Taking reasonable pluralism seriously: an internal critique of political liberalism

The later Rawls attempts to offer a non-comprehensive, but nonetheless moral justification in political philosophy. Many critics of political liberalism doubt that this is successful, but Rawlsians often complain that such criticisms rely on the unwarranted assumption that one cannot offer a moral justification other than by taking a philosophically comprehensive route. In this article, I internally criticize the justification strategy employed by the later Rawls. I show that he cannot offer us good grounds for the rational hope that citizens will assign political values priority over non-political values in cases of conflict about political matters. I also suggest an alternative approach to justification in political philosophy (that is, a weak realist, Williams-inspired account) that better respects the later Rawls’s concern with non-comprehensiveness and pluralism than either his own view or more comprehensive approaches. Thus, if we take reasonable pluralism seriously, then we should adopt what Shklar aptly called ‘liberalism of fear’. </jats:p

International Order, Political Community, and the Search for a Eurpoean Public Philosophy

The shaping of international order, and the place of concepts such as law and community within that order, has emerged as one of the most pressing issues in contemporary legal and political thought. This Essay examines three recent theses, each of which attempts to locate a public philosophy appropriate to the emerging new world order. Part I of this Essay takes a look at these theses: the orthodox Kantian theory of international relations, as recently articulated by Fernando Teson in A Philosophy of International Law, the liberal communitarian theory, which has been eloquently restated by Martha Nussbaum in Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, and the institutional rationalism of Jurgen Habermas, as described in Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy.\u27 Part II of this Essay suggests that the disparity between these alternative theses can be situated within the post-Kantian attempt to determine the moral self within modern political communities. There are, in effect, two Kants: one, which we can term the formalist, and which has enjoyed dominion in Kantian theories of international law, and another, the communitarian, which has gained increasing currency in radical liberal political theory. The final part of this Essay then takes these theses and situates them within the specific context of the new European order

Race, Crime, and Institutional Design

Minorities are gravely overrepresented in every stage of the criminal process--from pedestrian and automobile stops, to searches and seizures, to arrests and convictions, to incarceration and capital punishment. While racial data can provide a snapshot of the current state of affairs, such information rarely satisfies questions of causation, and usually only sets the scene for normative theory

Where the right gets in: on Rawls’s criticism of Habermas's conception of legitimacy

Many commentators have failed to identify the important issues at the heart of the debate between Habermas and Rawls. This is partly because they give undue attention to differences between their respective devices of representation, the original position and principle (U), neither of which are germane to the actual dispute. The dispute is at bottom about how best to conceive of democratic legitimacy. Rawls indicates where the dividing issues lie when he objects that Habermas’s account of democratic legitimacy is comprehensive and his is confined to the political. But his argument is vitiated by a threefold ambiguity in what he means by “comprehensive doctrine.” Tidying up this ambiguity helps reveal that the dispute turns on the way in which morality relates to political legitimacy. Although Habermas calls his conception of legitimate law “morally freestanding”, and as such distinguishes it from Kantian and Natural Law accounts of legitimacy, it is not as freestanding from morality as he likes to present it. Habermas’s mature theory contains conflicting claims about relation between morality and democratic legitimacy. So there is at least one important sense in which Rawls's charge of comprehensiveness is made to stick againstHabermas’s conception of democratic legitimacy, and remains unanswered

Disentangling economic and political goals in the net neutrality debate

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Is Liberalism Disingenuous? Truth and Lies in Political Liberalism

Rawlsian political liberalism famously requires a prohibition on truth. This has led to the charge that liberalism embraces non-cognitivism, according to which political claims have the moral status of emotions or expressions of preference. This result would render liberalism a non-starter for liberatory politics, a conclusion that political liberals themselves disavow. This conflict between what liberalism claims and what liberalism does has led critics to charge that the theory is disingenuous and functions as political ideology. In this paper, I explore one way that this charge unfolds: critics charge that liberalism utilizes an individualistic and identity-insensitive social ontology, which in turn yields epistemic deficiencies that render it incapable of detecting oppression. The theory’s claim to freestandingness then shields it from necessary critique. I argue that this objection relies on constructing a conflict between liberalism’s professed non-cognitivism and its actual cognitivist commitments. By demonstrating that Rawlsian political liberalism explicitly endorses substantive moral truths, and that the method of avoidance applies only to public justification for coercive state action, I show that the theory is openly and foundationally cognitivist, and thus that the charge of disingenuousness does not stick

Deliberative democracy and its informational basis: what lessons from the Capability Approach

Amartya Sen's works lead to focus theoretical issues relative to deliberative democracy, not only on optimal procedural rules, but upstream on the substantial content of the informational basis that serves as background to deliberation. The contribution explores the issues to take on board, especially questions on deliberative inquiries and the constitution of publics.Deliberative Democracy; Capability; Inquiry; Informational Basis; Amartya Sen

The twilight of the Liberal Social Contract? On the Reception of Rawlsian Political Liberalism

This chapter discusses the Rawlsian project of public reason, or public justification-based 'political' liberalism, and its reception. After a brief philosophical rather than philological reconstruction of the project, the chapter revolves around a distinction between idealist and realist responses to it. Focusing on political liberalism’s critical reception illuminates an overarching question: was Rawls’s revival of a contractualist approach to liberal legitimacy a fruitful move for liberalism and/or the social contract tradition? The last section contains a largely negative answer to that question. Nonetheless the chapter's conclusion shows that the research programme of political liberalism provided and continues to provide illuminating insights into the limitations of liberal contractualism, especially under conditions of persistent and radical diversity. The programme is, however, less receptive to challenges to do with the relative decline of the power of modern states