Sub-Versions: Investigating Videogame Hacking Practices and Subcultures

“Hacking” is an evocative term — one that is mired in tropes that reduce a diverse range of practices into a few stereotypically malicious activities. This thesis aims to explore one hacking practice, videogame hacking, whose practitioners make unauthorized alterations to videogames after their release. Through interviews, game analysis, and reflective writing, this thesis investigates videogame hacking subcultures of production — communities of creative labour that exist in the margins of mediamaking and the fringes of the law. This thesis begins by reviewing popular media and existing accounts of computer hacker culture, primarily Steven Levy’s Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution and Gabriella Coleman’s Coding Freedom, in order to contextualize videogame hacking in broader histories of computer culture. Using this analysis as a starting point, the author then proposes a reflexive methodological framework for studying videogame hacking subcultures, designed to accommodate the ephemerality of virtual communities and the apprehensions of participants. The following two chapters refer to participant interviews to pursue two avenues of research. First, drawing upon Michel de Certeau’s writing on strategies versus tactics and Henry Jenkins chronicling of prohibitionist and collaborationist models, this study explores how intellectual property law serves as a site of tension between media companies and videogame fans. Second, the author explores the diverse motivations of videogame hackers who create works that are undistributable through commercial markets and may face the risk of legal action

Detailed Concept of Network Security

Computer world security management is essential resource for all the latest news, analysis, case studies and reviews on authentication, business continuity and disaster recovery, data control, security infrastructure, intellectual property, privacy standards, law, threats cyber crime and hacking and identity fraud and theft. This section covers secrecy, reliable storage and encryption. security, protecting data from unauthorized access, protecting data from damage and ROM either an external or an internal source, and a disgruntled employee could easily do much harm

Data Scraping as a Cause of Action: Limiting Use of the CFAA and Trespass in Online Copying Cases

In recent years, online platforms have used claims such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) and trespass to curb data scraping, or copying of web content accomplished using robots or web crawlers. However, as the term “data scraping” implies, the content typically copied is data or information that is not protected by intellectual property law, and the means by which the copying occurs is not considered to be hacking. Trespass and the CFAA are both concerned with authorization, but in data scraping cases, these torts are used in such a way that implies that real property norms exist on the Internet, a misleading and harmful analogy. To correct this imbalance, the CFAA must be interpreted in its native context, that of computers, computer networks, and the Internet, and given contextual meaning. Alternatively, the CFAA should be amended. Because data scraping is fundamentally copying, copyright offers the correct means for litigating data scraping cases. This Note additionally offers proposals for creating enforceable terms of service online and for strengthening copyright to make it applicable to user-based online platforms

Sony, Cyber Security, and Free Speech: Preserving the First Amendment in the Modern World

Reprinted from 16 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 309 (2016). This paper explores the Sony hack in 2014 allegedly launched by the North Korean government in retaliation over Sony’s production of The Interview and considers the hack’s chilling impact on speech in technology. One of the most devastating cyber attacks in history, the hack exposed approximately thirty- eight million files of sensitive data, including over 170,000 employee emails, thousands of employee social security numbers and unreleased footage of upcoming movies. The hack caused Sony to censor the film and prompted members of the entertainment industry at large to tailor their communication and conform storylines to societal standards. Such censorship cuts the First Amendment at its core and exemplifies the danger cyber terror poses to freedom of speech by compromising Americans’ privacy in digital mediums. This paper critiques the current methods for combatting cyber terror, which consist of unwieldy federal criminal laws and controversial information sharing policies, while proposing more promising solutions that unleash the competitive power of the free market with limited government regulation. It also recommends legal, affordable and user-friendly tools anyone can use to secure their technology, recapture their privacy and exercise their freedom of speech online without fear of surreptitious surveillance or retaliatory exposure

Hacking in the university: contesting the valorisation of academic labour

In this article I argue for a different way of understanding the emergence of hacker culture. In doing so, I outline an account of ‘the university’ as an institution that provided the material and subsequent intellectual conditions that early hackers were drawn to and in which they worked. I argue that hacking was originally a form of academic labour that emerged out of the intensification and valorisation of scientific research within the institutional context of the university. The reproduction of hacking as a form of academic labour took place over many decades as academics and their institutions shifted from an ideal of unproductive, communal science to a more productive, entrepreneurial approach to the production of knowledge. As such, I view hacking as a peculiar, historically situated form of labour that arose out of the contradictions of the academy: vocation vs. profession; teaching vs. research; basic vs. applied research; research vs. development; private vs. public; war vs. peace; institutional autonomy vs. state dependence; scientific communalism vs. intellectual property

Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory Hacking by Non-State Actors as Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm

Cyberespionage has received even greater attention in the wake of reports of persistent and brazen cyberexploitation of U.S. and Canadian firms by the Chinese military. But the recent disclosures about NSA surveillance programs have made clear that a national program of cyberdefense of private firms\u27 intellectual property is politically infeasible. Following the lead of companies like Google, private corporations may increasingly resort to the use of self-defense, hacking back against cross-border incursions on the Internet. Most scholarship, however, has surprisingly viewed such actions as outside the ambit of international law. This Note provides a novel account of how international law should govern cross-border hacks by private actors, and especially hackbacks. It proposes that significant harm to a state\u27s intellectual property should be viewed as transboundary cyberharm and can be analyzed under traditional international legal principles, including the due diligence obligation to prevent significant harm to another state\u27s territorial sovereignty. Viewing cyber espionage within this framework, international law may presently permit states to allow private actors to resort to self-defense as proportionate countermeasures. By doing so, this Note offers a prescription for how states might regulate private actors to prevent unnecessary harm or vigilantism while preserving the right of self-defense

Peeling Back the Onion of Cyber Espionage after Tallinn 2.0

Tallinn 2.0 represents an important advancement in the understanding of international law’s application to cyber operations below the threshold of force. Its provisions on cyber espionage will be instrumental to states in grappling with complex legal problems in the area of digital spying. The law of cyber espionage as outlined by Tallinn 2.0, however, is substantially based on rules that have evolved outside of the digital context, and there exist serious ambiguities and limitations in its framework. This Article will explore gaps in the legal structure and consider future options available to states in light of this underlying mismatch

The university as a hackerspace

In a paper published last year, I argued for a different way of understanding the emergence of hacker culture. (Winn 2013) In doing so, I outlined an account of ‘the university’ as an institution that provided the material and subsequent intellectual conditions that early hackers were drawn to and in which they worked. The key point I tried to make was that hacking was originally a form of academic labour that emerged out of the intensification and valorisation of scientific research within the institutional context of the university. The reproduction of hacking as a form of academic labour took place over many decades as academics and their institutions shifted from an ideal of unproductive, communal science to a more productive, entrepreneurial approach to the production of knowledge. As such, I view hacking as a peculiar, historically situated form of labour that arose out of friction in the academy: vocation vs. profession; teaching vs. research; basic vs. applied research; research vs. development; private vs. public; war vs. peace; institutional autonomy vs. state dependence; scientific communalism vs. intellectual property; individualism vs. co-operation. A question I have for you today is whether hacking in the university is still a possibility? Can a university contain (i.e. intellectually, politically, practically) a hackerspace? Can a university be a hackerspace? If so, what does it look like? How would it work? I am trying to work through these questions at the moment with colleagues at the University of Lincoln. The name I have given to this emerging project is ‘The university as a hackerspace’ and it has grown out of an existing pedagogical and political project called ‘Student as Producer.’ It is also one of four agreed areas of work in a new ‘digital education’ strategy at Lincoln. More broadly, our project asks “how do we reproduce the university as a critical, social project?

Deceptive Practices 2.0: Legal and Policy Responses

Reviews recent online misinformation campaigns and "cyberfraud" to suppress voting and skew elections, mainly in minority communities. Examines whether federal and state laws can sufficiently deter and punish perpetrators. Makes policy recommendations