1,276 research outputs found
A Survey on Homomorphic Encryption Schemes: Theory and Implementation
Legacy encryption systems depend on sharing a key (public or private) among
the peers involved in exchanging an encrypted message. However, this approach
poses privacy concerns. Especially with popular cloud services, the control
over the privacy of the sensitive data is lost. Even when the keys are not
shared, the encrypted material is shared with a third party that does not
necessarily need to access the content. Moreover, untrusted servers, providers,
and cloud operators can keep identifying elements of users long after users end
the relationship with the services. Indeed, Homomorphic Encryption (HE), a
special kind of encryption scheme, can address these concerns as it allows any
third party to operate on the encrypted data without decrypting it in advance.
Although this extremely useful feature of the HE scheme has been known for over
30 years, the first plausible and achievable Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
scheme, which allows any computable function to perform on the encrypted data,
was introduced by Craig Gentry in 2009. Even though this was a major
achievement, different implementations so far demonstrated that FHE still needs
to be improved significantly to be practical on every platform. First, we
present the basics of HE and the details of the well-known Partially
Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) and Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE), which
are important pillars of achieving FHE. Then, the main FHE families, which have
become the base for the other follow-up FHE schemes are presented. Furthermore,
the implementations and recent improvements in Gentry-type FHE schemes are also
surveyed. Finally, further research directions are discussed. This survey is
intended to give a clear knowledge and foundation to researchers and
practitioners interested in knowing, applying, as well as extending the state
of the art HE, PHE, SWHE, and FHE systems.Comment: - Updated. (October 6, 2017) - This paper is an early draft of the
survey that is being submitted to ACM CSUR and has been uploaded to arXiv for
feedback from stakeholder
CryptGraph: Privacy Preserving Graph Analytics on Encrypted Graph
Many graph mining and analysis services have been deployed on the cloud,
which can alleviate users from the burden of implementing and maintaining graph
algorithms. However, putting graph analytics on the cloud can invade users'
privacy. To solve this problem, we propose CryptGraph, which runs graph
analytics on encrypted graph to preserve the privacy of both users' graph data
and the analytic results. In CryptGraph, users encrypt their graphs before
uploading them to the cloud. The cloud runs graph analysis on the encrypted
graphs and obtains results which are also in encrypted form that the cloud
cannot decipher. During the process of computing, the encrypted graphs are
never decrypted on the cloud side. The encrypted results are sent back to users
and users perform the decryption to obtain the plaintext results. In this
process, users' graphs and the analytics results are both encrypted and the
cloud knows neither of them. Thereby, users' privacy can be strongly protected.
Meanwhile, with the help of homomorphic encryption, the results analyzed from
the encrypted graphs are guaranteed to be correct. In this paper, we present
how to encrypt a graph using homomorphic encryption and how to query the
structure of an encrypted graph by computing polynomials. To solve the problem
that certain operations are not executable on encrypted graphs, we propose hard
computation outsourcing to seek help from users. Using two graph algorithms as
examples, we show how to apply our methods to perform analytics on encrypted
graphs. Experiments on two datasets demonstrate the correctness and feasibility
of our methods
Towards the AlexNet Moment for Homomorphic Encryption: HCNN, theFirst Homomorphic CNN on Encrypted Data with GPUs
Deep Learning as a Service (DLaaS) stands as a promising solution for
cloud-based inference applications. In this setting, the cloud has a
pre-learned model whereas the user has samples on which she wants to run the
model. The biggest concern with DLaaS is user privacy if the input samples are
sensitive data. We provide here an efficient privacy-preserving system by
employing high-end technologies such as Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE),
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). FHE,
with its widely-known feature of computing on encrypted data, empowers a wide
range of privacy-concerned applications. This comes at high cost as it requires
enormous computing power. In this paper, we show how to accelerate the
performance of running CNNs on encrypted data with GPUs. We evaluated two CNNs
to classify homomorphically the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. Our solution
achieved a sufficient security level (> 80 bit) and reasonable classification
accuracy (99%) and (77.55%) for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. In terms of
latency, we could classify an image in 5.16 seconds and 304.43 seconds for
MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. Our system can also classify a batch of
images (> 8,000) without extra overhead
Encrypted statistical machine learning: new privacy preserving methods
We present two new statistical machine learning methods designed to learn on
fully homomorphic encrypted (FHE) data. The introduction of FHE schemes
following Gentry (2009) opens up the prospect of privacy preserving statistical
machine learning analysis and modelling of encrypted data without compromising
security constraints. We propose tailored algorithms for applying extremely
random forests, involving a new cryptographic stochastic fraction estimator,
and na\"{i}ve Bayes, involving a semi-parametric model for the class decision
boundary, and show how they can be used to learn and predict from encrypted
data. We demonstrate that these techniques perform competitively on a variety
of classification data sets and provide detailed information about the
computational practicalities of these and other FHE methods.Comment: 39 page
Chaotic Compilation for Encrypted Computing: Obfuscation but Not in Name
An `obfuscation' for encrypted computing is quantified exactly here, leading
to an argument that security against polynomial-time attacks has been achieved
for user data via the deliberately `chaotic' compilation required for security
properties in that environment. Encrypted computing is the emerging science and
technology of processors that take encrypted inputs to encrypted outputs via
encrypted intermediate values (at nearly conventional speeds). The aim is to
make user data in general-purpose computing secure against the operator and
operating system as potential adversaries. A stumbling block has always been
that memory addresses are data and good encryption means the encrypted value
varies randomly, and that makes hitting any target in memory problematic
without address decryption, yet decryption anywhere on the memory path would
open up many easily exploitable vulnerabilities. This paper `solves (chaotic)
compilation' for processors without address decryption, covering all of ANSI C
while satisfying the required security properties and opening up the field for
the standard software tool-chain and infrastructure. That produces the argument
referred to above, which may also hold without encryption.Comment: 31 pages. Version update adds "Chaotic" in title and throughout
paper, and recasts abstract and Intro and other sections of the text for
better access by cryptologists. To the same end it introduces the polynomial
time defense argument explicitly in the final section, having now set that
denouement out in the abstract and intr
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