An Introduction to Critical Thinking and Symbolic Logic Volume 1: Formal Logic

This textbook has developed over the last few years of teaching introductory symbolic logic and critical thinking courses. It has been truly a pleasure to have benefited from such great students and colleagues over the years. As we have become increasingly frustrated with the costs of traditional logic textbooks (though many of them deserve high praise for their accuracy and depth), the move to open source has become more and more attractive. We're happy to provide it free of charge for educational use. With that being said, there are always improvements to be made here and we would be most grateful for constructive feedback and criticism. We have chosen to write this text in LaTex and have adopted certain conventions with symbols. Certainly many important aspects of critical thinking and logic have been omitted here, including historical developments and key logicians, and for that we apologize. Our goal was to create a textbook that could be provided to students free of charge and still contain some of the more important elements of critical thinking and introductory logic. To that end, an additional benefit of providing this textbook as a Open Education Resource (OER) is that we will be able to provide newer updated versions of this text more frequently, and without any concern about increased charges each time. We are particularly looking forward to expanding our examples, and adding student exercises. We will additionally aim to continually improve the quality and accessibility of our text for students and faculty alike. We have included a bibliography that includes many admirable textbooks, all of which we have benefited from. The interested reader is encouraged to consult these texts for further study and clarification. These texts have been a great inspiration for us and provide features to students that this concise textbook does not. We would both like to thank the philosophy students at numerous schools in the Puget Sound region for their patience and helpful suggestions. In particular, we would like to thank our colleagues at Green River College, who have helped us immensely in numerous different ways. Please feel free to contact us with comments and suggestions. We will strive to correct errors when pointed out, add necessary material, and make other additional and needed changes as they arise. Please check back for the most up to date version

Negotiating with a logical-linguistic protocol in a dialogical framework

This book is the result of years of reflection. Some time ago, while working in commodities, the author felt how difficult it was to decide the order in which to use arguments during a negotiation process. What would happen if we translated the arguments into cards and played them according to the rules of the Bridge game? The results were impressive. There was potential for improvement in the negotiation process. The investigation went deeper, exploring players, cards, deals and the information concealed in the players´ announcements, in the cards and in the deals. This new angle brought the research to NeuroLinguistic Patterns and cryptic languages, such as Russian Cards. In the following pages, the author shares her discovery of a new application for Logical Dialogues: Negotiations, tackled from basic linguistic structures placed under a dialogue form as a cognitive system which ‘understands’ natural language, with the aim to solve conflicts and even to serve peace

Argumentation-Based Contract Monitoring in Uncertain Domains

Publisher PD

A formal analysis of the notion of preference between deductive arguments

In the last two decades, justification logic has addressed the problem of including justifications into the field of epistemic logic. Nevertheless, there is something that has not received enough attention yet: how epistemic agents might prefer certain justifications to others, in order to have better pieces of evidence to support a particular belief. In this work, we study the notion of preference between a particular kind of justifications: deductive arguments. For doing so, we have built a logic using tools from epistemic logic, justification logic and logics for belief dependence. According to our solution, the preferences of an epistemic agent between different deductive arguments can be reduced to other notions

A Brief Critical Introduction to the Ontological Argument and its Formalization: Anselm, Gaunilo, Descartes, Leibniz and Kant

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at introducing the ontological argument through the analysis of five historical developments: Anselm’s argument found in the second chapter of his Proslogion, Gaunilo’s criticism of it, Descartes’ version of the ontological argument found in his Meditations on First Philosophy, Leibniz’s contribution to the debate on the ontological argument and his demonstration of the possibility of God, and Kant’s famous criticisms against the (cartesian) ontological argument. Second, it intends to critically examine the enterprise of formally analyzing philosophical arguments and, as such, contribute in a small degree to the debate on the role of formalization in philosophy. My focus will be mainly on the drawbacks and limitations of such enterprise; as a guideline, I shall refer to a Carnapian, or Carnapian-like theory of argument analysis

'Not Quite Right': Helping Students to Make Better Arguments

This paper looks at the need for a better understanding of the impediments to critical thinking in relation to graduate student work. The paper argues that a distinction is needed between two vectors that influence student writing: (1) the word-level–sentence-level vector; and (2) the grammar–inferencing vector. It is suggested that much of the work being done to assist students is only done on the first vector. This paper suggests a combination of explicit use of deductive syllogistic inferences and computer-aided argument mapping is needed. A methodology is suggested for tackling assignments that require students to ‘make an argument’. It is argued that what lecturers understand tacitly, now needs to be made a focus of deliberate educational practices

Metaphysics and Law

The dichotomy between questions of fact and questions of law serves as a starting point for the following discussion of the nature of legal reasoning. In the course of the dialogue the author notes similarities and dissimilarities between legal reasoning and philosophical and mathematical reasoning. In the end we are left with a clearer insight into the distinctive features of the adjudicative process