Rate of Arbitrage and Reconciled Beliefs

Any group of risk neutral agents who hold differing beliefs is vulnerable to money pumps (arbitrage). Thus, the agents may wish to reconcile their beliefs into a new joint belief. We propose a criterion for the choice of reconciled belief based on the notion of ``rate of arbitrage.''' It is shown that there exists a unique belief (probability distribution) that minimizes the maximal expected rate of arbitrage, and an explicit formula for this belief is given.

Towards an epistemic theory of probability.

The main concern of this thesis is to develop an epistemic conception of probability. In chapter one we look at Ramsey's work. In addition to his claim that the axioms of probability ace laws of consistency for partial beliefs, we focus attention on his view that the reasonableness of our probability statements does not consist merely in such coherence, but is to be assessed through the vindication of the habits which give rise to them. In chapter two we examine de Finetti's account, and compare it with Ramsey's. One significant point of divergence is de Finetti's claim that coherence is the only valid form of appraisal for probability statements. His arguments for this position depend heavily on the implementation of a Bayesian model for belief change; we argue that such an approach fails to give a satisfactory account of the relation between probabilities and objective facts. In chapter three we stake out the ground for oar own positive proposals - for an account which is non-objective in so far as it does not require the postulation of probabilistic facts, but non-subjective in the sense that probability statements are open to objective forms of appraisal. we suggest that a certain class of probability statements are best interpreted as recommendations of partial belief; these being measurable by the betting quotients that one judges to be fair. Moreover, we argue that these probability statements are open to three main forms of appraisal (each quantifiable through the use of proper scoring rules), namely: (i) Coherence (ii) Calibration (iii) Refinement. The latter two forms of appraisal are applicable both in an ex ante sense (relative to the information known by the forecaster) and an ex post one (relative to the results of the events forecast). In chapters four and five we consider certain problems which confront theories of partial belief; in particular, (1) difficulties surrounding the justification of the rule to maximise one's information, and (2) problems with the ascription of probabilities to mathematical propositions. Both of these issues seem resolvable; the first through the principle of maximising expected utility (SEU), and the second either by amending the axioms of probability, or by making use of the notion that probabilities are appraisable via scoring rules. There do remain, however, various difficulties with SEU, in particular with respect to its application in real-life situations. These are discussed, but no final conclusion reached, except that an epistemic theory such as ours is not undermined by the inapplicability of SEU in certain situations

The shape of incomplete preferences

Incomplete preferences provide the epistemic foundation for models of imprecise subjective probabilities and utilities that are used in robust Bayesian analysis and in theories of bounded rationality. This paper presents a simple axiomatization of incomplete preferences and characterizes the shape of their representing sets of probabilities and utilities. Deletion of the completeness assumption from the axiom system of Anscombe and Aumann yields preferences represented by a convex set of state-dependent expected utilities, of which at least one must be a probability/utility pair. A strengthening of the state-independence axiom is needed to obtain a representation purely in terms of a set of probability/utility pairs.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/009053606000000740 in the Annals of Statistics (http://www.imstat.org/aos/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Literal Perceptual Inference

In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module

Entangling quantum measurement and its properties

We study the mathematical structure of superoperators describing quantum measurements, including the \emph{entangling measurement}--the generalization of the standard quantum measurement that results in entanglement between the measurable system and apparatus. It is shown that the coherent information can be effectively used for the analysis of such entangling measurements whose possible applications are discussed as well.Comment: 8 pages, 1 figure; accepted for publication in Phys. Rev.

Path Integrals, Density Matrices, and Information Flow with Closed Timelike Curves

Two formulations of quantum mechanics, inequivalent in the presence of closed timelike curves, are studied in the context of a soluable system. It illustrates how quantum field nonlinearities lead to a breakdown of unitarity, causality, and superposition using a path integral. Deutsch's density matrix approach is causal but typically destroys coherence. For each of these formulations I demonstrate that there are yet further alternatives in prescribing the handling of information flow (inequivalent to previous analyses) that have implications for any system in which unitarity or coherence are not preserved.Comment: 25 pages, phyzzx, CALT-68-188

Comonotonic Book-Making with Nonadditive Probabilities

This paper shows how de Finetti's book-making principle, commonly used to justify additive subjective probabilities, can be modi-ed to agree with some nonexpected utility models.More precisely, a new foundation of the rank-dependent models is presented that is based on a comonotonic extension of the book-making principle.The extension excludes book-making only if all gambles considered induce a same rank-ordering of the states of nature through favorableness of their associated outcomes, and allows for nonadditive probabilities.Typical features of rank-dependence, hedging, ambiguity aversion, and pessimism and optimism, can be accommodated.Book-making;comonotonic;Choquet expected utility;ambiguity aversion;ordered vector space

Repelling a Prussian charge with a solution to a paradox of Dubins

Pruss (Thought 1:81–89, 2012) uses an example of Lester Dubins to argue against the claim that appealing to hyperreal-valued probabilities saves probabilistic regularity from the objection that in continuum outcome-spaces and with standard probability functions all save countably many possibilities must be assigned probability 0. Dubins’s example seems to show that merely finitely additive standard probability functions allow reasoning to a foregone conclusion, and Pruss argues that hyperreal-valued probability functions are vulnerable to the same charge. However, Pruss’s argument relies on the rule of conditionalisation, but I show that in examples like Dubins’s involving nonconglomerable probabilities, conditionalisation is self-defeating