Factors Associated with Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever:

Background. Reliable on-site polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing for Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) is not always available. Therefore, clinicians triage patients on the basis of presenting symptoms and contact history. Using patient data collected in Uige, Angola, in 2005, we assessed the sensitivity and specificity of these factors to evaluate the validity of World Health Organization (WHO)–recommended case definitions for MHF. Methods. Multivariable logistic regression was used to identify independent predictors of PCR confirmation of MHF. A data-derived algorithm was developed to obtain new MHF case definitions with improved sensitivity and specificity. Results. A MHF case definition comprising (1) an epidemiological link or (2) the combination of myalgia or arthralgia and any hemorrhage could potentially serve as an alternative to current case definitions. Our dataderived case definitions maintained the sensitivity and improved the specificity of current WHO-recommended case definitions. Conclusions. Continued efforts to improve clinical documentation during filovirus outbreaks would aid in the refinement of case definitions and facilitate outbreak control

What is the smallest prime?

What is the first prime? It seems that the number two should be the obvious answer, and today it is, but it was not always so. There were times when and mathematicians for whom the numbers one and three were acceptable answers. To find the first prime, we must also know what the first positive integer is. Surprisingly, with the definitions used at various times throughout history, one was often not the first positive integer (some started with two, and a few with three). In this article, we survey the history of the primality of one, from the ancient Greeks to modern times. We will discuss some of the reasons definitions changed, and provide several examples. We will also discuss the last significant mathematicians to list the number one as prime.Comment: 11 pages, 5 figure

Econometric reduction theory and philosophy

Econometric reduction theory provides a comprehensive probabilistic framework for the analysis and classification of the reductions (simplifications) associated with empirical econometric models. However, the available approaches to econometric reduction theory are unable to satisfactory accommodate a commonplace theory of social reality, namely that the course of history is indeterministic, that history does not repeat itself and that the future depends on the past. Using concepts from philosophy this paper proposes a solution to these shortcomings, which in addition permits new reductions, interpretations and definitions

What is metaphysics ? The one and only meaningful definition, and why traditional academic philosophy is unlikely ever to embrace it

‘Metaphysics’ is the quest to find the ultimate meaning and purpose of existence. It is about trying to find a decisive and conclusive resolution to the human condition, such that the human condition is fulfilled in some absolute way, and no longer at the mercy of meaningless suffering, or a dreadful sense of uncertainty. All other definitions and determinations of metaphysics are trivial, and irrelevant; and, given the critical importance of the quest for human fulfilment – our lives are not infinite, after all – really quite bewildering. Western philosophy has never understood this, and its entire intellectual history has been characterised by a persistent debasing of any simple, straightforward and direct quest for objective metaphysical self-knowledge, preferring instead always to indulge either in pedantic squabbling over definitions, distinctions and conceptual manoeuvrings, or in flatulent ‘system building’

Misclassification Bias Related to Definition of Menopausal Status in Case-Control Studies of Breast Cancer

It is often assumed, but has not been consistently observed, that some characteristics of reproductive history are specifically related to breast cancer of pre- or postmenopausal onset. To determine whether inconsistent reports may be due to differences in definition of menopause, we computed the relative odds (RO) of breast cancer for nulliparity, age at first live birth, family history of breast cancer and prior history of benign breast disease, separately in pre- and postmenopausal women, using seven different definitions of menopause. Results show that (i) relative odds of breast cancer and their confidence intervals may vary according to definitions of menopause; (ii) age-based definitions of menopause are associated with moderate differential misclassification bias between cases and controls; (iii) nulliparity, late age at first birth and family history of breast cancer seem to be specific risk factors for pre- but not postmenopausal breast cancer when cutoff for menopausal status is 10 years or more after last menses; and (iv) when information on menstrual history is not available, 50 years of age may be the best proxy for all menses-based definitions of menopause. We conclude that inconsistent findings on the effect of menopausal status in the association of breast cancer with some reproductive factors are partly due to statistical imprecision and differential misclassification bias associated with different age-based or menses-based definitions of menopause. Researchers should either test whether their conclusions hold using several definitions of menopause or give a biological rationale for the choice of a given definition of menopaus