An Examination into Teacher Hiring: Preferences, Efficiency, Stability, and Student Outcomes

This dissertation studies teacher hiring practices, an avenue to potentially raise teacher quality which has not been studied extensively. I analyze three aspects of the teacher hiring process, which, if improved, could promote education quality: the principal hiring decision, the teacher application decision, and the effects of information on teacher behavior and market outcomes in the teacher labor market. The first two are empirical studies utilizing administrative data from an urban school district, and the last is a laboratory experiment. Education is a labor focused enterprise where outcomes are largely determined by teacher quality, so hiring the most productive teachers is paramount. Hiring is even more important given that teaching is a high-turnover profession, thus hiring occurs frequently. I first compare the elements of a teacher’s application that predict principal hiring decisions to those predicting teacher performance and retention outcomes. Similar to other recent work, I find disparities between the two sets of predictors. I utilize additional methods to study the relation of the size and quality of the applicant pool, as well as how those factors relate to the quality of the selected candidate. The results indicate that the applicant pools do not systematically vary by school characteristics in an obvious manner. Also, while the quality of the candidate pool may influence principal hiring decisions, it is not the dominate factor. Given that teaching sorting across schools occurs in the new-teacher labor market (Sass, et al. 2012) and in post-hire differential patterns of teacher mobility,[1] which in turn create disparities in access to effective teachers, it is important to understand the mechanisms that lead to teacher sorting across schools. In chapter 2, I study how teacher application behavior reveals teacher preferences over schools. The preferences can lead to differences in application pools, thereby affecting principals’ ability to hire quality candidates. I find that the application decisions of new-to-the-district candidates may be affected by accountability pressures or the resource level in high-needs schools, but current teachers’ revealed preferences agree with those previously found in the research literature. It has also been found that a teacher’s compatibility with a school can affect their ability to improve student outcomes and their own satisfaction (which decreases mobility, thereby increasing experience and decreasing turnover costs). In my third chapter, I use a laboratory experiment to examine teacher and school behavior and their effects on outcomes in a controlled setting while varying the preference structure of the market and the information agents have on competitors’ actions. I find that information on competitor behavior affects signaling behavior and the market efficiency and payoffs, but that these effects are dependent on the preference structure. I also find that the preference structure affects the stability of the matches. [1] Darling-Hammond, 2001; Viadero, 2002; Gordon & Maxey, 2000; Goldhaber et al., 2007; Feng & Sass, 201

Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy

The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the incentives to increase the quality of the researchers hired. We analyze the mechanism both under complete and incomplete information. The comparison of the theoretical findings with the available data points out that the mechanism provides poor incentives and does not prevent collusion between research departments and candidates in the hiring process.Matching Markets; Preagreements; Implementation.

Information Channels in Labor Markets. On the Resilience of Referral Hiring

Economists and sociologists disagree over markets' potential to assume functions typically performed by networks of personal connections, first among them the transmission of information. This paper begins from a model of labor markets where social ties are stronger between similar individuals and firms employing productive workers prefer to rely on personal referrals than to hire on the anonymous market (Montgomery (1991). However, we allow workers in the market to engage in a costly action that can signal their high productivity, and ask whether the possibility of signaling reduces the reliance on the network. We find that the network is remarkably resilient. To be effective signaling must fulfill two contradictory requirements: unless the signal is extremely precise, it must be expensive or it is not informative; but it must be cheap, or the network can undercut it.Networks, Signaling, Referral hiring, Referral premium

Converging to efficiency : the Ramón y Cajal Program experience

We analyze the evolution on the design of a policy measure promoted by the Spanish Government: the Ramón y Cajal Program. In the first calls of the Program, an eligibility requirement for a researcher was a preacceptance from at least one Spanish research institution. This requirement was removed in the fourth call. We model the recruiting process as a twosided matching model to find the reason for the new design. We model the situation as if research centers decided by majority to play either the old or the new mechanism. Our results prove that in a repeated game and assuming that research personnel is scarce, even endogamic centers will prefer the new mechanism after a finite number of calls. We also analyze application data for the first five calls, finding empirical support to our assumptions and theoretical findings

GOVERNING OF LABOR SUPPLY IN BULGARIAN FARMS

This is the second paper from a series of articles on governing of different types of transactions in Bulgarian farming applying the framework of New Institutional and Transaction Cost Economics. It is based on a large scale microeconomic data from 194 typical commercial farms of different sizes and types from all regions of the country. This study concentrates on factors and modes for organization of labor supply in Bulgarian farms. Structure of kind of labor (permanent, seasonal, irregular, others), and type of labor use (in production, in administration, in management, for protection, others), and labor source (own labor, family labor, hired labor, cooperative members, others) in farms of different types and sizes has been determined. Microeconomic factors responsible for various organizational and contract choices for labor supply (own cultivation, using of family labor, hiring of workers, cooperation etc.) have been specified. Dominant governing modes have been explained by comparative advantages for saving on transacting costs (for finding partners, contracting, monitoring of hired labor, conflict resolutions, renewal of contracts etc). Limits of farm extension (optimization) through effective alternative (to outside labor supply) modes for “internal” service, and inputs, and land supply have been determined. Transaction costs economizing framework has been used through analysis of: types of wage formation (time based, output based, mixed) for different categories of labor; reasons for hiring labor (extension of business, support of own labor, support of family labor, replace of family labor, others); ways of application of hired labor (in production, in administration, in management, in protection, others); personality of different types of hired labor (relatives; close friends; known before hiring; unknown before first hiring; same persons every time; from universities, agricultural schools etc; others); frequency of experiencing problems leading to suspension of labor contracts; main reasons for conflicts with hired labor (lack of qualification; lack of desire for hard work; lack of entrepreneurial spirit; cheating, stealing etc); kind of contracts with different types of labor (informal, written) and extend of specifications of contract obligations; ways of income formation (fixed monthly wages, daily based, output based, based on final year results, others) of different categories of labor in crop, livestock, services and management. Relative level of farms transaction costs associated with labor supply (for finding needed labor, negotiation and contracting, for directing and monitoring of hired labor, for contract enforcement and disputing etc.) has been determined. Besides high governing costs associated with labor contracts other factors restricting farm enlargement of Bulgarian farms as present stage are: high enforcement costs of contracts in general, and enormous credit supply and marketing costs. According to estimate of farm managers most important factors for future development of farms relate to improvement of institutional environment (guaranteed marketing, enforcement of Laws and private contracts, macro-economic stability, legislation framework, access to free markets) and own and family experience in farm management.type of labor and service contract, organization of labor, governing of labor and service supply, farm organization, transaction costs, transitional farming structure

The Use of Flexible Measures to Cope with Economic Crises in Germany and Brazil

This study gives a comparative overview of labor market dynamics and institutional arrangements in Germany and Brazil with particular emphasis on industrial relations, wage setting, unemployment benefits, employment protection and vocational training. The paper shows that institutions determine the mode of adjustment to changing economic conditions and the role of standard vs. non-standard contracts. Whereas internal flexibility via shorter working time was a dominant mode of adjustment during the 2008-09 crisis in the German manufacturing sector, in Brazil such plant-level flexibility to avoid dismissals was less prominent.dismissal protection, working time, labor market flexibility, Germany, Brazil

Vulnerability to Broker-Related Forced Labor Among Migrant Workers in Information Technology Manufacturing in Taiwan and Malaysia

This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, Cornell University, pertaining to the effects of globalization on the workplace worldwide. Special emphasis is placed on labor rights, working conditions, labor market changes, and union organizing.V_HELP_WANTED_A_Verit%C3%A9_Report_Workers_in_Taiwan___Malaysia.pdf: 1735 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

Recommendations in the Italian Labour Market: An Empirical Analysis

In this paper I focus on one of the most peculiar features of the Italian labour market: the importance played by recommendations in the hiring of new personnel. It is usually argued that, in contrast with the experience of other industrialized countries, in Italy letters of reference are not used to signal job applicants' qualities, but only to obtain a favoured treatment in the hiring process. Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms have used those practices both to overcome rigid hiring regulation and to weaken unions' power. In the empirical analysis, conducted on data drawn from the 1991 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth, I show that while workers seeking through recommendations increase the chance of being hired, they also pay a ''recommendation fee'' vis-a-vis workers hired through more traditional mechanisms. I provide various explanations for these results.Labour market imperfections, Earnings function