Flight crew aiding for recovery from subsystem failures

Some of the conceptual issues associated with pilot aiding systems are discussed and an implementation of one component of such an aiding system is described. It is essential that the format and content of the information the aiding system presents to the crew be compatible with the crew's mental models of the task. It is proposed that in order to cooperate effectively, both the aiding system and the flight crew should have consistent information processing models, especially at the point of interface. A general information processing strategy, developed by Rasmussen, was selected to serve as the bridge between the human and aiding system's information processes. The development and implementation of a model-based situation assessment and response generation system for commercial transport aircraft are described. The current implementation is a prototype which concentrates on engine and control surface failure situations and consequent flight emergencies. The aiding system, termed Recovery Recommendation System (RECORS), uses a causal model of the relevant subset of the flight domain to simulate the effects of these failures and to generate appropriate responses, given the current aircraft state and the constraints of the current flight phase. Since detailed information about the aircraft state may not always be available, the model represents the domain at varying levels of abstraction and uses the less detailed abstraction levels to make inferences when exact information is not available. The structure of this model is described in detail

Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy

\u3e Context • The alleged dichotomy between mind and matter is pervasive. Therefore, the attempt to explain mat- ter in terms of mind (idealism) is often considered a mirror image of that of explaining mind in terms of mat- ter (mainstream physicalism), in the sense of being structurally equivalent despite being reversely arranged. \u3e Problem • I argue that this is an error arising from language artifacts, for dichotomies must reside in the same level of abstraction. \u3e Method • I show that, because matter outside mind is not an empirical observation but rather an explanatory model, the epistemic symmetry between the two is broken. Consequently, matter and mind cannot reside in the same level of abstraction. \u3e Results • It then becomes clear that attempting to explain mind in terms of matter is epistemically more costly than attempting to explain matter in terms of mind. \u3e Implications • The qualities of experience are suggested to be not only epistemically, but also ontologically primary. \u3e Constructivist content • I high- light the primacy of perceptual constructs over explanatory abstraction on both epistemic and ontic levels. \u3e Key words • Idealism, physicalism, pancomputationalism, anti-realism, hard problem of consciousness, epistemic symmetry, explanatory abstraction, levels of abstraction

Semantic Ambiguity and Perceived Ambiguity

I explore some of the issues that arise when trying to establish a connection between the underspecification hypothesis pursued in the NLP literature and work on ambiguity in semantics and in the psychological literature. A theory of underspecification is developed `from the first principles', i.e., starting from a definition of what it means for a sentence to be semantically ambiguous and from what we know about the way humans deal with ambiguity. An underspecified language is specified as the translation language of a grammar covering sentences that display three classes of semantic ambiguity: lexical ambiguity, scopal ambiguity, and referential ambiguity. The expressions of this language denote sets of senses. A formalization of defeasible reasoning with underspecified representations is presented, based on Default Logic. Some issues to be confronted by such a formalization are discussed.Comment: Latex, 47 pages. Uses tree-dvips.sty, lingmacros.sty, fullname.st

The Yarmouk tributary to the Jordan river I: Agreements impeding equitable transboundary water arrangements

This article explores the ways in which two international water agreements on the Yarmouk tributary to the Jordan River induce or impede transformation to equitable transboundary water arrangements. The agreements in question were reached between Jordan and Syria in 1987, and between Jordan and Israel in 1994. Following a brief review of theory and a summary of the body of knowledge on 'model' agreements, the article combines official river-gauging data with interviews and textual analysis to query the text and role of the agreements, particularly in relation to key dams and other infrastructure. Both agreements are found to i) lack important clauses that could govern groundwater abstraction, environmental concerns, water quality, and the ability to adapt to changing water quality, availability and need; and ii) include both ambiguous and rigid clauses that result in generally inequitable allocation of water and thus of the benefits derived from its use. Due to their omissions and to their reflection of the asymmetries in power between the states, both agreements are found to be 'blind' to existing use, to be incapable of dealing with urgent governance needs, and to impede more equitable arrangements

Theoretical models of the role of visualisation in learning formal reasoning

Although there is empirical evidence that visualisation tools can help students to learn formal subjects such as logic, and although particular strategies and conceptual difficulties have been identified, it has so far proved difficult to provide a general model of learning in this context that accounts for these findings in a systematic way. In this paper, four attempts at explaining the relative difficulty of formal concepts and the role of visualisation in this learning process are presented. These explanations draw on several existing theories, including Vygotsky's Zone of Proximal Development, Green's Cognitive Dimensions, the Popper-Campbell model of conjectural learning, and cognitive complexity. The paper concludes with a comparison of the utility and applicability of the different models. It is also accompanied by a reflexive commentary[0] (linked to this paper as a hypertext) that examines the ways in which theory has been used within these arguments, and which attempts to relate these uses to the wider context of learning technology research