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    BitTorrent ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์—์„œ ์ปจํ…ํŠธ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋ง ๋ฐ ๋ฐฐํฌ

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (๋ฐ•์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› : ์ „๊ธฐยท์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๊ณตํ•™๋ถ€, 2013. 2. ์ตœ์–‘ํฌ.BitTorrent๋Š” ์ปจํ…ํŠธ ๊ณต์œ ์— ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜๋Š” ๊ฐ€์žฅ ์ธ๊ธฐ์žˆ๋Š” ์ธํ„ฐ๋„ท ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด์ด๋‹ค. BitTorrent๊ฐ€ ๋„๋ฆฌ ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋จ์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ, ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ž๋“ค์€ BitTorrent์˜ ์ฒ˜๋ฆฌ๋Ÿ‰, ๊ณต์ •์„ฑ, ์ธ์„ผํ‹ฐ๋ธŒ์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ด์Šˆ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌํ•ด ์™”๊ณ , ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์€ BitTorrent ์„ฑ๋Šฅ๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จ๋œ ๊ฐ€์น˜์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋“ค์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ฃผ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์˜ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์—์„œ๋Š”, BitTorrent์—์„œ์˜ ์ปจํ…ํŠธ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋ง ๋ฐ ๋ฐฐํฌ ์ „๋žต๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จํ•ด์„œ (1) BitTorrent ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž๊ฐ€ ํŒŒ์ผ์„ ์–ด๋–ค ๋ชฉ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค ํ•˜๋Š”์ง€์™€ (2) BitTorrent์˜ ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž๋“ค์ด ๊ทธ๋“ค์˜ ๋ชฉ์ ์„ ์„ฑ์ทจํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ์–ด๋– ํ•œ ์ „๋žต๋“ค์„ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋Š”์ง€ ๋“ฑ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๋‹ค๋ฃจ๊ณ  ์žˆ์ง€ ์•Š๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ํ•™์œ„ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ๋Š”, ์•ž์„œ ์–ธ๊ธ‰ํ•œ ๋ฌธ์ œ๋“ค์„ ์ธก์ •๋œ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ๋ฐ”ํƒ•์œผ๋กœ ์กฐ์‚ฌํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ, BitTorrent ํฌํƒˆ์ค‘ ๊ฐ€์žฅ ํฐ ๊ทœ๋ชจ์ธ The Pirate Bay (TPB)์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ข…ํ•ฉ์ ์ธ ์ธก์ • ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ธก์ •๋œ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ์…‹์€ 12๋งŒ๊ฐœ์˜ ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ์™€ 1600๋งŒ๋ช…์˜ ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ž๋กœ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ๋˜์—ˆ๊ณ , ์ปจํ…ํŠธ ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž๋ฅผ (i) ๊ฐ€์งœ ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž, (ii) ์ด์œค์ถ”๊ตฌ ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž, (iii) ์ดํƒ€์  ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž ์„ธ๊ฐ€์ง€ ์ข…๋ฅ˜๋กœ ๋ถ„๋ฅ˜ํ•˜์—ฌ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์ง„ํ–‰ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์˜ํ™”, TV, ์„ฑ์ธ๋ฌผ, ์Œ์•…, ์‘์šฉํ”„๋กœ๊ทธ๋žจ, ๊ฒŒ์ž„, ์ „์ž์ฑ…๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ปจํ…ํŠธ ์นดํ…Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋ง๊ณผ ์ปจํ…ŒํŠธ ๋ฐฐํฌ ํ˜„ํ™ฉ์ด ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๋˜๋Š”์ง€ ์กฐ์‚ฌํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ฒซ๋ฒˆ์งธ๋กœ, ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ์˜ ๊ตฌ์กฐ์  ํŒจํ„ด๊ณผ ์Šค์™ ์ฐธ์—ฌ์ž์˜ ํ–‰๋™ ํŒจํ„ด์„ ํŒŒ์•…ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ์ปจํ…ํŠธ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋ง๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จ๋œ ํ˜„ํ™ฉ์„ ์กฐ์‚ฌํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ํŠน๋ณ„ํžˆ, (1) ์–ผ๋งˆ๋‚˜ ์ปจํ…ํŠธ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋ง์ด ๋„๋ฆฌ ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜๋Š”๊ฐ€, (2) ์–ด๋–ค ํŒŒ์ผ๋“ค์ด ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ๋กœ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋˜๋Š”๊ฐ€, (3) ์™œ ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž๋“ค์ด ํŒŒ์ผ์„ ๋ฒˆ๋“คํ•ด์„œ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋Š”๊ฐ€, (4) ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ž๋“ค์ด ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋œ ํŒŒ์ผ๋“ค์„ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๋‹ค์šด๋กœ๋“œ ๋ฐ›๋Š”๊ฐ€์— ์ดˆ์ ์„ ๋งž์ถ”์–ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ธก์ •๊ฒฐ๊ณผ 72% ์ด์ƒ์˜ ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ๋“ค์ด ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๊ฐœ์˜ ํŒŒ์ผ๋กœ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ๋˜์–ด ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ์•Œ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๊ณ , ์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค์ด BitTorrent์˜ ํŒŒ์ผ ๊ณต์œ ๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋„๋ฆฌ ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์Œ์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ค€๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๊ฒฝ์ œ์ ์ธ ์ด๋“์„ ์œ„ํ•ด ์›น์‚ฌ์ดํŠธ๋ฅผ ๊ด‘๊ณ ํ•˜๋Š” ์ด์œค์ถ”๊ตฌ ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž๋“ค์ด ๋ฒˆ๋“ค์„ ์„ ํ˜ธํ•˜์—ฌ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒฝํ–ฅ์ด ์žˆ์Œ์„ ์•Œ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋œ ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ์˜ ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์˜ ํŒŒ์ผ(94%)์ด ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ž๋“ค์— ์˜ํ•ด ์„ ํƒ๋˜๊ณ , ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋œ ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ๊ฐ€ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค์ด ์•„๋‹Œ ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ๋ณด๋‹ค ํ‰๊ท ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋” ์ธ๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ์ข‹์Œ์„ ์•Œ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ „์ฒด์ ์œผ๋กœ, ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ์˜ ๊ตฌ์กฐ์  ํŒจํ„ด๊ณผ ์Šค์™ ์ฐธ์—ฌ์ž์˜ ํŠน์ง•์€ ์ปจํ…ํŠธ์˜ ์นดํ…Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ ์ข…๋ฅ˜์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋œ ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ์ธ์ง€ ๋ฒˆ๋“ค๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ์ธ์ง€์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ์ฃผ๋ชฉํ• ๋งŒํ•œ ์ฐจ์ด์ ์ด ์žˆ์Œ์„ ๋ฐœ๊ฒฌํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹ค์Œ์œผ๋กœ, ์‚ฌํšŒ๊ฒฝ์ œ์  ๊ด€์ ์—์„œ BitTorrent์˜ ์ปจํ…ํŠธ ๋ฐฐํฌ ํŒจํ„ด์„ (1) ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž์— ์˜ํ•ด์„œ ํŒŒ์ผ์ด ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๋ฐฐํฌ๋˜๋Š”๊ฐ€, (2) ๊ฐ ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž๋“ค์€ ์–ด๋–ค ์ „๋žต๋“ค์„ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋Š”๊ฐ€, (3) ๋ฐฐํฌ ์ „๋žต๋“ค์ด ์–ผ๋งˆ๋‚˜ ํšจ๊ณผ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋Š”๊ฐ€์˜ ์ธก๋ฉด์—์„œ ์กฐ์‚ฌํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ธก์ •๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ์ƒ๋‹นํ•œ ์–‘์˜ ํŠธ๋ž˜ํ”ฝ(61%)์ด ๊ฐ€์งœ ํ† ๋ŸฐํŠธ๋ฅผ ๋‹ค์šด๋ฐ›์„ ๋•Œ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ์•Œ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๊ณ , ์ด๋Š” ๋งŽ์€ ์–‘์˜ ์ธํ„ฐ๋„ท ํŠธ๋ž˜ํ”ฝ์ด ๋ถˆํ•„์š”ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋‚ญ๋น„๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์Œ์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ ์ฃผ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ๋ณธ ์ธก์ • ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ์•Œ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฐ€์งœ ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž๋“ค์˜ ๋ฐฐํฌ ํŒจํ„ด์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•ด์„œ TPB์˜ ๊ฐ€์งœ ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž๋ฅผ ๊ฑธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚ผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์„ ์ œ์•ˆํ•˜์˜€๊ณ , ์ œ์•ˆ๋œ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์ด ์ „์ฒด ๋‹ค์šด๋กœ๋“œ ํŠธ๋ž˜ํ”ฝ์˜ 45% ๊ฐ€๋Ÿ‰์„ ์ค„์ผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Œ์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ ์ฃผ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์ด์œค์ถ”๊ตฌ ๋ฐฐํฌ์ž๋“ค์€ ๊ทธ๋“ค์˜ ์ˆ˜์ต๋ชจ๋ธ(์˜ˆ๋ฅผ ๋“ค์–ด, ๊ฐœ์ธ ํŠธ๋ž˜์ปค ์‚ฌ์ดํŠธ์— ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ž๋ฅผ ์˜์ž…ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‚˜ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ์‚ฌ์ง„๊ณผ ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ๋œ URL ๋งํฌ๋ฅผ ํด๋ฆญํ•˜๋„๋ก ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ)์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๋ฐฐํฌ ์ „๋žต์„ ์ด์šฉํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์Œ์„ ์•Œ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค.BitTorrent is one of the most popular applications for sharing contents over the Internet. The huge success of BitTorrent has attracted the research community to investigate BitTorrent's behavior in terms of throughput, fairness, and incentive issues, revealing valuable insights into the performance aspects of BitTorrent. However, most of these studies paid little attention to understand content bundling and publishing strategies in BitTorrent from the following perspectives: (1) how, and for what purposes, are constituent files bundled by BitTorrent publishers? and (2) what strategies are adopted by BitTorrent publishers to achieve their goals? To answer these questions with data from a large-scale BitTorrent system, we conduct comprehensive measurements on one of the largest BitTorrent portals: the Pirate Bay (TPB). From the datasets of the 120 K torrents and 16 M peers, we classify BitTorrent publishers into three types: (i) fake publishers, (ii) profit-driven publishers, and (iii) altruistic publishers. Throughout this dissertation, we investigate the current practice of bundling and publishing across different content categories: Movie, TV, Porn, Music, Application, Game, and E-book. We first investigate the current practice of content bundling to understand the structural patterns of torrents and the participant behaviors of swarms. In particular, we focus on: (1) how prevalent content bundling is, (2) how and what files are bundled into torrents, (3) what motivates publishers to bundle files, and (4) how peers access the bundled files. We find that over 72% of BitTorrent torrents contain multiple files, which indicates that bundling is widely used for file sharing. We reveal that profit-driven BitTorrent publishers who promote their own web sites for financial gains like advertising tend to prefer to use the bundling. We also observe that most files (94%) in a bundle torrent are selected by users and the bundle torrents are more popular than the single (or non-bundle) ones on average. Overall, there are notable differences in the structural patterns of torrents and swarm characteristics (i) across different content categories and (ii) between single and bundle torrents. We next investigate the current practice of content publishing in BitTorrent from a socio-economic point of view, by unraveling (1) how files are published by publishers, (2) what strategies are adopted by publishers, and (3) how effective those strategies are. We show that a significant amount of traffic (61%) of BitTorrent has been generated (i.e., unnecessarily wasted) to download fake torrents. Therefore, we suggest a method to filter out fake publishers on TPB by considering their distinct publishing patterns learned from our measurement study, and show that the proposed method can reduce around 45% of the total download traffic. We also reveal that profit-driven publishers adopt different publishing strategies according to their revenue models (e.g., advertising private tracker sites to attract potential new members, or exposing image URLs to make people click the URL links).Abstract i I. Introduction 1 II. Related Work 5 2.1 Multi-torrent Systems 5 2.2 Bundling in BitTorrent 6 2.3 Bundling in Economics 7 2.4 Content publishing in BitTorrent 7 III. Methodology 9 3.1 Measurement Methodology 9 3.2 Publisher Classification 11 IV. Bundling Practice in BitTorrent: What, How, and Why 14 4.1 Introduction 14 4.2 Datasets 16 4.2.1 Torrent Datasets 17 4.2.2 Swarm Datasets 17 4.3 Single vs. Bundle 18 4.3.1 Bundling is widespread 18 4.3.2 How files are bundled 20 4.4 Main File Analysis in Bundling 27 4.4.1 Identifying Main Files 28 4.4.2 Constituents of Bundle-k 29 4.5 Publisher Analysis 32 4.5.1 Contribution of Top-20 Publishers 33 4.5.2 Cross-category Publishing of Top-20 Publishers 39 4.6 User Access Pattern Analysis 40 4.6.1 Popularity Analysis 40 4.6.2 Availability Analysis 43 4.6.3 The Number of Files Requested by Users in a Bundle Torrent 44 4.6.4 Swarm Behaviors versus Bundle-k 47 4.7 Discussions 50 V. Content Publishing Practice in BitTorrent 52 5.1 Introduction 52 5.2 The Number of Published Torrents 54 5.3 Publishers Strategies 58 5.3.1 Lifetime of Publishers and their Publishing Rates 59 5.3.2 Content Categories 60 5.3.3 Advertising Strategies of Profit-driven Publishers 63 5.4 Downloaders Behavior 64 5.5 Implications on Publishers Strategies 69 5.5.1 Fake Publishers 69 5.5.2 Profit-driven Publishers 71 VI. Summary & Future Work 73 Bibliography 75 Korean Abstract 80Docto

    ์˜จ๋ผ์ธ ๊ฒŒ์ž„๊ณผ ์ปจํ…ํŠธ ๊ณต์œ  ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ ๋ถ„์„์„ ํ†ตํ•œ ์˜จ๋ผ์ธ ๊ตฐ์ง‘ ํ˜„์ƒ์˜ ์ดํ•ด

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (๋ฐ•์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› : ์ „๊ธฐยท์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๊ณตํ•™๋ถ€, 2015. 2. ๊ถŒํƒœ๊ฒฝ.Quantification of collective human behavior and understanding the group characteristics in the Internet is important in user behavior studies since people tend to gather together and form groups due to their inherent nature. On the Internet, people are also often forming a group for a specific purpose such as i) an online group in games (e.g., MMORPGs) to experience various social interactions with other players or accomplish a difficult quest with teammates or ii) a swarm in peer-to-peer network to share a content to utilize a higher download rate with an availability. To this end, we studied the two most well-known major applications in the Internet that people are actively using with different purposesi) MMORPGs and ii) BitTorrent. In this dissertation, we analyze the i) group activities of users in Aion, one of the largest MMORPGs, based on the records of the activities of 94,497 users and ii) crowd phenomena of BitTorrent. First, in a case study of Aion, we focus on (i) how social interactions within a group differ from the ones across groups, (ii) what makes a group rise, sustain, or fall, (iii) how group members join and leave a group, and (iv) what makes a group end. We first find that structural patterns of social interactions within a group are more likely to be close-knit and reciprocative than the ones across groups.We also observe that members in a rising group (i.e., the number of members increases) are more cohesive, and communicate with more evenly within the group than the ones in other groups. Our analysis further reveals that if a group is not cohesive, not actively communicating, or not evenly communicating among members, members of the group tend to leave. Second, we investigate what kinds of crowd phenomena of content exist and why different patterns of crowd phenomena appears and how we can exploit content crowd phenomena considering the content category, publisher, and population of content in BitTorrent. To this end,We conduct comprehensive measurements on content locality in one of the largest BitTorrent portals: The Pirate Bay. In particular, we focus on (i) how content is consumed from spatial and temporal perspectives, (ii) what makes content be consumed with disparity in spatial and temporal domains, and (iii) how we can exploit the content locality. We find that content consumption in real swarms is 4.56 times and 1.46 times skewed in spatial (country) and temporal (time) domains, respectively. We observe that a cultural factor (e.g., language) mainly affects spatial locality of content. Not only the time-sensitivity of content but also the publishing purpose affects temporal locality of content.We reveal that spatial locality of content iii rarely changes on a daily basis (microscopic level), but there is notably spatial spread of content consumption over the years (macroscopic level). Based on the observation, we conduct simulations to show that bundling and caching can exploit the content locality.Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Crowd Phenomena in Massively Multi-player Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2 Crowd Phenomena in BitTorrent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 II. RelatedWork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1 Crowd Phenomena in MMORPGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.1 Social Interactions in MMORPGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.2 Group Activities in MMORPGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1.3 Group Activities in Other Online Services . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2 Crowd Phenomena (Locality) in BitTorrent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2.1 Peer Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2.2 Crowd Phenomena in BitTorrent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2.3 Locality in Other Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 III. Group Activities in Online Social Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.1 Aion overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.1.1 Game Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.1.2 Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.2 Group Affiliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 v 3.2.1 How prevalent are group activities in Aion? . . . . . . . . . 14 3.2.2 Effect of Joining a Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2.3 Social Interactions Within a Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.3 Group Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.3.1 Group Cohesion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.3.2 Group Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.3.3 Group Locality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.3.4 Survival Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.3.5 Dichotomy in Stable Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.4 Group Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.4.1 Properties of the Group Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.4.2 Structural Holes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3.5 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.5.1 Why people leave groups? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.5.2 Why a group ends? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 IV. Crowd phenomena of BitTorrent in Spatial and Temporal Perspective 46 4.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4.1.1 Discovering Swarm Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4.1.2 Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4.1.3 Representativeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.2 Spatial Locality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4.2.1 Locality Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4.2.2 Swarm, Community, and Neighbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 vi 4.2.3 Content Categories, Publishers, and Popularity . . . . . . . 55 4.2.4 Spatial Locality Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.3 Temporal Locality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.3.1 Existence of Temporal Locality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.3.2 Categories, Publishers, and Popularity . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.3.3 Temporal Usage Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 How to Exploit Locality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 V. Summary & Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Docto

    The Future of Digital Rights Management in Digital Video

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    The rise in the popularity of internet-based digital video has created a major revolution in the way consumers acquire content. Users no longer need to watch a television show live or obtain a physical disc in order to view a movie. However, this transition comes with a price: Digital Rights Management (DRM). Every digital video file requires a user to be locked into a particular combination of software, hardware, and business plan in order to be authorized for viewing purchased content. DRM was just as prevalent during the introduction of digital audio, but DRM was abolished from the format within four years. The goal of this paper is to attempt to divine the future of DRM and digital video by comparing the current marketplace to the case study of digital audio. In order to estimate the lifespan of video DRM, this paper first examined the history of audio DRM and the factors that led to its demise. Two key factors were discovered: technological innovations that helped push audio piracy into the mainstream and the market forces that forced the copyright holders to relax their DRM requirements. Those factors were used to analyze the current state of video DRM. While disruptive technologies are still being developed to compete against DRM, a combination of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act\u27s stifling of innovation and the rise of online streaming content has prevented the creation of a universal technological solution that would push for DRM-free video. As for the market forces, users treat video content differently than audio. Video content is more disposable, with users preferring to rent content for a single viewing while digital audio lends itself to an ownership culture. This difference in how users treat their content does not create the level of piracy necessary to make DRM-free digital video a reality. The paper concludes that despite the internet\u27s massive ability for the free dissemination of data, digital video DRM will be a factor in the foreseeable future

    The Darknet: A Digital Copyright Revolution

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    We are in the midst of a digital revolution. In this โ€œAge of Peer Production,โ€ armies of amateur participants demand the freedom to rip, remix, and share their own digital culture. Aided by the newest iteration of file sharing networks, digital media users now have the option to retreat underground, by using secure, private, and anonymous file sharing networks, to share freely and breathe new life into digital media. These underground networks, collectively termed โ€œthe Darknet[,] will grow in scope, resilience, and effectiveness in direct proportion to [increasing] digital restrictions the public finds untenable.โ€ The Darknet has been called the publicโ€™s great equalizing force in the digital millennium, because it will serve as โ€œa counterbalancing force and bulwark to defend digital libertiesโ€ against forces lobbying for stronger copyrights and increased technological controls

    A HOLISTIC REDUNDANCY- AND INCENTIVE-BASED FRAMEWORK TO IMPROVE CONTENT AVAILABILITY IN PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS

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    Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology has emerged as an important alternative to the traditional client-server communication paradigm to build large-scale distributed systems. P2P enables the creation, dissemination and access to information at low cost and without the need of dedicated coordinating entities. However, existing P2P systems fail to provide high-levels of content availability, which limit their applicability and adoption. This dissertation takes a holistic approach to device mechanisms to improve content availability in large-scale P2P systems. Content availability in P2P can be impacted by hardware failures and churn. Hardware failures, in the form of disk or node failures, render information inaccessible. Churn, an inherent property of P2P, is the collective effect of the usersโ€™ uncoordinated behavior, which occurs when a large percentage of nodes join and leave frequently. Such a behavior reduces content availability significantly. Mitigating the combined effect of hardware failures and churn on content availability in P2P requires new and innovative solutions that go beyond those applied in existing distributed systems. To addresses this challenge, the thesis proposes two complementary, low cost mechanisms, whereby nodes self-organize to overcome failures and improve content availability. The first mechanism is a low complexity and highly flexible hybrid redundancy scheme, referred to as Proactive Repair (PR). The second mechanism is an incentive-based scheme that promotes cooperation and enforces fair exchange of resources among peers. These mechanisms provide the basis for the development of distributed self-organizing algorithms to automate PR and, through incentives, maximize their effectiveness in realistic P2P environments. Our proposed solution is evaluated using a combination of analytical and experimental methods. The analytical models are developed to determine the availability and repair cost properties of PR. The results indicate that PRโ€™s repair cost outperforms other redundancy schemes. The experimental analysis was carried out using simulation and the development of a testbed. The simulation results confirm that PR improves content availability in P2P. The proposed mechanisms are implemented and tested using a DHT-based P2P application environment. The experimental results indicate that the incentive-based mechanism can promote fair exchange of resources and limits the impact of uncooperative behaviors such as โ€œfree-ridingโ€
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