Challenges for ‘Community’ in Science and Values: Cases from Robotics Research

Philosophers of science often make reference — whether tacitly or explicitly — to the notion of a scientific community. Sometimes, such references are useful to make our object of analysis tractable in the philosophy of science. For others, tracking or understanding particular features of the development of science proves to be tied to notions of a scientific community either as a target of theoretical or social intervention. We argue that the structure of contemporary scientific research poses two unappreciated, or at least underappreciated, challenges to this concept of the “scientific community” in the philosophy of science. In particular, we will present two case studies from robotics research, broadly construed, which show that (1) the boundedness of the scientific community is threatened when private citizens can develop scientific and technological advances at minimal expense (democratization), and (2) the discreteness of scientific research programs is threatened by the complexly interrelated environment of contemporary scientific work (interconnectivity). Taken together, the extent of democratization and interconnectivity present a significant challenge for any practically oriented philosophy of science, one which we hope will be taken on directly by philosophers in the future

Challenges for ‘Community’ in Science and Values: Cases from Robotics Research

Philosophers of science often make reference — whether tacitly or explicitly — to the notion of a scientific community. Sometimes, such references are useful to make our object of analysis tractable in the philosophy of science. For others, tracking or understanding particular features of the development of science proves to be tied to notions of a scientific community either as a target of theoretical or social intervention. We argue that the structure of contemporary scientific research poses two unappreciated, or at least underappreciated, challenges to this concept of the “scientific community” in the philosophy of science. In particular, we will present two case studies from robotics research, broadly construed, which show that (1) the boundedness of the scientific community is threatened when private citizens can develop scientific and technological advances at minimal expense (democratization), and (2) the discreteness of scientific research programs is threatened by the complexly interrelated environment of contemporary scientific work (interconnectivity). Taken together, the extent of democratization and interconnectivity present a significant challenge for any practically oriented philosophy of science, one which we hope will be taken on directly by philosophers in the future

Explainable Artificial Intelligence in Data Science: From Foundational Issues Towards Socio-technical Considerations

A widespread need to explain the behavior and outcomes of AI-based systems has emerged, due to their ubiquitous presence. Thus, providing renewed momentum to the relatively new research area of eXplainable AI (XAI). Nowadays, the importance of XAI lies in the fact that the increasing control transference to this kind of system for decision making -or, at least, its use for assisting executive stakeholders- already afects many sensitive realms (as in Politics, Social Sciences, or Law). The decision making power handover to opaque AI systems makes mandatory explaining those, primarily in application scenarios where the stakeholders are unaware of both the high technology applied and the basic principles governing the technological solu tions. The issue should not be reduced to a merely technical problem; the explainer would be compelled to transmit richer knowledge about the system (including its role within the informational ecosystem where he/she works). To achieve such an aim, the explainer could exploit, if necessary, practices from other scientifc and humanistic areas. The frst aim of the paper is to emphasize and justify the need for a multidisciplinary approach that is benefciated from part of the scientifc and philosophical corpus on Explaining, underscoring the particular nuances of the issue within the feld of Data Science. The second objective is to develop some arguments justifying the authors’ bet by a more relevant role of ideas inspired by, on the one hand, formal techniques from Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, and on the other hand, the modeling of human reasoning when facing the explanation. This way, explaining modeling practices would seek a sound balance between the pure technical justifcation and the explainer-explainee agreement.Agencia Estatal de Investigación PID2019-109152GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/50110001103

Criteria of Empirical Significance: Foundations, Relations, Applications

This dissertation consists of three parts. Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists' application of an artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance, which I analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis, in part III I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific status of intelligent design, and further discuss confirmation, reduction, and concept formation

Criteria of Empirical Significance: Foundations, Relations, Applications

This dissertation consists of three parts. Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists' application of an artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance, which I analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis, in part III I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific status of intelligent design, and further discuss confirmation, reduction, and concept formation

Are phenomenology and naturalism compatible

Abstract: We find in Husserl’s texts – Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900), Philosophy as Rigorous Science (1911), and Ideas (1913-4) – that the incompatibility of phenomenology and naturalism is self-evident because consciousness is treated: (a) as the foundation of experience of the world in phenomenology and, (b) as other things in the world in naturalism. Secondly, mental experience (a) is approached using intentionality in phenomenology and, (b) is approached using causality in naturalism. In this dissertation, I argue that Husserl does not mean, in all cases, that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible, specifically, if Husserl’s text, Phenomenological Psychology (1925) is analyzed and the themes of embodiment and enactivism are drawn out from the text. Firstly, I show that since phenomenology treats consciousness as the foundation of experience of the world, including natural experience, phenomenology swallows up naturalism – making them incompatible. Secondly, I abandon the transcendental version of phenomenology and combine some parts of phenomenology and naturalism to explain the mind. By so doing, I draw out, – using the analyses of Jack Reynolds, Francesco Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, – the themes of (a) enactivism from the relationship between phenomenology and cognitive science, and (b) embodiment from the relationship between phenomenology and biological science, noting that the latter are naturalist disciplines. While embodiment studies the mind as it animates the body, enactivism studies the rise of cognition when the acting body interacts with the environment. Lastly, I present the possibility of compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism by analyzing Husserl’s text, Phenomenological Psychology (1925) and drawing out the themes of embodiment and enactivism in the text. I show from the text that Husserl bypasses the transcendental questions and presents phenomenological psychology as a version that is compatible with naturalism.M.Phil. (Philosophy

Concepts enacted: confronting the obstacles and paradoxes inherent in pursuing a scientific understanding of the building blocks of human thought

This thesis confronts a fundamental shortcoming in cognitive science research: a failure to be explicit about the theory of concepts underlying cognitive science research and a resulting failure to justify that theory philosophically or otherwise. It demonstrates how most contemporary debates over theories of concepts divide over whether concepts are best understood as (mental) representations or as non-representational abilities. It concludes that there can be no single correct ontology, and that both perspectives are logically necessary. It details three critical distinctions that are frequently neglected: between concepts as we possess and employ them non-reflectively, and concepts as we reflect upon them; between the private (subjective) and public (inter-subjective) aspects of concepts; and between concepts as approached from a realist versus anti-realist perspective. Metaphysical starting points fundamentally shape conclusions. The main contribution of this thesis is a pragmatic, meticulously detailed, and distinctive account of concepts in terms of their essential nature, core properties, and context of application. This is done within the framework of Peter Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces theory of concepts, which is offered as a bridging account, best able to tie existing theories together into one framework. A set of extensions to conceptual spaces theory, called the unified conceptual space theory, are offered as a means of pushing Gärdenfors’ theory in a more algorithmically amenable and empirically testable direction. The unified conceptual space theory describes how all of an agent’s many different conceptual spaces, as described by Gärdenfors, are mapped together into one unified space of spaces, and how an analogous process happens at the societal level. The unified conceptual space theory is put to work offering a distinctive account of the co-emergence of concepts and experience out of a circularly causal process. Finally, an experimental application of the theory is presented, in the form of a simple computer program

Sensor Fusion in the Perception of Self-Motion

This dissertation has been written at the Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics (Max-Planck-Institut für Biologische Kybernetik) in Tübingen in the department of Prof. Dr. Heinrich H. Bülthoff. The work has universitary support by Prof. Dr. Günther Palm (University of Ulm, Abteilung Neuroinformatik). Main evaluators are Prof. Dr. Günther Palm, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Becker (University of Ulm, Sektion Neurophysiologie) and Prof. Dr. Heinrich Bülthoff.amp;lt;bramp;gt;amp;lt;bramp;gt; The goal of this thesis was to investigate the integration of different sensory modalities in the perception of self-motion, by using psychophysical methods. Experiments with healthy human participants were to be designed for and performed in the Motion Lab, which is equipped with a simulator platform and projection screen. Results from psychophysical experiments should be used to refine models of the multisensory integration process, with an mphasis on Bayesian (maximum likelihood) integration mechanisms.amp;lt;bramp;gt;amp;lt;bramp;gt; To put the psychophysical experiments into the larger framework of research on multisensory integration in the brain, results of neuroanatomical and neurophysiological experiments on multisensory integration are also reviewed

Actor & Avatar: A Scientific and Artistic Catalog

What kind of relationship do we have with artificial beings (avatars, puppets, robots, etc.)? What does it mean to mirror ourselves in them, to perform them or to play trial identity games with them? Actor & Avatar addresses these questions from artistic and scholarly angles. Contributions on the making of "technical others" and philosophical reflections on artificial alterity are flanked by neuroscientific studies on different ways of perceiving living persons and artificial counterparts. The contributors have achieved a successful artistic-scientific collaboration with extensive visual material