Can Science Explain Consciousness?

For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate this approach, a concept of agency is introduced along with a different understanding of intentionality. Following this approach reveals that the autopoietic cognitive system constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, which underlie perceptual completion effects and “filling in”—and, by implication, phenomenology in general. It creates phenomenality much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that it assigns meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history that is the source of valuation upon which meaning depends. Phenomenality is a virtual representation to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self) tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub- agencies. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from that of unconscious processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least psychologically bridge the explanatory gulf between mind and matter, and perhaps hope for a broader definition of science

The possibility of super-somnolent mentation: A new information-processing approach to sleep-onset acceleration and insomnia exemplified by serial diverse imagining

This paper proposes a new conceptual framework and techniques for sleep-onset acceleration: the somnolent mentation framework. It distinguishes between somnolent, asomnolent and insomnolent mentation. Somnolent mentation inherently accelerates sleep onset (SO). Insomnolent mentation (e.g., deliberating, ruminating or focusing on one’s arousal) interferes with SO. Deliberate mentation approaches to insomnia attempt to influence the participant’s mentation at SO. They may prescribe somnolent or counter-insomnolent mentation. Existing deliberate mentation approaches attempt mainly to counter insomnolent mentation (e.g., thought control through imagery distraction). Thus they are at best counter-insomnolent. Super-somnolent mentation is both somnolent and counter-insomnolent. Extended SO (E-SO) is defined as the period just before SO (P-SO) combined with SO. A scientific challenge is to correctly classify features of mentation as somnolent, asomnolent and insomnolent. This classification should be done both from a phenomena-based perspective—e.g., the empirical study of E-SO mentation— and from a designer-based perspective (in terms of a theory of the architecture of the human mind). This paper proposes a secondary hypothesis: the E-SO mentation emulation hypothesis. To emulate somnolent features of P-SO mentation is somnolent. This paper proposes also that some types of incoherent mentation are super-somnolent.  This paper presents no new empirical data. However, from the new conjectures, several predictions can be derived, new treatments developed, and new possibilities investigated. From the incoherent mentation principle the serial diverse imagining (SDI) family of techniques is derived. From this and related considerations SDI is expected to be super-somnolent

Evolution: The Computer Systems Engineer Designing Minds

What we have learnt in the last six or seven decades about virtual machinery, as a result of a great deal of science and technology, enables us to offer Darwin a new defence against critics who argued that only physical form, not mental capabilities and consciousness could be products of evolution by natural selection. The defence compares the mental phenomena mentioned by Darwin’s opponents with contents of virtual machinery in computing systems. Objects, states, events, and processes in virtual machinery which we have only recently learnt how to design and build, and could not even have been thought about in Darwin’s time, can interact with the physical machinery in which they are implemented, without being identical with their physical implementation, nor mere aggregates of physical structures and processes. The existence of various kinds of virtual machinery (including both “platform” virtual machines that can host other virtual machines, e.g. operating systems, and “application” virtual machines, e.g. spelling checkers, and computer games) depends on complex webs of causal connections involving hardware and software structures, events and processes, where the specification of such causal webs requires concepts that cannot be defined in terms of concepts of the physical sciences. That indefinability, plus the possibility of various kinds of self-monitoring within virtual machinery, seems to explain some of the allegedly mysterious and irreducible features of consciousness that motivated Darwin’s critics and also more recent philosophers criticising AI. There are consequences for philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and robotics

Can Science Explain consciousness? Toward a solution to the 'hard problem'

For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate this approach, a concept of agency is introduced along with a different understanding of intentionality. Following this approach reveals that the autopoietic cognitive system constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, which underlie perceptual completion effects and “filling in”—and, by implication, phenomenology in general. It creates phenomenality much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that it assigns meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history that is the source of valuation upon which meaning depends. Phenomenality is a virtual representation to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self) tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub- agencies. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from that of unconscious processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least psychologically bridge the explanatory gulf between mind and matter, and perhaps hope for a broader definition of science

Extending the Extended Mind : From Cognition to Consciousness

Where does conscious experience stop and the rest of the world begin? Is the material basis of consciousness confined to the brain, or can it be extended to include other parts of the body and environmental elements? This study proposes an extended account: when all the requirements are fulfilled, an external tool may become part of the realising basis for certain experiential processes. Andy Clark and David Chalmers argued famously that the material basis of cognitive states sometimes extends out of the barriers of skin and skull to external objects such as notebooks and other everyday tools. However, they draw the line there: only cognition, but not consciousness can have an extended base. The central argument of this study is that their constraint is not legitimate. If one is accepted, the other one follows. The first chapter lays an overview of the theoretical background of externalism and the 4E-theories in present-day philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. It also examines the central concepts, accounts and methodological questions that will be used and further developed in later chapters. The second chapter presents three arguments for the position defended in this thesis, namely the hypothesis of extended conscious mind. The third chapter analyses the ongoing debate in the interface of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science about the causal–constitution distinction, and argues that rather than in mechanist terms, the causal–constitution distinction should be interpreted in diachronic terms when dealing with mental phenomena. When depicted that way, the extension relation in the hypothesis of extended conscious mind counts as constitutive. The fourth chapter distinguishes between several different levels of extension, from mere short-term extension to more robust functional incorporation, where the external tool has become part of the transparent bodily point of view of the subject. Based on the notion of functional incorporation, a set of demarcation criteria for the hypothesis of extended conscious mind will be developed. The chapter closes by discussing sensory substitution as a concrete example of functional incorporation. Finally, the fifth chapter introduces the most influential counter-arguments that have been set forth against the hypothesis of extended conscious mind. The critiques will be examined and answered.Väitöstutkimus esittää, että mielen ja tietoisen kokemuksen rajat laajentuvat pään ja ruumiin ulkopuolelle, esimerkiksi teknologisiin apuvälineisiin. Tutkimus kyseenalaistaa mielenfilosofiassa perinteisesti vallassa olleen näkemyksen, jonka mukaan mielen toiminnot voitaisiin selittää pelkän aivotoiminnan pohjalta – sen sijaan mielen toiminnot syntyvät aivojen, ruumiin ja ympäristön vuorovaikutuksessa. Andy Clark ja David Chalmers esittivät kuuluisassa artikkelissaan, että jokapäiväiset apuvälineet voivat olla kognitiivisten prosessien muodostamisessa mukana biologisen ruumiin ohella. Clark ja Chalmers kuitenkin rajoittivat laajentumisen tähän: heidän mukaansa pelkästään kognitiivisilla prosesseilla voi olla laajentunut perusta, mutta tietoinen kokemus rajoittuu pään sisään. Tämän tutkimuksen uusi avaus ja ydinargumentti on, että tällaista rajanvetoa ei ole mahdollista tehdä johdonmukaisesti. Jos hyväksymme kognitiivisten tilojen laajentumisen, tietoinen kokemus seuraa mukana. Biologisten toimintojen ohella esimerkiksi muistikirja tai älypuhelin voi toimia muistoja ja uskomuksia osaltaan toteuttavana välineenä, ja sokeankeppi tai tekoraaja osana tuntoaistimuksen toteuttavaa materiaalista pohjaa. Jotta laajentuminen voi tapahtua, ulkoisen välineen tulee täyttää tietyt ehdot, sen täytyy muun muassa tulla osaksi funktionaalista ruumiillista identiteettiä. Ulkoisiin apuvälineisiin laajentuminen on mahdollista aivojen ja ruumiin rakenteellisen muovautuvuuden ansiosta: ruumiillistetun osan ei tarvitse olla biologinen, mutta sen täytyy tulla ”läpinäkyväksi” osaksi subjektin näkökulmaa. Käsitteellisen analyysin lisäksi työssä käsitellään useita empiirisiä tutkimustapauksia (kuten aistikorvaavuuslaite-teknologia ja empiirinen unitutkimus). Mielen ja tietoisen kokemuksen laajentumisella on kauaskantoinen vaikutus, joka näkyy filosofian ohella useilla muillakin aloilla. Tutkimus auttaa vastaamaan erittäin ajankohtaisiin kysymyksiin, kuten millainen status käyttämillemme jokapäiväisille teknologisille laitteille tulisi antaa: tulisiko niitä pitää vain fyysisinä esineinä vai kognitiivisten prosessien jatkeena? Yksi esiin nouseva käytännönläheinen kysymys jatkotutkimukselle on kuinka ympäristön muokkaaminen (esim. hoitolaitoksissa tehtävät ratkaisut) vaikuttaa mieleen – ja tästä seuraa myös monenlaisia eettisiä kysymyksiä

Minds Online: The Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science, and the Philosophy of Mind

Alongside existing research into the social, political and economic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particularly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive significance of the Web because of the emphasis they place on forces and factors that reside at the level of agent–world interactions. In particular, by adopting a situated or ecological approach to cognition, we are able to assess the significance of the Web from the perspective of research into embodied, extended, embedded, social and collective cognition. The results of this analysis help to reshape the interdisciplinary configuration of Web Science, expanding its theoretical and empirical remit to include the disciplines of both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind

A process-oriented approach to the science of human-computer interaction

Since the birth of the field, HCI has defined itself both as a theory of therelations between humans and numerical systems and as a practical activity that aimsat building new interactive systems. However, HCI has not yet succeeded in discoveringa unified theoretical framework nor in building a strong link between both activities.Based on an analysis from various fields, we show that most of the difficulties come fromthe computational paradigm that is still used as a foundation of most of the theories inHCI. This brings us to proposing a new philosophical view on the science of HCI, basedon a process ontology. We show how it accounts for several phenomena related to HCIand unifies them. This approach lends itself to new ways of thinking and programminginteraction at di↵erent scales, which may help HCI scientists in their modelling and designactivities

Naturalising phenomenology: using phenomenology to close the explanatory gap

Naturalists and Phenomenologists have contrasting conceptions of philosophy and its purpose. The naturalist takes philosophy to be a discipline that is continuous with the natural sciences, while phenomenology defines itself by its opposition to such a view of philosophy. My thesis project argues that this opposition is unfounded.The phenomenologist takes the world we consciously experience to be a world of subjective facts. My thesis begins by introducing the phenomenologist's conception of a subjective fact. I call a situation "a subjective fact" when it essentially involves a subject of experience. I go on to explain why phenomenologists thought the world we experience is a world of subjective facts.Naturalists hold that all facts are objective facts, and it is generally supposed that no fact can be both subjective and objective. I argue that it is the contrast between these two kinds of facts that led phenomenologists to conclude that a naturalistic theory of mind will have no place in it for subjective facts.A central claim in my PhD thesis is that a fact can be both subjective and objective. I argue that a naturalist could accept the existence of subjective facts if s/he could admit the existence of situations that essentially involve relations to subjects of experience. If a naturalist is to accept the existence of situations of this kind, a naturalist account must be given of what it is to be a subject of experience.A creature becomes a subject of experience, I claim, when it tokens representations with reflexive content. I offer an account of what it is for a representation to have reflexive content in terms of a special kind of representation I call 'an implicit self-representation'. I offer a naturalist account of implicit self-representation by appealing to the role this notion of representations plays in embodied and situated accounts of perception.I conclude that naturalism can admit into its ontology subjects of experience. The phenomenologist says naturalism must exclude subjective facts with the result that our relation to the world gets misdescribed. I argue that naturalists can admit subjective facts, thereby opening up the possibility of a naturalised phenomenology

The Brain is a Suitability Probability Processor: A macro model of our neural control system

Our world is characterized by growing diversity and complexity, and the effort to manage our affairs in a good way becomes increasingly difficult. This is true for all spheres of life, including culture, economy, technology, science, politics, environment and daily grind. A corresponding development occurs to our understanding of the brain, which is the crucial organ to keep track of everything. The amount of domain specific findings about this organ grows dramatically, what takes preferably place by highly specialized research. But the holistic understanding of the brain is rather more challenged than supported by this development, resulting in a huge lack of knowledge on the systemic level of the neurosciences. Eckhard Schindler faces this dilemma by introducing a macro model of the brain. This is not only an attempt to improve the perception of our most crucial organ, but also to open a door for a better understanding of our species and for ease our life again.:Part 1 - The Brain as Suitability Probability Processor Introduction Neuro basics Purpose, perception and motor control Excitation, inhibition, pattern transformation and circuits Memory Homeostasis, pain, emotions and rewards The SPP model The emoti(onal-moti)vational system The control levels of the central nervous system The attention assessment controller (AAC) Efficiency through delegation and structuring Universal suitability probability evaluation Needs and library of associative-emotivational patterns Higher needs Needs and suitability probability evaluation Suitability probability evaluation and evolution The two types of consciousness Conscious experiences Individual and social consciousness The 4DI model A four-dimensional intelligence concept (4DI) Dynamics of the need hierarchy Social emotivational dependency chains The need for coherence Artificial needs versus growth needs Dynamics in the 3D tension field 3D tensions in the affluent society The tunnel vision paradox Emotivational amplification adaptation Fading consciousness in affluent contexts About the integrative ingredient of 4DI Toe-holds for other disciplines Part 2 - Excursions to the current state of science Introduction Basal ganglia (BG) and frontal cortex Emotion, motivation and memory Cognitive control and emotions Consciousness Psychology Brain and computer The biggest open questions Index of figures Index of tables Reference

Como é ser um enativista

Orientador: Marco Antonio Caron RuffinoTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências HumanasResumo: Explicar fenômenos mentais tem sido um desafio permanente tanto para filósofos quanto para cientistas. Esta tese oferece razões para considerar o Enativismo, especialmente em suas variantes radicais, como uma abordagem que enquadra fenômenos mentais de maneira frutífera. Para enativistas, não somente o cérebro, como também o corpo inteiro, o ambiente e sua história biológica, tanto no nível filogenético como ontogenético, além de aspectos sociais e culturais, são necessários para a compreensão da cognição. Além de apresentar os principais princípios do Enativismo (capítulos 1 e 2), argumento que as maneiras tradicionais de entender a fenomenalidade enfrentam deficiências que derivam de pressuposições filosóficas errôneas. Mais especificamente, as dificuldades profundas em explicar cientificamente a fenomenalidade surgem de expectativas redutivistas implícitas na pesquisa filosófica e científica sobre a mente (capítulo 3) e de uma concepção distorcida de experiência (capítulo 4). Concluo indicando que uma visão inspirada pelo enativismo é não somente possível como, de fato, uma abordagem promissora para a mente e a cogniçãoAbstract: Explaining mental phenomena has been a permanent challenge for both scientists and philosophers. This thesis provides reasons to consider Enactivism, specially in its radical variants, as an approach able to fruitfully frame mental phenomena. For enactivists, not only the brain, but the whole body, the environment and the biological history, both in the phylogenetic and the ontogenetic levels, besides social and cultural aspects are necessary for an adequate understanding of cognition. In addition to presenting the main tenets of Enactivism (chapters 1 and 2), I argue that the standard ways according to which phenomenality has been traditionally understood face shortcomings which derive from misleading philosophical assumptions. More specifically, the deep difficulties in scientifically explaining phenomenality stem from implicit reductive expectations in philosophical and scientific research about the mind (chapter 3) and from a distorted conception of experience (chapter 4). As a conclusion, I indicate that an enactivist inspired view for phenomenality is not only possible, but in fact a promising approach for mind and cognitionDoutoradoFilosofiaDoutora em Filosofia2014/03029-2; 2016/20284-1FAPES