Optimal two stage committee voting rules

We study option management by committee. Analysis is illustrated by tenure decisions. Our innovations are two-fold: we treat the committee's problem as one of social choice, not of information aggregation; and we endogenise the outside option: rejecting a candidate at either the probationary or tenure stage return the committee to a candidate pool. For committees with N members, we find three key results: (1) a candidate's fate depends only on the behaviour of two `weather-vane' committee members - generalised median voters; (2) enthusiastic assessments by one of these weather-vanes may harm a candidate's chances by increasing others' thresholds for hiring him; and (3) sunk time costs may lead voters who opposed hiring a candidate to favour tenuring him, even after a poor probationary performance. We also characterise the optimal voting rule when N=2. A patient or perceptive committee does best with a (weak) majority at the hiring stage and unanimity at the tenure stage. An impatient or imperceptive committee does best under a double (weak) majority rule. If particularly impatient or imperceptive, this rule implies that any hire is automatically tenured. Perversely, the performance of a patient, imperceptive committee improves as its perceptiveness further declines.intertemporal strategic voting, real options, social choice, heterogenous priors, tenure

The International Bar Association and Trade in Legal Services: Meta Law-Making in International Economic Law?

This article presents the International Bar Association as a highly-influential but often overlooked non-state actor through the lens of its involvement in the standardization of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA)s for legal services. Not only do most MRAs contemplate the active involvement of professional bodies such as law societies and bar associations in their construction and monitoring, the IBA’s guidelines for MRAs inform the content of these agreements, facilitating the practice of international law by a more highly mobile profession. This in turn underpins the capacity of the community of international lawyers to exercise their technical expertise to influence other non-state actors, exemplifying what may be described as the IBA’s “meta-lawmaking” on the global stage. As there has been poor uptake of MRAs by developing countries, initiatives of the IBA could help establish mutual recognition for legal services in the developing world

The Effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome

Emerging from out of the shadows? Service user and carer involvement in systematic reviews

The systematic review methodology literature refers to the importance of involving stakeholders, including service users and carers, in the research. However, compared with other aspects of the methodology, this aspect of conducting systematic reviews is under-developed and the practice of involvement appears highly variable. This article draws on the experience of working with service users and carers in one systematic review to review the barriers to participation and the components of effective involvement. It suggests that quality standards can be identified for service user and carer involvement in systematic reviews, which will benefit policy and practice development

Regulation by Demand: A New Institutional Approach to the Natural Monopoly Problem

Regulation-by-demand, a new institutional design for the natural monopoly system, is based on the demanders’ participation in the industry’s regulatory process. Conventional rate of return regulation fails to implement allocative efficiency and is subject to significant limitations and distortions in its information processing, which prevents the preferences from being disclosed. It is suggested that, if a utility function that encompasses quality characteristics is considered, the failures in the industry’s performance are even more severe than what is usually acknowledged. Regulation-by-demand provides allocatively functional incentives for reliable information processing and for efficient performance of the industry. It has significant advantages of institutional flexibility if the industry looses its natural monopoly properties

'To give or not to give medication, that is the question.’ Healthcare personnel’s perceptions of factors affecting pro re nata medication in sheltered housing for older adults — a focus-group interview study

publishedVersio

Differentiated Fiscal Surveillance and the Democratic Promise of Independent Fiscal Institutions in the Economic and Monetary Union

2sìopenThe post-crisis reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have met with skepticism toward their democratic credentials. This certainly applies to the requirement to set up Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs). Drawing on Pettit’s model of republican legitimacy, this paper argues however that IFIs can indirectly increase the democratic character of national fiscal policy while preserving Member States’ autonomy. Such a democratic contribution is further facilitated by nationally differentiated implementation of the EU rules regarding the heterogeneous design and powers of IFIs. Based on a comparative analysis of selected Member States’ “elaboration discretion” in defining the organisation and the mandate of IFIs, the article highlights that these features reflect the variety of constitutional settings at domestic level. It is concluded that this heterogeneity amounts to a form of differentiated integration which allows for a better navigation of the trade-off between the persistence of fiscal policy externalities and the reduction in national autonomy.openFasone, Cristina; Merlo, StefanoFasone, Cristina; Merlo, Stefan

Voting in Corporate Boards with Heterogeneous Preferences

We analyze the voting behavior of a board of directors that has to approve (or reject) an investment proposal with uncertain return. We consider three types of directors: insiders, who are biased toward acceptance of the project, independent outsiders who want to maximize the firm's profit and independent outsiders who care about their reputation. We show that the presence of members with heterogeneous preferences can be beneficial and that the partisan behavior of insiders can be used as a sort of coordinating device by uninformed outsiders. Provided that the size of the board is optimal, there is no gain from increasing the number of outsiders above the strict majority despite the fact that each outsider is informed with positive probability. Substituting profit-maximizing directors with directors concerned about their reputation is not an obstacle to profit maximization provided that an appropriate sequential voting protocol is followed. We also show that a proper board composition makes communication between directors irrelevant in the sense that the same outcome is obtained with and without communication. Finally, as information is costly, our model provides some suggestions on the optimal size of boards.Board of directors, Voting, Corporate Governance

Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power

Judicial Independence is a crucial aspect of the rule of law and the concept of separation of powers. It gives judges considerable leeway in interpreting and thereby modifying the constitution. In this paper, the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as an actor in the strategic game played between the other actors on the European level as well as actors on the nation-state level (the respective governments, but also national courts, corporate actors and individuals) is inquired into. After describing the changes of the ECJs competence that have occurred since 1953, an attempt at explaining them is undertaken. It is shown that the ECJ has been able to bring about implicit constitutional change because its members are constrained less stringently than most supreme court judges on the nationstate level. It is furthermore shown that lower court judges have incentives to cooperate with the ECJ sometimes to the detriment of national supreme court judges.European Court of Justice, Economic Analysis of Court Behavior, Implicit and Explicit Constitutional Change, Preliminary Reference Procedure, Positive Constitutional Economics,