructions
International audienceTweakable block ciphers are increasingly becoming a common primitive to build new resilient modes as well as a concept for multiple dedicated designs. While regular block ciphers define a family of permutations indexed by a secret key, tweakable ones define a family of permutations indexed by both a secret key and a public tweak. In this work we formalize and study a generic framework for building such a tweakable block cipher based on regular block ciphers, the iterated tweakable FX construction, which includes many such previous constructions of tweakable block ciphers. Then we describe a cryptanal-ysis from which we can derive a provable security upper-bound for all constructions following this tweakable iterated FX strategy. Concretely, the cryptanalysis of r rounds of our generic construction based on n-bit block ciphers with κ-bit keys requires O(2 r r+1 (n+κ)) online and offline queries. For r = 2 rounds this interestingly matches the proof of the particular case of XHX2 by Lee and Lee (ASIACRYPT 2018) thus proving for the first time its tightness. In turn, the XHX and XHX2 proofs show that our generic cryptanalysis is information theoretically optimal for 1 and 2 rounds
Cascading Four Round LRW1 is Beyond Birthday Bound Secure
In CRYPTO\u2702, Liskov et al. have introduced a new symmetric key primitive called tweakable block cipher. They have proposed two constructions of designing a tweakable block cipher from block ciphers. The first proposed construction is called and the second proposed construction is called . Although, has been extended in later works to provide beyond birthday bound security (e.g., cascaded in CRYPTO\u2712 by Landecker et al.), but extension of the has received no attention until the work of Bao et al. in EUROCRYPT\u2720, where the authors have shown that one round extension of , i.e., masking the output of with the given tweak and then re-encrypting it with the same block cipher, gives security up to queries. Recently, Khairallah has shown a birthday bound distinguishing attack on the construction and hence invalidated the security claim of Bao et al. This has led to the open research question, that {\em how many round are required for cascading to achieve beyond birthday bound security ?}
In this paper, we have shown that cascading up to four rounds is sufficient for ensuring beyond the birthday bound security. In particular, we have shown that provides security up to queries. Security analysis of our construction is based on the recent development of the mirror theory technique for tweakable random permutations under the framework of the Expectation Method
Tight Security of Cascaded LRW2
At CRYPTO \u2712, Landecker et al. introduced the cascaded LRW2 (or CLRW2) construction, and proved that it is a secure tweakable block cipher up to roughly queries. Recently, Mennink presented a distinguishing attack on CLRW2 in queries. In the same paper, he discussed some non-trivial bottlenecks in proving tight security bound, i.e. security up to queries. Subsequently, he proved security up to queries for a variant of CLRW2 using -wise independent AXU assumption and the restriction that each tweak value occurs at most times. Moreover, his proof relies on a version of mirror theory which is yet to be publicly verified. In this paper, we resolve the bottlenecks in Mennink\u27s approach and prove that the original CLRW2 is indeed a secure tweakable block cipher up to roughly queries. To do so, we develop two new tools: First, we give a probabilistic result that provides improved bound on the joint probability of some special collision events; Second, we present a variant of Patarin\u27s mirror theory in tweakable permutation settings with a self-contained and concrete proof. Both these results are of generic nature, and can be of independent interests. To demonstrate the applicability of these tools, we also prove tight security up to roughly queries for a variant of DbHtS, called DbHtS-p, that uses two independent universal hash functions
Cascading Four Round LRW1 is Beyond Birthday Bound Secure
In CRYPTO’02, Liskov et al. introduced the concept of a tweakable block cipher, a novel symmetric key primitive with promising applications. They put forth two constructions for designing such tweakable block ciphers from conventional block ciphers: LRW1 and LRW2. While subsequent efforts extended LRW2 to achieve security beyond the birthday bound (e.g., cascaded LRW2 in CRYPTO’12 by Landecker et al.), the extension of LRW1 remained unexplored until Bao et al.’s work in EUROCRYPT’20 that considered cascaded LRW1, a one-round extension of LRW1 - entailing masking the LRW1 output with the given tweak and re-encrypting it with the same block cipher. They showed that CLRW1 offers security up to 22n/3 queries. However, this result was challenged by Khairallah’s recent birthday bound distinguishing attack on cascaded LRW1, effectively refuting the security claim of Bao et al. Consequently, a pertinent research question emerges: How many rounds of cascaded LRW1 are required to obtain security beyond the birthday bound? This paper addresses this question by establishing that cascading LRW1 for four rounds suffices to ensure security beyond the birthday bound. Specifically, we demonstrate that 4 rounds of CLRW1 guarantees security for up to 23n/4 queries. Our security analysis is based from recent advancements in the mirror theory technique for tweakable random permutations, operating within the framework of the Expectation Method
Tweaks and Keys for Block Ciphers: the TWEAKEY Framework
We propose the TWEAKEY framework with goal to unify the design of tweakable block ciphers and of block ciphers resistant to related-key attacks. Our framework is simple, extends the key-alternating construction, and allows to build a primitive with arbitrary tweak and key sizes, given the public round permutation (for instance, the AES round). Increasing the sizes renders the security analysis very difficult and thus we identify a subclass of TWEAKEY, that we name STK, which solves the size issue by the use of finite field
multiplications on low hamming weight constants. We give very efficient instances of STK, in particular, a 128-bit tweak/key/state block cipher Deoxys-BC that is the first AES-based ad-hoc tweakable block cipher. At the same time, Deoxys-BC could be seen as a secure alternative to AES-256, which is known to be insecure in the related-key model. As another member of the TWEAKEY framework, we describe Kiasu-BC, which is a very simple and even more efficient tweakable variation of AES-128 when the tweak size is limited to 64 bits.
In addition to being efficient, our proposals, compared to the previous schemes that use AES as a black box, offer security beyond the birthday bound. Deoxys-BC and Kiasu-BC represent interesting pluggable primitives for authenticated encryption schemes, for instance, OCB instantiated with Kiasu-BC runs at about 0.75 c/B on Intel Haswell. Our work can also be seen as
advances on the topic of secure key schedule design for AES-like ciphers, describing several proposals in this direction
Offset-Based BBB-Secure Tweakable Block-ciphers with Updatable Caches
A nonce-respecting tweakable blockcipher is the building-block for the OCB authenticated encryption mode. An XEX-based TBC is used to process each block in OCB. However, XEX can provide at most birthday bound privacy security, whereas in Asiacrypt 2017, beyond-birthday-bound (BBB) forging security of OCB3 was shown by Bhaumik and Nandi. In this paper we study how at a small cost we can construct a nonce-respecting BBB-secure tweakable blockcipher. We propose the OTBC-3 construction, which maintains a cache that can be easily updated when used in an OCB-like mode. We show how this can be used in a BBB-secure variant of OCB with some additional keys and a few extra blockcipher calls but roughly the same amortised rate
Minimizing Even-Mansour Ciphers for Sequential Indifferentiability (Without Key Schedules)
Iterated Even-Mansour (IEM) schemes consist of a small number of fixed permutations separated by round key additions. They enjoy provable security, assuming the permutations are public and random. In particular, regarding chosen-key security in the sense of sequential indifferentiability (seq-indifferentiability), Cogliati and Seurin (EUROCRYPT 2015) showed that without key schedule functions, the 4-round Even-Mansour with Independent Permutations and no key schedule is sequentially indifferentiable.
Minimizing IEM variants for classical strong (tweakable) pseudorandom security has stimulated an attractive line of research. In this paper, we seek for minimizing the construction while retaining seq-indifferentiability. We first consider , a natural variant of using a single round permutation. Unfortunately, we exhibit a slide attack against with any number of rounds. In light of this, we show that the 4-round using 2 independent random permutations is seq-indifferentiable. This provides the minimal seq-indifferentiable IEM without key schedule
- …