4,244 research outputs found
Forward Hedging and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets.
This paper analyzes the interactions between vertical integration and (wholesale) spot, forward and retail markets in risk management. We develop an equilibrium model that fits electricity markets well. We point out that vertical integration and forward hedging are two separate levers for demand and spot price risk diversification. We show that they are imperfect substitutes as to their impact on retail prices and agentsâ utility because the asymmetry between upstream and downstream segments. While agents always use the forward market, vertical integration may not arise. In addition, in presence of highly risk averse downstream agents, vertical integration may be a better way to diversify risk than spot, forward and retail mar kets. We illustrate our analysis with data from the French electricity market.producers; hedging; forward; spot; vertical integration; retailers; electricity markets;
Risk management in electricity markets: hedging and market incompleteness
The high volatility of electricity markets gives producers and retailers an incentive to hedge their exposure to electricity prices by buying and selling derivatives. This paper studies how welfare and investment incentives are affected when markets for derivatives are introduced, and to what extent this depends on market completeness. We develop an equilibrium model of the electricity market with risk-averse firms and a set of traded financial products, more specifically: forwards and an increasing number of options. Using this model, we first show that aggregate welfare in the market increases with the number of derivatives offered. If firms are concerned with large negative shocks to their profitability due to liquidity constraints, option markets are particularly attractive from a welfare point of view. Secondly, we demonstrate that increasing the number of derivatives improves investment decisions of small firms (especially when firms are risk-averse), because the additional financial markets signal to firms how they can reduce the overall sector risk. Also the information content of prices increases: the quality of investment decisions based on risk-free probabilities, inferred from market prices, improves as markets become more complete Finally, we show that government intervention may be needed, because private investors may not have the right incentives to create the optimal number of markets.
Risk management in electricity markets: hedging and market incompleteness.
The high volatility of electricity markets gives producers and retailers an incentive to hedge their exposure to electricity prices by buying and selling derivatives. This paper studies how welfare and investment incentives are affected when markets for derivatives are introduced, and to what extent this depends on market completeness. We develop an equilibrium model of the electricity market with riskaverse firms and a set of traded financial products, more specifically: forwards and an increasing number of options. Using this model, we first show that aggregate welfare in the market increases with the number of derivatives offered. If firms are concerned with large negative shocks to their profitability due to liquidity constraints, option markets are particularly attractive from a welfare point of view. Secondly, we demonstrate that increasing the number of derivatives improves investment decisions of small firms (especially when firms are risk-averse), because the additional financial markets signal to firms how they can reduce the overall sector risk. Also the information content of prices increases: the quality of investment decisions based on risk-free probabilities, inferred from market prices, improves as markets become more complete Finally, we show that government intervention may be needed, because private investors may not have the right incentives to create the optimal number of markets.
Market completeness: how options affect hedging and investments in the electricity sector.
The high volatility of electricity markets gives producers and retailers an incentive to hedge their exposure to electricity prices by buying and selling derivatives. This paper studies how welfare and investment incentives are affected when an increasing number of derivatives are introduced. It develops an equilibrium model of the electricity market with risk averse firms and a set of traded financial products, more specifically: a forward contract and an increasing number of options. We first show that aggregate welfare (the sum of individual firms' utility) increases with the number of derivatives offered, although most of the benefits are captured with one to three options. Secondly, power plant investments typically increase because additional derivatives enable better hedging of investments. However, the availability of derivatives sometimes leads to âcrowding-outâ of physical investments because capital is being used more profitably to speculate on financial markets. Finally, we illustrate that players basing their investment decisions on risk-free probabilities inferred from market prices, may significantly overinvest when markets are not sufficiently complete.
Recommended from our members
Generation Adequacy and Investment Incentives in Britain: from the Pool to NETA
Three years after the controversial change of the British market design from compulsory Pool with capacity payments to decentralised energy-only New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) market framework, we compare the two designs in terms of investment incentives. We review the biases of the Pool capacity payments design, the drought of investment following the introduction of NETA, and the reaction of the market during the first âstress-testâ of NETA during the winter 2003. In an energy-only market such as NETA, it is essential that price signals are right and the system operator has a crucial role in contracting ahead for reserve. We recommend that NETA adopt a single marginal imbalance price as dual imbalance pricing distorts price signals in times of scarcity. The lack of long-term contracting that causes hedging and financing difficulties for power projects can becompensated by vertical and horizontal reintegration at a cost of increased market power
Essays on the Interaction Between Risk and Market Structure in Electricity Markets
This thesis proposes a new framework to jointly analyze electricity spot
market and hedging decisions in an oligopolistic setup. Firstly, we find
that, when exogenous, both quantity of electricity hedged by contract and
vertical integration decrease the equilibrium spot price. Secondly, we use
a hybrid approach and show that market structure can affect a generatorâs
decision to vertically integrate under uncertain demand. Thirdly, we consider
uncertainty in costs and demand and show that concentration in the
spot market, for a given hedge quantum, can increase forward prices and
affect the slope of the forward curve. Our empirical results indicate that
the model fits the New Zealand electricity market well. This evidence that
market structure and hedging decisions are closely connected is further
explored in a three period equilibrium model for the spot and forward
markets, where hedging occurs prior to the submission of supply curves.
Taking into account demand-side and supply-side uncertainties, we find
that when hedging is endogenous, hedging quantities are affected by spot
market parameters, but market power is itself mitigated in the conscious
hedging choice of generators. We also show that forward markets can
coexist with highly vertically integrated markets. The importance of our
results is general. Our models can be used by policy makers to analyze
investment and forward price implications of changes in the spot market
structure. Our results also indicate that electricity generators, in equilibrium,
face a trade-off between market power and hedging. Given that it is
socially beneficial to manage risk, the equilibrium impact of their choices
on welfare should not be considered in isolation by competition authorities
A waste of energy? A critical assessment of the investigation of the UK Energy Market by the Competition and Markets Authority
This document is the accepted manuscript version of the following article: Chrysovalantis Amountzias, Hulya Dagdeviren and Tassos Patokos, âA waste of energy? A critical assessment of the investigation of the UK energy market by the Competition and Markets Authorityâ, Competition & Change, Vol. 21 (1): 45-60, February 2017. The final version of this paper is available at doi: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1024529416678070. Published by SAGE Publishing.In this paper, we assess the findings of the UK energy market investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority, conducted during June 2014âJune 2016.We argue that the results of the investigation have been advantageous for the large energy companies and they risk failing to bring any significant and positive change to the energy industry.We highlight three major aspects of the Competition and Markets Authorities assessment. First, the panel examined retail and wholesale segments of the energy industry in isolation, which can be misleading in the assessment of vertical integration. It also considered new entries to the sector as a sign of competitive strength when many were due to favourable government policies in the form of exemptions from various obligations. Second, its conclusion that a position of unilateral market power by the large energy companies arises from weak customer engagement (i.e. low switching rates) shifts the focus and responsibility for the problems of the energy markets away from the conduct of the companies onto customers. Finally, the investigation placed an overemphasis on competition without due reference to its consequences for consumersâ welfare.Peer reviewe
A looming revolution: Implications of self-generation for the risk exposure of retailers. ESRI WP597, September 2018
Managing the risk associated with uncertain load has always been a challenge for retailers in electricity markets. Yet
the load variability has been largely predictable in the past, especially when aggregating a large number of consumers. In
contrast, the increasing penetration of unpredictable, small-scale electricity generation by consumers, i.e. self-generation,
constitutes a new and yet greater volume risk. Using value-at-risk metrics and Monte Carlo simulations based on German
historical loads and prices, the contribution of decentralized solar PV self-generation to retailersâ load and revenue risks is
assessed. This analysis has implications for the consumersâ welfare and the overall efficiency of electricity markets
Recommended from our members
Investment in new power generation in New South Wales: Comments by Public Service International Research Unit, University of Greenwich, London
This report comments on the prospects for new generation investment in New South Wales, in particular, what the role of the public sector should be
Recommended from our members
New South Wales Government Energy Directions Green Paper: comments by Public Service International Research Unit, University of Greenwich, London
A critique of the New South Wales Government's 2004 Green Paper on energy polic
- âŠ