Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies

The efficient design of networks has been an important engineering task that involves challenging combinatorial optimization problems. Typically, a network designer has to select among several alternatives which links to establish so that the resulting network satisfies a given set of connectivity requirements and the cost of establishing the network links is as low as possible. The Minimum Spanning Tree problem, which is well-understood, is a nice example. In this paper, we consider the natural scenario in which the connectivity requirements are posed by selfish users who have agreed to share the cost of the network to be established according to a well-defined rule. The design proposed by the network designer should now be consistent not only with the connectivity requirements but also with the selfishness of the users. Essentially, the users are players in a so-called network design game and the network designer has to propose a design that is an equilibrium for this game. As it is usually the case when selfishness comes into play, such equilibria may be suboptimal. In this paper, we consider the following question: can the network designer enforce particular designs as equilibria or guarantee that efficient designs are consistent with users' selfishness by appropriately subsidizing some of the network links? In an attempt to understand this question, we formulate corresponding optimization problems and present positive and negative results.Comment: 30 pages, 7 figure

Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks

AbstractA crucial issue in non-cooperative wireless networks is that of sharing the cost of multicast transmissions to different users residing at the stations of the network. Each station acts as a selfish agent that may misreport its utility (i.e., the maximum cost it is willing to incur to receive the service, in terms of power consumption) in order to maximize its individual welfare, defined as the difference between its true utility and its charged cost. A provider can discourage such deceptions by using a strategyproof cost sharing mechanism, that is a particular public algorithm that, by forcing the agents to truthfully reveal their utility, starting from the reported utilities, decides who gets the service (the receivers) and at what price. A mechanism is said budget balanced (BB) if the receivers pay exactly the (possibly minimum) cost of the transmission, and β-approximate budget balanced (β-BB) if the total cost charged to the receivers covers the overall cost and is at most β times the optimal one, while it is efficient if it maximizes the sum of the receivers’ utilities minus the total cost over all receivers’ sets. In this paper, we first investigate cost sharing strategyproof mechanisms for symmetric wireless networks, in which the powers necessary for exchanging messages between stations may be arbitrary and we provide mechanisms that are either efficient or BB when the power assignments are induced by a fixed universal spanning tree, or (3ln(k+1))-BB (k is the number of receivers), otherwise. Then we consider the case in which the stations lay in a d-dimensional Euclidean space and the powers fall as 1/dα, and provide strategyproof mechanisms that are either 1-BB or efficient for α=1 or d=1. Finally, we show the existence of 2(3d-1)-BB strategyproof mechanisms in any d-dimensional space for every α⩾d. For the special case of d=2 such a result can be improved to achieve 12-BB mechanisms

Cluster Before You Hallucinate: Approximating Node-Capacitated Network Design and Energy Efficient Routing

We consider circuit routing with an objective of minimizing energy, in a network of routers that are speed scalable and that may be shutdown when idle. We consider both multicast routing and unicast routing. It is known that this energy minimization problem can be reduced to a capacitated flow network design problem, where vertices have a common capacity but arbitrary costs, and the goal is to choose a minimum cost collection of vertices whose induced subgraph will support the specified flow requirements. For the multicast (single-sink) capacitated design problem we give a polynomial-time algorithm that is O(log^3n)-approximate with O(log^4 n) congestion. This translates back to a O(log ^(4{\alpha}+3) n)-approximation for the multicast energy-minimization routing problem, where {\alpha} is the polynomial exponent in the dynamic power used by a router. For the unicast (multicommodity) capacitated design problem we give a polynomial-time algorithm that is O(log^5 n)-approximate with O(log^12 n) congestion, which translates back to a O(log^(12{\alpha}+5) n)-approximation for the unicast energy-minimization routing problem.Comment: 22 pages (full version of STOC 2014 paper