29 research outputs found
Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards Without the PIN
In this paper we present an attack, which allows fraudulent transactions to be collected from EMV contactless credit and debit cards without the knowledge of the cardholder. The attack exploits a previously unreported vulnerability in EMV protocol, which allows EMV contactless cards to approve unlimited value transactions without the cardholder’s PIN when the transaction is carried out in a foreign currency. For example, we have found that Visa credit cards will approve foreign currency transactions for any amount up to €999,999.99 without the cardholder’s PIN, this side-steps the £20 contactless transaction limit in the UK. This paper outlines our analysis methodology that identified the flaw in the EMV protocol, and presents a scenario in which fraudulent transaction details are transmitted over the Internet to a “rogue merchant” who then uses the transaction data to take money from the victim’s account. In reality, the criminals would choose a value between €100 and €200, which is low enough to be within the victim’s balance and not to raise suspicion, but high enough to make each attack worthwhile. The attack is novel in that it could be operated on a large scale with multiple attackers collecting fraudulent transactions for a central rogue merchant which can be located anywhere in the world where EMV payments are accepted
Contactless payments :usability at the cost of security?
PhD ThesisEMV (Europay, MasterCard, Visa), commonly termed “Chip & PIN”, is becoming the dominant card
based payment technology globally. The EMV Chip & PIN transaction protocol was originally
designed to operate in an environment where the card was physically inserted into the POS terminal /
ATM and used a wired connection to communicate. The introduction of EMV contactless payments
technology raises an interesting question “has usability been improved at the cost of security?”.
Specifically, to make contactless payments more convenient / usable, a wireless interface has been
added to EMV cards and PIN entry has been waived for contactless payments. Do these new usability
features make contactless cards less secure?
This PhD thesis presents an analysis of the security of the EMV contactless payments. It considers
the security of the EMV contactless transaction protocols as stand-alone processes and the wider
impact of contactless technology upon the security of the EMV card payment system as a whole.
The thesis contributes a structured analysis methodology which identifies vulnerabilities in the EMV
protocol and demonstrates the impact of these vulnerabilities on the EMV payment system. The
analysis methodology comprises UML diagrams and reference tables which describe the EMV
protocol sequences, a protocol emulator which implements the protocol, a Z abstract model of the
protocol and practical demonstrations of the research results. Detailed referencing of the EMV
specifications provide a documented link between the exploitable vulnerabilities observed in real
EMV cards and the source of the vulnerability in the EMV specifications.
Our analysis methodology has identified two previously undocumented vulnerabilities in the EMV
contactless transaction protocol. The potential existence of these vulnerabilities was identified using
the Z abstract model with the protocol emulator providing experimental confirmation of the potential
for real-world exploitation of the vulnerabilities and test results quantifying the extent of the impact.
Once a vulnerability has been shown to be exploitable using the protocol emulator, we use practical
demonstrations to show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited in the real-world using off-the-shelf
equipment. This presents a stronger impact message when presenting our research results to a nontechnical
audience. This has helped to raise awareness of security issues relating to EMV contactless
cards, with our work appearing in the media, radio and TV
Consumer-facing technology fraud : economics, attack methods and potential solutions
The emerging use of modern technologies has not only benefited society but also attracted fraudsters and criminals to misuse the technology for financial benefits. Fraud over the Internet has increased dramatically, resulting in an annual loss of billions of dollars to customers and service providers worldwide. Much of such fraud directly impacts individuals, both in the case of browser-based and mobile-based Internet services, as well as when using traditional telephony services, either through landline phones or mobiles. It is important that users of the technology should be both informed of fraud, as well as protected from frauds through fraud detection and prevention systems. In this paper, we present the anatomy of frauds for different consumer-facing technologies from three broad perspectives - we discuss Internet, mobile and traditional telecommunication, from the perspectives of losses through frauds over the technology, fraud attack mechanisms and systems used for detecting and preventing frauds. The paper also provides recommendations for securing emerging technologies from fraud and attacks
Does the online card payment system unwittingly facilitate fraud?
PhD ThesisThe research work in this PhD thesis presents an extensive investigation into the security settings of
Card Not Present (CNP) financial transactions. These are the transactions which include payments
performed with a card over the Internet on the websites, and over the phone. Our detailed analysis on
hundreds of websites and on multiple CNP payment protocols justifies that the current security
architecture of CNP payment system is not adequate enough to protect itself from fraud.
Unintentionally, the payment system itself will allow an adversary to learn and exploit almost all of
the security features put in place to protect the CNP payment system from fraud. With insecure modes
of accepting payments, the online payment system paves the way for cybercriminals to abuse even the
latest designed payment protocols like 3D Secure 2.0.
We follow a structured analysis methodology which identifies vulnerabilities in the CNP payment
protocols and demonstrates the impact of these vulnerabilities on the overall payment system. The
analysis methodology comprises of UML diagrams and reference tables which describe the CNP
payment protocol sequences, software tools which implements the protocol and practical
demonstrations of the research results. Detailed referencing of the online payment specifications
provides a documented link between the exploitable vulnerabilities observed in real implementations
and the source of the vulnerability in the payment specifications.
We use practical demonstrations to show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited in the real-world
with ease. This presents a stronger impact message when presenting our research results to a nontechnical audience. This has helped to raise awareness of security issues relating to payment cards,
with our work appearing in the media, radio and T
Analysing and Improving the Security of Contactless Payment Cards
Europay, MasterCard, and Visa (EMV) is the most used payment protocol around the world with 85.9% of the payment cards in the EU and the UK being EMV based cards in 2019. The EMV payment protocol has made contactless transactions faster and more convenient for cardholders as they only need to place the card next to the Point of Sale (POS) to make a payment. According to the latest report of the UK Finance, the total value of contactless card transactions in 2019 was higher than the cash ones for the first time ever.
On the other hand, the introduction of the wireless interface in the EMV contactless transactions opens the door for several attacks to be launched on contactless cards such as skimming, eavesdropping, replay, and relay attacks. Since April 2020, the limit of contactless transactions has increased to ÂŁ45 as a response to the Covid-19 crisis. This might create an extra motivation for launching more attackers on contactless cards.
This thesis is primarily concerned with investigating and analysing the security of contactless card’s payments and uncovering the impact of key vulnerabilities in the EMV contactless card specifications. The two main vulnerable are the one-way authentication methods and the lack of cardholder verification in such transactions.
The thesis also proposes the following four practical protocols to improve the security and the privacy of the EMV contactless cards.
1- A new tokenization protocol to replace the actual Primary Account Number (PAN) with a token to prevent the EMV contactless cards from revealing the actual PAN.
2- A mutual authentication protocol to address the vulnerabilities related to the EMV one-way card authentication methods in the EMV payment protocol.
3- A novel gyroscope sensor into EMV contactless cards to be used for activating the cards by perfuming a simple move by the cardholder.
4- A protocol to use cardholders’ NFC enabled smartphones to activate contactless cards.
The two main aims of these four proposed protocols are to prevent such cards from being read by unauthorised NFC enabled readers/smartphones and to give cardholders more control of their contactless cards in order to prevent several attacks. Moreover, the thesis also describes a Java framework to mimic a genuine EMV contactless card and validate the four proposed solutions.
The thesis argues that the first two proposed solutions require minimal changes to the existing EMV infrastructures and do not have any impact on the user’s experience while the last two proposed solutions require some changes the users’ experience when making contactless card transactions