24 research outputs found
Hardness Estimation of LWE via Band Pruning
This paper, examining the hardness of the search LWE problem, is a refined continuation of previous works including (Lindner-Peikert 2011, Liu-Nguyen 2013, Aono et al. 2013) using lattice reduction and lattice vector enumeration. We adopt the attack to the LWE using discrete Gaussian distribution, and propose a new bounding method named band pruning in lattice enumeration. We update the security estimations for several parameter sets proposed in the literature. Finally, using the data gained in our experiments, we derive an explicit formula linking the LWE\u27s parameters with the bit security
Frodo: Take off the ring! Practical, quantum-secure key exchange from LWE
Lattice-based cryptography offers some of the most attractive primitives believed to be resistant to quantum computers. Following increasing interest from both companies and government agencies in building quantum computers, a number of works have proposed instantiations of practical post-quantum key exchange protocols based on hard problems in ideal lattices, mainly based on the Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) problem. While ideal lattices facilitate major efficiency and storage benefits over their nonideal counterparts, the additional ring structure that enables these advantages also raises concerns about the assumed difficulty of the underlying problems. Thus, a question of significant interest to cryptographers, and especially to those currently placing bets on primitives that will withstand quantum adversaries, is how much of an advantage the additional ring structure actually gives in practice. Despite conventional wisdom that generic lattices might be too slow and unwieldy, we demonstrate that LWE-based key exchange is quite practical: our constant time implementation requires around 1.3ms computation time for each party; compared to the recent NewHope R-LWE scheme, communication sizes increase by a factor of 4.7×, but remain under 12 KiB in each direction. Our protocol is competitive when used for serving web pages over TLS; when partnered with ECDSA signatures, latencies increase by less than a factor of 1.6×, and (even under heavy load) server throughput only decreases by factors of 1.5× and 1.2× when serving typical 1 KiB and 100 KiB pages, respectively. To achieve these practical results, our protocol takes advantage of several innovations. These include techniques to optimize communication bandwidth, dynamic generation of public parameters (which also offers additional security against backdoors), carefully chosen error distributions, and tight security parameters
Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes with Key Privacy from LWE
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is a cryptographic primitive in which a proxy can transform Alice\u27s ciphertexts into ones decryptable by Bob. Key-private PRE specifies an additional level of security,
requiring that proxy keys leak no information on the identities of Alice and Bob. In this paper, we build two key-private PRE schemes: (1) we propose a CPA-secure key-private PRE scheme in the standard model, and (2) we then transform it into a CCA-secure scheme in the random oracle model. Both schemes enjoy following properties: both are uni-directional and the CPA-secure one is a multi-hop scheme.
In addition, the security of our schemes is based on the hardness of the standard Learning-With-Errors (LWE) problem, itself reducible from worst-case lattice hard problems that are conjectured immune to quantum cryptanalysis, or ``post-quantum\u27\u27. We implement the CPA-secure scheme and point out that, among many applications, it can be sufficiently used for the practical task of key rotation over encrypted data
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Toward practical and private online services
Today's common online services (social networks, media streaming, messaging,
email, etc.) bring convenience. However, these services are susceptible to
privacy leaks. Certainly, email snooping by rogue employees, email server
hacks, and accidental disclosures of user ratings for movies are some
sources of private information leakage. This dissertation investigates the
following question: Can we build systems that (a) provide strong privacy
guarantees to the users, (b) are consistent with existing commercial and policy
regimes, and (c) are affordable?
Satisfying all three requirements simultaneously is challenging, as providing
strong privacy guarantees usually necessitates either sacrificing functionality,
incurring high resource costs, or both. Indeed, there are powerful cryptographic
protocols---private information retrieval (PIR), and secure two-party
computation (2PC)---that provide strong guarantees but are orders of magnitude
more expensive than their non-private counterparts. This dissertation takes
these protocols as a starting point and then substantially reduces their costs
by tailoring them using application-specific properties. It presents two
systems, Popcorn and Pretzel, built on this design ethos.
Popcorn is a Netflix-like media delivery system, that provably hides, even from
the content distributor (for example, Netflix), which movie a user is watching.
Popcorn tailors PIR protocols to the media domain. It amortizes the server-side
overhead of PIR by batching requests from the large number of concurrent users
retrieving content at any given time; and, it forms large batches without
introducing playback delays by leveraging the properties of media streaming.
Popcorn is consistent with the prevailing commercial regime (copyrights, etc.),
and its per-request dollar cost is 3.87 times that of a non-private system.
The other system described in this dissertation, Pretzel, is an email system
that encrypts emails end-to-end between senders and intended recipients, but
allows the email service provider to perform content-based spam filtering and
targeted advertising. Pretzel refines a 2PC protocol. It reduces the resource
consumption of the protocol by replacing the underlying encryption scheme with a
more efficient one, applying a packing technique to conserve invocations of the
encryption algorithm, and pruning the inputs to the protocol. Pretzel's costs,
versus a legacy non-private implementation, are estimated to be up to 5.4 times
for the email provider, with additional but modest client-side requirements.
Popcorn and Pretzel have fundamental connections. For instance, the
cryptographic protocols in both systems securely compute vector-matrix products.
However, we observe that differences in the vector and matrix dimensions lead to
different system designs.
Ultimately, both systems represent a potentially appealing compromise: sacrifice
some functionality to build in strong privacy properties at affordable costs.Computer Science
International Symposium on Mathematics, Quantum Theory, and Cryptography
This open access book presents selected papers from International Symposium on Mathematics, Quantum Theory, and Cryptography (MQC), which was held on September 25-27, 2019 in Fukuoka, Japan. The international symposium MQC addresses the mathematics and quantum theory underlying secure modeling of the post quantum cryptography including e.g. mathematical study of the light-matter interaction models as well as quantum computing. The security of the most widely used RSA cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of factoring large integers. However, in 1994 Shor proposed a quantum polynomial time algorithm for factoring integers, and the RSA cryptosystem is no longer secure in the quantum computing model. This vulnerability has prompted research into post-quantum cryptography using alternative mathematical problems that are secure in the era of quantum computers. In this regard, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) began to standardize post-quantum cryptography in 2016. This book is suitable for postgraduate students in mathematics and computer science, as well as for experts in industry working on post-quantum cryptography
International Symposium on Mathematics, Quantum Theory, and Cryptography
This open access book presents selected papers from International Symposium on Mathematics, Quantum Theory, and Cryptography (MQC), which was held on September 25-27, 2019 in Fukuoka, Japan. The international symposium MQC addresses the mathematics and quantum theory underlying secure modeling of the post quantum cryptography including e.g. mathematical study of the light-matter interaction models as well as quantum computing. The security of the most widely used RSA cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of factoring large integers. However, in 1994 Shor proposed a quantum polynomial time algorithm for factoring integers, and the RSA cryptosystem is no longer secure in the quantum computing model. This vulnerability has prompted research into post-quantum cryptography using alternative mathematical problems that are secure in the era of quantum computers. In this regard, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) began to standardize post-quantum cryptography in 2016. This book is suitable for postgraduate students in mathematics and computer science, as well as for experts in industry working on post-quantum cryptography
Two quantum Ising algorithms for the shortest-vector problem
Quantum computers are expected to break today's public key cryptography within a few decades. New cryptosystems are being designed and standardized for the postquantum era, and a significant proportion of these rely on the hardness of problems like the shortest-vector problem to a quantum adversary. In this paper we describe two variants of a quantum Ising algorithm to solve this problem. One variant is spatially efficient, requiring only O ( N log 2 N ) qubits, where N is the lattice dimension, while the other variant is more robust to noise. Analysis of the algorithms' performance on a quantum annealer and in numerical simulations shows that the more qubit-efficient variant will outperform in the long run, while the other variant is more suitable for near-term implementation
On the Security of Lattice-Based Signature Schemes in a Post-Quantum World
Digital signatures are indispensable for security on the Internet, because they guarantee authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation, of namely e-mails, software
updates, and in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol which is used for secure data transfer, for example. Most signature schemes that are currently in use such as the RSA signature scheme, are considered secure as long as the integer factorization problem or the discrete logarithm (DL) problem are computationally hard. At present, no algorithms have yet been found to solve these problems on conventional computers in polynomial time. However, in 1997, Shor published a polynomial-time algorithm that uses quantum computation to solve the integer factorization and the DL problem. In particular, this means that RSA signatures are considered broken as soon as large-scale quantum computers exist. Due to significant advances in the area of quantum computing, it is reasonable to assume that within 20 years, quantum computers that are able to break the RSA scheme, could exist. In order to maintain authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation of data, cryptographic schemes that cannot be broken by quantum attacks are required. In addition, these so-called post-quantum secure schemes should be sufficiently efficient to be suitable for all established applications. Furthermore, solutions enabling a timely and secure transition from classical to post-quantum schemes are needed. This thesis contributes to the above-mentioned transition.
In this thesis, we present the two lattice-based digital signature schemes TESLA and qTESLA, whereby lattice-based cryptography is one of five approaches to construct post-quantum secure schemes. Furthermore, we prove that our signature schemes are secure as long as the so-called Learning With Errors (LWE) problem is computationally hard to solve. It is presumed that even quantum computers cannot solve the LWE problem in polynomial time. The security of our schemes is proven using security reductions. Since our reductions are tight and explicit, efficient instantiations are possible that provably guarantee a selected security level, as long as the corresponding LWE instance provides a certain hardness level. Since both our reductions (as proven in the quantum random oracle model) and instantiations, take into account quantum attackers, TESLA and qTESLA are considered post-quantum secure. Concurrently, the run-times for generating and verifying signatures of qTESLA are similar (or faster) than those of the RSA scheme. However, key and signature sizes of RSA are smaller than those of qTESLA. In order to protect both the theoretical signature schemes and their implementations against attacks, we analyze possible vulnerabilities against implementation attacks. In particular, cache-side-channel attacks resulting from observing the cache behavior and fault attacks, which recover secret information by actively disrupting the execution of an algorithm are focused. We present effective countermeasures for each implementation attack we found. Our analyses and countermeasures also influence the design and implementation of qTESLA. Although our schemes are considered (post-quantum) secure according to state-of-the-art LWE attacks, cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes is still a relatively new field of research in comparison to RSA schemes. Hence, there is a lack of confidence in the concrete instantiations and their promised security levels. However, due to developments within the field of quantum computers, a transition to post-quantum secure solutions seems to be more urgently required than ever. To solve this dilemma, we present an approach to combine two schemes, e.g., qTESLA and the RSA signature scheme, so that the combination is secure as long as one of the two combined schemes is secure. We present several of such combiners to construct hybrid signature schemes and hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms to ensure both authenticity and confidentiality in our Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). Lastly, we also demonstrate how to apply the resulting hybrid schemes in standards such as X.509 or TLS.
To summarize, this work presents post-quantum secure candidates which can, using our hybrid schemes, add post-quantum security to the current classical security in our PKI