Ready for the design of voting rules?

The design of fair voting rules has been addressed quite often in the literature. Still, the so-called inverse problem is not entirely resolved. We summarize some achievements in this direction and formulate explicit open questions and conjectures.Comment: 10 page

Fair Representation and a Linear Shapley Rule

When delegations to an assembly or council represent differently sized constituencies, they are often allocated voting weights which increase in population numbers (EU Council, US Electoral College, etc.). The Penrose square root rule (PSRR) is the main benchmark for fair representation of all bottom-tier voters in the top-tier decision making body, but rests on the restrictive assumption of independent binary decisions. We consider intervals of alternatives with single-peaked preferences instead, and presume positive correlation of local voters. This calls for a replacement of the PSRR by a linear Shapley rule: representation is fair if the Shapley value of the delegates is proportional to their constituency sizes.Comment: 21 pages, 2 figure

Mostly sunny : a forecast of tomorrow's power index research

Power index research has been a very active field in the last decades. Will this continue or are all the important questions solved? We argue that there are still many opportunities to conduct useful research with and on power indices. Positive and normative questions keep calling for theoretical and empirical attention. Technical and technological improvements are likely to boost applicability.Comment: 12 page

Minimal proper non-IRUP instances of the one-dimensional Cutting Stock Problem

We consider the well-known one dimensional cutting stock problem (1CSP). Based on the pattern structure of the classical ILP formulation of Gilmore and Gomory, we can decompose the infinite set of 1CSP instances, with a fixed demand n, into a finite number of equivalence classes. We show up a strong relation to weighted simple games. Studying the integer round-up property we computationally show that all 1CSP instances with $n\le 9$ are proper IRUP, while we give examples of a proper non-IRUP instances with $n=10$. A gap larger than 1 occurs for $n=11$. The worst known gap is raised from 1.003 to 1.0625. The used algorithmic approaches are based on exhaustive enumeration and integer linear programming. Additionally we give some theoretical bounds showing that all 1CSP instances with some specific parameters have the proper IRUP.Comment: 14 pages, 2 figures, 2 table

Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?

Binary yes-no decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon use a more complicated construction. Here we want to study the question if we lose much from a practical point of view, if we restrict ourselves to weighted games. To this end, we invoke power indices that measure the influence of a member in binary decision committees. More precisely, we compare the achievable power distributions of weighted games with those from a reasonable superset of weighted games. It turns out that the deviation is relatively small.Comment: 7 pages, 2 tables; typos correcte