The Evolution of Shopping Center Research: A Review and Analysis

Retail research has evolved over the past sixty years. Christaller\u27s early work on central place theory, with its simplistic combination of range and threshold has been advanced to include complex consumer shopping patterns and retailer behavior in agglomerated retail centers. Hotelling\u27s seminal research on competition in a spatial duopoly has been realized in the form of comparison shopping in regional shopping centers. The research that has followed Christaller and Hoteling has been as wide as it has been deep, including literature in geography, economics, finance, marketing, and real estate. In combination, the many extensions of central place theory and retail agglomeration economics have clearly enhanced the understanding of both retailer and consumer behavior. In addition to these two broad areas of shopping center research, two more narrowly focused areas of research have emerged. The most recent focus in the literature has been on the positive effects large anchor tenants have on smaller non-anchor tenant sales. These positive effects are referred to as retail demand externalities. Exploring the theoretical basis for the valuation of shopping centers has been another area of interest to researchers. The primary focus of this literature is based in the valuation of current and expected lease contracts

Stability Of Nash Equilibria In Locational Games

Consider a locational game on a network in which two competing facilities charge fixed, but not necessarily equal, prices and the decision variables are their respective locations. Rather than deciding in a given situation whether Or not an equilibrium exists, we devise a stability index that measures the stability or instability of a given situation. In other words, given that an equilibrium exists, our index indicates how much external effort (or subsidy) is required to destroy that equilibrium; if equilibria do not exist, the index shows how much external effort (or tax) is needed to "generate" an equilibrium. Computational evidence for randomly generated problems is presented

Reachability of locational Nash equilibria

This paper examines the location of duopolists on a tree. Given parametric prices, we first delineate necessary and sufficient conditions for locational Nash equilibria on trees. Given these conditions, we then show that Nash equilibria, provided they exist, can be reached in a repeated sequential relocation process in which both facil-ities follow short-term profit maximization objectives

RJVs and Price Collusione under Endogenous Product Differentiation

We characterise the interplay between firms' decisions in product development, be it joint or independent, and their ensuing repeated price behaviour, either collusive or Bertrand- Nash. Firms face a choice between participating in a joint venture inventing a single product, and in independent ventures developing their respective products which can be either horizontally or vertically differentiated. We prove that joint product development and the resulting lack of horizontal product differentiation may destabilise collusion, whilst firms' R&D decisions have no bearings on collusive stability in the vertical differentiation setting. We also discover the non-monotone dependence of firms' venture decisions at the development stage upon their intertemporal preferences, as well as upon consumers' willingness to pay

RJVs and Price Collusion under Endogenous Product Differentiation

We characterise the interplay between firms' decisions in product development, be it joint or independent, and their ensuing repeated price behaviour, either collusive or Bertrand-Nash. Firms face a choice between participating in a joint venture inventing a single product, and in independent ventures developing their respective products which can be either horizontally or vertically differentiated. We prove that joint product development and the resulting lack of horizontal product differentiation may destabilise collusion, whilst firms' R&D decisions have no bearings on collusive stability in the vertical differentiation setting. We also discover the non-monotone dependence of firms' venture decisions at the development stage upon their intertemporal preferences, as well as upon consumers' willingness to pay

Hub location under competition

Ankara : The Department of Industrial Engineering and the Graduate School of Engineering and Science of Bilkent University, 2013.Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 2013.Includes bibliographical references leaves 64-69.Hubs are consolidation and dissemination points in many-to-many flow networks. The hub location problem is to locate hubs among available nodes and allocate non-hub nodes to these hubs. The mainstream hub location studies focus on optimal decisions of one decision-maker with respect to some objective(s) even though the markets that benefit hubbing are oligopolies. Therefore, in this thesis, we propose a competitive hub location problem where the market is assumed to be a duopoly. Two decision-makers (or firms) sequentially decide the locations of their hubs and then customers choose the firm according to provided service levels. Each decision-maker aims to maximize his/her market share. Having investigated the existing studies in the field of economy, retail location and operation research, we propose two problems for the leader (former decision-maker) and follower (latter decision-maker): (r|Xp) hub-medianoid and (r|p) hub-centroid problems. After defining them as combinatorial optimization problems, the problems are proved to be NP-hard. Linear programming models are presented for these problems as well as exact solution algorithms for the (r|p) hub-centroid problem that outperform the linear model in terms of memory requirement and CPU time. The performance of models and algorithms are tested by the computational analysis conducted on two well-known data sets from the hub location literature.Mahmutoğulları, Ali İrfanM.S