Hedonic Seat Arrangement Problems

In this paper, we study a variant of hedonic games, called \textsc{Seat Arrangement}. The model is defined by a bijection from agents with preferences to vertices in a graph. The utility of an agent depends on the neighbors assigned in the graph. More precisely, it is the sum over all neighbors of the preferences that the agent has towards the agent assigned to the neighbor. We first consider the price of stability and fairness for different classes of preferences. In particular, we show that there is an instance such that the price of fairness ({\sf PoF}) is unbounded in general. Moreover, we show an upper bound $\tilde{d}(G)$ and an almost tight lower bound $\tilde{d}(G)-1/4$ of {\sf PoF}, where $\tilde{d}(G)$ is the average degree of an input graph. Then we investigate the computational complexity of problems to find certain ``good'' seat arrangements, say \textsc{Maximum Welfare Arrangement}, \textsc{Maximin Utility Arrangement}, \textsc{Stable Arrangement}, and \textsc{Envy-free Arrangement}. We give dichotomies of computational complexity of four \textsc{Seat Arrangement} problems from the perspective of the maximum order of connected components in an input graph. For the parameterized complexity, \textsc{Maximum Welfare Arrangement} can be solved in time $n^{O(\gamma)}$, while it cannot be solved in time $f(\gamma)^{o(\gamma)}$ under ETH, where $\gamma$ is the vertex cover number of an input graph. Moreover, we show that \textsc{Maximin Utility Arrangement} and \textsc{Envy-free Arrangement} are weakly NP-hard even on graphs of bounded vertex cover number. Finally, we prove that determining whether a stable arrangement can be obtained from a given arrangement by $k$ swaps is W[1]-hard when parameterized by $k+\gamma$, whereas it can be solved in time $n^{O(k)}$

The Effect of Atmosphere Perception, Perceived Value, And Hedonic Value on Consumer Loyalty Through The Service Quality of Warunk Upnormal

This study aimed to analyze the effect of the atmospheric stimulus, perceived value, and hedonic values on consumer loyalty through the service quality of Warunk Upnormal and formulate managerial implications of consumer loyalty. The study used cross-sectional data obtained from a survey using an online open-close ended questionnaire. The data were collected from 300 respondents following the criteria studied through visits of at least two times to Warunk Upnormal and the use of convenience sampling technique. The data were analyzed using Structural Equation Model (SEM) with the help of Lisrel 8.51 software. SEM was used to assess the relationship between atmospheric perception, perceived values, and hedonic values in measurements. Loyalty was analyzed using Customer Loyalty Index (CLI) to connect the factors that encourage the creation of loyalty. The results of this study indicated that atmospheric perception had a significant effect on service quality but had no effect on consumer loyalty. Value perception had a significant effect on service quality but had no effect onconsumer loyalty. Hedonic value had a significant effect on service quality but had no significant effect on consumer loyalty. Meanwhile, service quality had nosignificant effect on consumer loyalty. Keywords: atmosphere perception, consumer loyalty, hedonic value, perceived value, service qualit

Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function u that took into account distances in a given social network. In this paper, we consider a non-normalized score-based definition of social distance games where the utility function u_v depends on a generic scoring vector v, which may be customized to match the specifics of each individual application scenario. As our main technical contribution, we establish the tractability of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning of the agents into coalitions on tree-like networks, for every score-based function u_v. We provide more efficient algorithms when dealing with specific choices of u_v or simpler networks, and also extend all of these results to computing coalitions that are Nash stable or individually rational. We view these results as a further strong indication of the usefulness of the proposed score-based utility function: even on very simple networks, the problem of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning into coalitions remains open for the originally considered canonical function u.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2023, arXiv:2307.0400

Group Bargaining and Conflict

We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative) negotiation protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata allocation (as a function of the size of the groups). We analyse the conditions (on the internal composition of the groups) under which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we provide results of comparative statics that highlight the influence of changes in the internal composition of groups and in their relative size on the profitability of negotiated agreements.Bargaining, Conflict, Agency Problem

Restructuring the ECB

Soon, euro area membership could more than double, with the vast majority of accession countries being quite different in economic terms compared with current members. Under the current decision-making system, this can lead to high decisionmaking costs and there is a risk that monetary policy could deviate from the targets specified in the Maastricht treaty. While centralization might be a “first-best” solution to these problems in many ways, there are possible disadvantages from a political economy perspective, including a potential conflict with the established voting rights of current euro area member countries. An alternative solution to ensure the European perspective of decision-making in the ECB Council is to match economic size and voting power. One way to implement this principle is a rotation scheme for national central bank governors that takes economic differences between the member countries into account. The paper discusses various rotation schemes, also with a view to the decision-making cost argument.European Central Bank, centralization of monetary policy, EMU, transition countries, accession countries

Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy

We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions that form depend upon the relative importance of rents of office and seat shares of the parties. If rents are high, governments cannot be surplus. With low rents or the formateur close to the median, minority governments occur for a wider ideological dispersion. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between connectedness of coalitions and rents.Coalitions, Ideology, Rents