Higher-Order Matching, Games and Automata

Higher-order matching is the problem given t = u where t, u are terms of simply typed λ-calculus and u is closed, is there a substitution θ such that tθ and u have the same normal form with respect to βη-equality: can t be pattern matched to u? This paper considers the question: can we characterize the set of all solution terms to a matching problem? We provide an automata-theoretic account that is relative to resource: given a matching problem and a finite set of variables and constants, the (possibly infinite) set of terms that are built from those components and that solve the problem is regular. The characterization uses standard bottom-up tree automata. 1

Visibly Linear Dynamic Logic

We introduce Visibly Linear Dynamic Logic (VLDL), which extends Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) by temporal operators that are guarded by visibly pushdown languages over finite words. In VLDL one can, e.g., express that a function resets a variable to its original value after its execution, even in the presence of an unbounded number of intermediate recursive calls. We prove that VLDL describes exactly the $\omega$-visibly pushdown languages. Thus it is strictly more expressive than LTL and able to express recursive properties of programs with unbounded call stacks. The main technical contribution of this work is a translation of VLDL into $\omega$-visibly pushdown automata of exponential size via one-way alternating jumping automata. This translation yields exponential-time algorithms for satisfiability, validity, and model checking. We also show that visibly pushdown games with VLDL winning conditions are solvable in triply-exponential time. We prove all these problems to be complete for their respective complexity classes.Comment: 25 Page

Leaving the prison: A discussion of the Iterated prisoner`s dilemma under preferential partner selection.

Outside prison agents do not only ehoose a game strategy but also a game partner. In this paper players are finite automata and willing to interaet only if their expected payoff exeeeds an endogenously evolving aeeeptable minimum. In the resulting behavioural strueture the initial population is subdivided aeeording to players' degree of exploitiveness. If the number of eooperators is at least two, eooperators will be better off than defeetors. If more sueeessful automata reproduce, simulations show that due to partner seleetion eooperative behaviour is irnmune to invading mutants even if the life-span of generations is short.Prisoner`s dilemma; Partner selection; Finite automata; Matching;

Fashion, Cooperation, and Social Interactions

Fashion plays such a crucial rule in the evolution of culture and society that it is regarded as a second nature to the human being. Also, its impact on economy is quite nontrivial. On what is fashionable, interestingly, there are two viewpoints that are both extremely widespread but almost opposite: conformists think that what is popular is fashionable, while rebels believe that being different is the essence. Fashion color is fashionable in the first sense, and Lady Gaga in the second. We investigate a model where the population consists of the afore-mentioned two groups of people that are located on social networks (a spatial cellular automata network and small-world networks). This model captures two fundamental kinds of social interactions (coordination and anti-coordination) simultaneously, and also has its own interest to game theory: it is a hybrid model of pure competition and pure cooperation. This is true because when a conformist meets a rebel, they play the zero sum matching pennies game, which is pure competition. When two conformists (rebels) meet, they play the (anti-) coordination game, which is pure cooperation. Simulation shows that simple social interactions greatly promote cooperation: in most cases people can reach an extraordinarily high level of cooperation, through a selfish, myopic, naive, and local interacting dynamic (the best response dynamic). We find that degree of synchronization also plays a critical role, but mostly on the negative side. Four indices, namely cooperation degree, average satisfaction degree, equilibrium ratio and complete ratio, are defined and applied to measure people's cooperation levels from various angles. Phase transition, as well as emergence of many interesting geographic patterns in the cellular automata network, is also observed.Comment: 21 pages, 12 figure

Buffered Simulation Games for B\"uchi Automata

Simulation relations are an important tool in automata theory because they provide efficiently computable approximations to language inclusion. In recent years, extensions of ordinary simulations have been studied, for instance multi-pebble and multi-letter simulations which yield better approximations and are still polynomial-time computable. In this paper we study the limitations of approximating language inclusion in this way: we introduce a natural extension of multi-letter simulations called buffered simulations. They are based on a simulation game in which the two players share a FIFO buffer of unbounded size. We consider two variants of these buffered games called continuous and look-ahead simulation which differ in how elements can be removed from the FIFO buffer. We show that look-ahead simulation, the simpler one, is already PSPACE-hard, i.e. computationally as hard as language inclusion itself. Continuous simulation is even EXPTIME-hard. We also provide matching upper bounds for solving these games with infinite state spaces.Comment: In Proceedings AFL 2014, arXiv:1405.527

Infinite games with finite knowledge gaps

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning strategies can be constructed effectively without restricting the direction of information flow. Instead, our condition requires that the players attain common knowledge about the actual state of the game over and over again along every play. We show that it is decidable whether a given game satisfies the condition, and prove tight complexity bounds for the strategy synthesis problem under $\omega$-regular winning conditions given by parity automata.Comment: 39 pages; 2nd revision; submitted to Information and Computatio

Cooperative Strategies in Groups of Strangers: An Experiment

We study cooperation in four-person economies of indefinite duration. Subjects interact anonymously playing a prisoner’s dilemma. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the aggregate and at the individual level. We find that (i) grim trigger well describes aggregate play, but not individual play; (ii) individual behavior is persistently heterogeneous; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience; (iv) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation.repeated games, equilibrium selection, prisoners’ dilemma, random matching

Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees

Environment;Mathematics

Decision Problems for Deterministic Pushdown Automata on Infinite Words

The article surveys some decidability results for DPDAs on infinite words (omega-DPDA). We summarize some recent results on the decidability of the regularity and the equivalence problem for the class of weak omega-DPDAs. Furthermore, we present some new results on the parity index problem for omega-DPDAs. For the specification of a parity condition, the states of the omega-DPDA are assigned priorities (natural numbers), and a run is accepting if the highest priority that appears infinitely often during a run is even. The basic simplification question asks whether one can determine the minimal number of priorities that are needed to accept the language of a given omega-DPDA. We provide some decidability results on variations of this question for some classes of omega-DPDAs.Comment: In Proceedings AFL 2014, arXiv:1405.527