Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons: LightSquared and the Missing Spectrum Rights

The endemic underuse of radio spectrum constitutes a tragedy of the regulatory commons. Like other common interest tragedies, the outcome results from a legal or market structure that prevents economic actors from executing socially efficient bargains. In wireless markets, innovative applications often provoke claims by incumbent radio users that the new traffic will interfere with existing services. Sometimes these concerns are mitigated via market transactions, a la “Coasian bargaining.” Other times, however, solutions cannot be found even when social gains dominate the cost of spillovers. In the recent “LightSquared debacle,” such spectrum allocation failure played out. GPS interests that access frequencies adjacent to the band hosting LightSquared’s new nationwide mobile network complained that the wireless entrant would harm the operation of locational devices. Based on these complaints, regulators then killed LightSquared’s planned 4G network. Conservative estimates placed the prospective 4G consumer gains at least an order of magnitude above GPS losses. “Win win” bargains were theoretically available, fixing GPS vulnerabilities while welcoming the highly valuable wireless innovation. Yet transaction costs—largely caused by policy choices to issue limited and highly fragmented spectrum usage rights (here in the GPS band)—proved prohibitive. This episode provides a template for understanding market and non-market failure in radio spectrum allocation

Enforcement in Dynamic Spectrum Access Systems

The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing harmful interference is the mechanism for enforcement of those rights. Since the rights to use spectrum and to protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, legacy/newly reformed) and type of use/users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement mechanisms may need to vary as well.\ud \ud In this paper, we present a taxonomy for evaluating alternative mechanisms for enforcing interference protection for spectrum usage rights, with special attention to the potential changes that may be expected from wider deployment of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems. Our exploration of how the design of the enforcement regime interacts with and influences the incentives of radio operators under different rights regimes and market scenarios is intended to assist in refining thinking about appropriate access rights regimes and how best to incentivize investment and growth in more efficient and valuable uses of the radio frequency spectrum

World radiocommunication conference 12 : implications for the spectrum eco-system

Spectrum allocation is once more a key issue facing the global telecommunications industry. Largely overlooked in current debates, however, is the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC). Decisions taken by WRC shape the future roadmap of the telecommunications industry, not least because it has the ability to shape the global spectrum allocation framework. In the debates of WRC-12 it is possible to identify three main issues: enhancement of the international spectrum regulatory framework, regulatory measures required to introduce Cognitive Radio Systems (CRS) technologies; and, additional spectrum allocation to mobile service. WRC-12 eventually decided not to change the current international radio regulations with regard to the first two issues and agreed to the third issue. The main implications of WRC-12 on the spectrum ecosystem are that most of actors are not in support of the concept of spectrum flexibility associated with trading and that the concept of spectrum open access is not under consideration. This is explained by the observation that spectrum trading and spectrum commons weaken state control over spectrum and challenge the main principles and norms of the international spectrum management regime. In addition, the mobile allocation issue has shown the lack of conformity with the main rules of the regime: regional spectrum allocation in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) three regions, and the resistance to the slow decision making procedures. In conclusion, while the rules and decision-making procedures of the international spectrum management regime were challenged in the WRC-12, the main principles and norms are still accepted by the majority of countries

Enforcement and Spectrum Sharing: Case Studies of Federal-Commercial Sharing

To promote economic growth and unleash the potential of wireless broadband, there is a need to introduce more spectrally efficient technologies and spectrum management regimes. That led to an environment where commercial wireless broadband need to share spectrum with the federal and non-federal operations. Implementing sharing regimes on a non-opportunistic basis means that sharing agreements must be implemented. To have meaning, those agreements must be enforceable.\ud \ud With the significant exception of license-free wireless systems, commercial wireless services are based on exclusive use. With the policy change facilitating spectrum sharing, it becomes necessary to consider how sharing might take place in practice. Beyond the technical aspects of sharing, that must be resolved lie questions about how usage rights are appropriately determined and enforced. This paper is reasoning about enforcement in a particular spectrum bands (1695-1710 MHz and 3.5 GHz) that are currently being proposed for sharing between commercial services and incumbent spectrum users in the US. We examine three enforcement approaches, exclusion zones, protection zones and pure ex post and consider their implications in terms of cost elements, opportunity cost, and their adaptability

Emerging Technologies and Access to Spectrum Resources: the Case of Short-Range Systems

Traditional regulatory arrangements have constrained access to radio frequency spectrum. This has resulted in artificial scarcity of spectrum. The paper addresses the issue of whether technological developments in short-range systems (e.g. cognitive radios and ultra wideband) might promote access to spectrum - possibly using market mechanisms such as trading - and reduce spectrum shortages.spectrum policy, spectrum access, emerging spectrum-using technology, Telecommunications, regulation, infrastructure

Capitalizing on National Self-Interest: The Management of International Telecommunication Conflict by the International Telecommunication Union

This article will examine the potential for conflict and the need for international cooperation in the contemporary telecommunication industry, with a particular focus on the role of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in international conflict management. After addressing particular aspects of modern telecommunication which invite international conflict, the article will present an overview of the ITU as the principal instrumentality for maintaining world order in telecommunication. The Union\u27s importance in conflict prevention, dispute resolution, and arbitration will be analyzed in detail. Finally, this article will assess the success of the ITU in conflict management and evaluate the need for change in the ITU as it enters a new era of international telecommunication

Unlocking the deployment of spectrum sharing with a policy enforcement framework

Spectrum sharing has been proposed as a promising way to increase the efficiency of spectrum usage by allowing incumbent operators (IOs) to share their allocated radio resources with licensee operators (LOs), under a set of agreed rules. The goal is to maximize a common utility, such as the sum rate throughput, while maintaining the level of service required by the IOs. However, this is only guaranteed under the assumption that all “players”respect the agreed sharing rules. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework for licensed shared access (LSA) networks that discourages LO misbehavior. Our framework is built around three core functions: misbehavior detection via the employment of a dedicated sensing network; a penalization function; and, a behavior-driven resource allocation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that these components are combined for the monitoring/policing of the spectrum under the LSA framework. Moreover, a novel simulator for LSA is provided as an open access tool, serving the purpose of testing and validating our proposed techniques via a set of extensive system-level simulations in the context of mobile network operators, where IOs and several competing LOs are considered. The results demonstrate that violation of the agreed sharing rules can lead to a great loss of resources for the misbehaving LOs, the amount of which is controlled by the system. Finally, we promote that including a policy enforcement function as part of the spectrum sharing system can be beneficial for the LSA system, since it can guarantee compliance with the spectrum sharing rules and limit the short-term benefits arising from misbehavior