Hire the Experts: Combinatorial Auction Based Scheme for Experts Selection in E-Healthcare

During the last decade, scheduling the healthcare services (such as staffs and OTs) inside the hospitals have assumed a central role in healthcare. Recently, some works are addressed in the direction of hiring the expert consultants (mainly doctors) for the critical healthcare scenarios from outside of the medical unit, in both strategic and non-strategic settings under monetary and non-monetary perspectives. In this paper, we have tried to investigate the experts hiring problem with multiple patients and multiple experts; where each patient reports a preferred set of experts which is private information alongwith their private cost for consultancy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first step in the direction of modeling the experts hiring problem in the combinatorial domain. In this paper, the combinatorial auction based scheme is proposed for hiring experts from outside of the hospitals to have expertise by the preferred doctors set to the patients.Comment: 7 Page

A mechanism design framework for hiring experts in e-healthcare

We investigate the problem of hiring experts (motivated socially and monetarily) from outside of the hospital(s) in e-healthcare through the lens of mechanism design with and without money. This paper presents the mechanisms that handle the following scenarios: 1) Multiple patients and multiple experts with patients having zero budget, 2) Single or multiple patients and multiple experts with patient(s) having some positive budget. In this paper, for the first scenario, we have proposed algorithms based on the theory of mechanism design without money that satisfies several economic properties such as truthfulness, pareto optimality, and core allocation. Considering the second scenario, the truthful and budget feasible mechanisms are proposed. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanismsPeer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

A budget feasible mechanism for hiring doctors in e-healthcare

(c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.Throughout the past decade, there has been an extensive research on scheduling the hospital resources such as the operation theatre(s) (OTs) and the experts (such as nurses, doctors etc.) inside the hospitals. With the technological growth, mainly advancement in communication media (such as smart phones, video conferencing, smart watches etc.) one may think of taking the expertise by the doctors (distributed around the globe) from outside the in-house hospitals. Earlier this interesting situation of hiring doctors from outside the hospitals has been studied from monetary (with patient having infinite budget) and non-monetary perspectives in strategic setting. In this paper, the more realistic situation is studied in terms of hiring the doctors from outside the hospital when a patient is constrained by budget. Our proposed mechanisms follow the two pass mechanism design framework each consisting of allocation rule and payment rule. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanisms.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

A budget feasible mechanism for hiring doctors in e-healthcare

(c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.Throughout the past decade, there has been an extensive research on scheduling the hospital resources such as the operation theatre(s) (OTs) and the experts (such as nurses, doctors etc.) inside the hospitals. With the technological growth, mainly advancement in communication media (such as smart phones, video conferencing, smart watches etc.) one may think of taking the expertise by the doctors (distributed around the globe) from outside the in-house hospitals. Earlier this interesting situation of hiring doctors from outside the hospitals has been studied from monetary (with patient having infinite budget) and non-monetary perspectives in strategic setting. In this paper, the more realistic situation is studied in terms of hiring the doctors from outside the hospital when a patient is constrained by budget. Our proposed mechanisms follow the two pass mechanism design framework each consisting of allocation rule and payment rule. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanisms.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Management practices in Australian healthcare: can NSW public hospitals do better?

© 2016, © Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of best management practices in an Australian state-run healthcare system, namely New South Wales (NSW), and studies the impact of a range of hospital factors in driving best management practices as a means of enhancing healthcare delivery. Design/methodology/approach – This study adapts a unique survey instrument globally tested to quantify the multi-dimensional nature of hospital management practices in 42 acute care public hospitals of NSW. The authors then analysed the role of hospital-specific characteristics in driving best management practices, namely hospital size (measured by the number of hospital beds, employees and doctors), level of skill and education, degree of hospital manager autonomy and organisational hierarchy. Findings – The findings of this study show the areas of strength and potential areas of improvement in NSW hospitals. The authors find a positive association between the adoption of better management practices and hospital size (measured by the number of hospital beds and employees), level of skills and education, degree of hospital manager autonomy and organisational hierarchy. However, hospital size as measured by the number of doctors did not have a statistically significant relationship. Practical implications – This paper is of interest to both hospital administrators, clinical doctors and healthcare policy-makers who want to improve and develop strategies for better management in the healthcare sector. Originality/value – This study provides an internationally comparable robust measure of management capability in public hospitals, and contributes to the evidence-base of management practices and performance in hospitals

Socio-indicators related to social perception of reforms in the public health system.The romanian case

The paper approaches the social perception of the reform in the public health system through statistic modelling and analyses. Based upon the general framework of the European and international activities on improving the public health policies, the structure of the first part of the paper comprises the description of the health security models, analyses for Central and Eastern European countries, SWOT analysis on the health system in Romania. The socio indicators are empirically described, taking into consideration the measurement of the medical staff opinion on the quality of the reform process.models of public health systems, social perception, socio indicators, empirical analysis

Efficiency of Government Social Spending in Croatia

This paper analyzes the relative efficiency of social spending and service delivery in Croatia by comparing social spending and key social (outcome) indicators in Croatia to those of comparator countries. The analysis finds evidence of significant inefficiencies in Croatia’s social spending, mainly related to inadequate cost recovery for health and education services, weaknesses in the financing mechanisms and institutional arrangements, weak competition in the provision of social services, and weaknesses in targeting benefits. The paper also identifies areas for cost recovery and reform.Expenditure efficiency; health care spending; education spending; social protection spending

Hiring expert consultants in e-healthcare: an analytics-based two sided matching approach

Very often in some censorious healthcare scenario, there may be a need to have some expert consultancies (especially by doctors) that are not available in-house to the hospitals. Earlier, this interesting healthcare scenario of hiring the expert consultants (mainly doctors) from outside of the hospitals had been studied with the robust concepts of mechanism design with money and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we explore the more realistic two sided matching market in our healthcare set-up. In this, the members of the two participating communities, namely the patients and the doctors are revealing the strict preference ordering over the members of the opposite community for a stipulated amount of time. We assume that the patients and doctors are strategic in nature. With the theoretical analysis, we demonstrate that the TOMHECs, that results in the stable allocation of doctors to the patients, satisfies the several economic properties such as strategy-proof-ness (or truthfulness) and optimality. Further, the analytically based analysis of our proposed mechanisms i.e. RAMHECs and TOMHECs are carried out on the ground of the expected distance of the allocation done by the mechanisms from the top most preference. The proposed mechanisms are also validated with the help of exhaustive experiments.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft