ANALISIS KEAMANAN JARINGAN UNIVERSITAS KRISTEN DUTA WACANA DENGAN SERANGAN SSL/TLS

The security of data communication over the network has become an obligation that needs to be considered in a technology ecosystem. Data security has various layers, one layer that needs to be protected is the presentation layer where SSL/TLS is located. If at this layer there are vulnerabilities where sensitive data such as cookies, usernames, and passwords are present, then data leakage will have a major impact on all stakeholders in the technology sector using SSL/TLS technology. In order to research and improve data security in Duta Wacana Christian University (DWCU) campus network, the researchers conducted SSL/TLS vulnerability testing on the  SSAT and E-Class websites using the SSL Test from Qualys and a script from testssl.sh, the author also conducted Checking Mixed Content with GeekFlare and checking HSTS Preload using the HSTS Preload website provided by Google. Researchers also conducted SSL Strip penetration tests at 12 points of the DWCU building and also in Lab D. Based on the results of the study, there were several results found. The results on the SSL Test using Qualys found that the SSAT and E-Class websites already use HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) rules with Max-Age 31536000 (1 year) but HSTS Preload has not been implemented, Mixed Content testing with GeekFlare shows that all transactions on SSAT and E-Class already uses HTTPS paths, then in tests using the testssl.sh script there are vulnerabilities that are read, and SSL Strip attacks are possible in Duta Wacana Christian University network under several conditions.Keamanan komunikasi data melalui jaringan sudah menjadi kewajiban yang perlu di pertimbangkan dalam sebuah ekosistem teknologi. Keamanan data memiliki berbagai layer, salah satu layer yang perlu dilindungi adalah layer presentasi dimana SSL/TLS berada. Jika pada layer ini terdapat kerentanan dimana data sensitif seperti cookie, username, dan password, maka kebocoran data akan berdampak besar bagi semua pelaku kepentingan di bidang teknologi yang menggunakan teknologi SSL/TLS. Dalam rangka penelitian dan peningkatan keamanan data di jaringan kampus Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana (UKDW), maka peneliti melakukan pengujian kerentanan SSL/TLS pada situs web SSAT UKDW dan E-Class UKDW menggunakan Test SSL dari Qualys dan script dari testssl.sh, penulis juga melakukan pengecekan Mixed Content dengan GeekFlare serta pengecekan HSTS Preload meenggunakan situs web HSTS Preload yang disediakan Google. Peneliti juga melakukan uji penetrasi SSL Strip di 12 titik gedung Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana dan juga di Lab D. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian, ada beberapa hasil yang ditemukan. Hasil pada SSL Test menggunakan Qualys menemukan situs web SSAT dan E-Class sudah menggunakan aturan HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) dengan Max-Age 31536000 (1 tahun) namun HSTS Preload belum di terapkan, pengujian Mixed Content dengan GeekFlare menunjukkan bahwa seluruh transaksi pada SSAT dan E-Class sudah menggunakan jalur HTTPS, lalu pada uji menggunakan script testssl.sh terdapat kerentanan yang terbaca, serta serangan SSL Strip dimungkinkan terjadi di jaringan Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana dengan beberapa kondisi

Betrayed by the Guardian: Security and Privacy Risks of Parental Control Solutions

For parents of young children and adolescents, the digital age has introduced many new challenges, including excessive screen time, inappropriate online content, cyber predators, and cyberbullying. To address these challenges, many parents rely on numerous parental control solutions on different platforms, including parental control network devices (e.g., WiFi routers) and software applications on mobile devices and laptops. While these parental control solutions may help digital parenting, they may also introduce serious security and privacy risks to children and parents, due to their elevated privileges and having access to a significant amount of privacy-sensitive data. In this paper, we present an experimental framework for systematically evaluating security and privacy issues in parental control software and hardware solutions. Using the developed framework, we provide the first comprehensive study of parental control tools on multiple platforms including network devices, Windows applications, Chrome extensions and Android apps. Our analysis uncovers pervasive security and privacy issues that can lead to leakage of private information, and/or allow an adversary to fully control the parental control solution, and thereby may directly aid cyberbullying and cyber predators

Reducing Third Parties in the Network through Client-Side Intelligence

The end-to-end argument describes the communication between a client and server using functionality that is located at the end points of a distributed system. From a security and privacy perspective, clients only need to trust the server they are trying to reach instead of intermediate system nodes and other third-party entities. Clients accessing the Internet today and more specifically the World Wide Web have to interact with a plethora of network entities for name resolution, traffic routing and content delivery. While individual communications with those entities may some times be end to end, from the user's perspective they are intermediaries the user has to trust in order to access the website behind a domain name. This complex interaction lacks transparency and control and expands the attack surface beyond the server clients are trying to reach directly. In this dissertation, we develop a set of novel design principles and architectures to reduce the number of third-party services and networks a client's traffic is exposed to when browsing the web. Our proposals bring additional intelligence to the client and can be adopted without changes to the third parties. Websites can include content, such as images and iframes, located on third-party servers. Browsers loading an HTML page will contact these additional servers to satisfy external content dependencies. Such interaction has privacy implications because it includes context related to the user's browsing history. For example, the widespread adoption of "social plugins" enables the respective social networking services to track a growing part of its members' online activity. These plugins are commonly implemented as HTML iframes originating from the domain of the respective social network. They are embedded in sites users might visit, for instance to read the news or do shopping. Facebook's Like button is an example of a social plugin. While one could prevent the browser from connecting to third-party servers, it would break existing functionality and thus be unlikely to be widely adopted. We propose a novel design for privacy-preserving social plugins that decouples the retrieval of user-specific content from the loading of third-party content. Our approach can be adopted by web browsers without the need for server-side changes. Our design has the benefit of avoiding the transmission of user-identifying information to the third-party server while preserving the original functionality of the plugins. In addition, we propose an architecture which reduces the networks involved when routing traffic to a website. Users then have to trust fewer organizations with their traffic. Such trust is necessary today because for example we observe that only 30% of popular web servers offer HTTPS. At the same time there is evidence that network adversaries carry out active and passive attacks against users. We argue that if end-to-end security with a server is not available the next best thing is a secure link to a network that is close to the server and will act as a gateway. Our approach identifies network vantage points in the cloud, enables a client to establish secure tunnels to them and intelligently routes traffic based on its destination. The proliferation of infrastructure-as-a-service platforms makes it practical for users to benefit from the cloud. We determine that our architecture is practical because our proposed use of the cloud aligns with existing ways end-user devices leverage it today. Users control both endpoints of the tunnel and do not depend on the cooperation of individual websites. We are thus able to eliminate third-party networks for 20% of popular web servers, reduce network paths to 1 hop for an additional 20% and shorten the rest. We hypothesize that user privacy on the web can be improved in terms of transparency and control by reducing the systems and services that are indirectly and automatically involved. We also hypothesize that such reduction can be achieved unilaterally through client-side initiatives and without affecting the operation of individual websites

Attacking and securing Network Time Protocol

Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used to synchronize time between computer systems communicating over unreliable, variable-latency, and untrusted network paths. Time is critical for many applications; in particular it is heavily utilized by cryptographic protocols. Despite its importance, the community still lacks visibility into the robustness of the NTP ecosystem itself, the integrity of the timing information transmitted by NTP, and the impact that any error in NTP might have upon the security of other protocols that rely on timing information. In this thesis, we seek to accomplish the following broad goals: 1. Demonstrate that the current design presents a security risk, by showing that network attackers can exploit NTP and then use it to attack other core Internet protocols that rely on time. 2. Improve NTP to make it more robust, and rigorously analyze the security of the improved protocol. 3. Establish formal and precise security requirements that should be satisfied by a network time-synchronization protocol, and prove that these are sufficient for the security of other protocols that rely on time. We take the following approach to achieve our goals incrementally. 1. We begin by (a) scrutinizing NTP's core protocol (RFC 5905) and (b) statically analyzing code of its reference implementation to identify vulnerabilities in protocol design, ambiguities in specifications, and flaws in reference implementations. We then leverage these observations to show several off- and on-path denial-of-service and time-shifting attacks on NTP clients. We then show cache-flushing and cache-sticking attacks on DNS(SEC) that leverage NTP. We quantify the attack surface using Internet measurements, and suggest simple countermeasures that can improve the security of NTP and DNS(SEC). 2. Next we move beyond identifying attacks and leverage ideas from Universal Composability (UC) security framework to develop a cryptographic model for attacks on NTP's datagram protocol. We use this model to prove the security of a new backwards-compatible protocol that correctly synchronizes time in the face of both off- and on-path network attackers. 3. Next, we propose general security notions for network time-synchronization protocols within the UC framework and formulate ideal functionalities that capture a number of prevalent forms of time measurement within existing systems. We show how they can be realized by real-world protocols (including but not limited to NTP), and how they can be used to assert security of time-reliant applications-specifically, cryptographic certificates with revocation and expiration times. Our security framework allows for a clear and modular treatment of the use of time in security-sensitive systems. Our work makes the core NTP protocol and its implementations more robust and secure, thus improving the security of applications and protocols that rely on time

Web-based Secure Application Control

The world wide web today serves as a distributed application platform. Its origins, however, go back to a simple delivery network for static hypertexts. The legacy from these days can still be observed in the communication protocol used by increasingly sophisticated clients and applications. This thesis identifies the actual security requirements of modern web applications and shows that HTTP does not fit them: user and application authentication, message integrity and confidentiality, control-flow integrity, and application-to-application authorization. We explore the other protocols in the web stack and work out why they can not fill the gap. Our analysis shows that the underlying problem is the connectionless property of HTTP. However, history shows that a fresh start with web communication is far from realistic. As a consequence, we come up with approaches that contribute to meet the identified requirements. We first present impersonation attack vectors that begin before the actual user authentication, i.e. when secure web interaction and authentication seem to be unnecessary. Session fixation attacks exploit a responsibility mismatch between the web developer and the used web application framework. We describe and compare three countermeasures on different implementation levels: on the source code level, on the framework level, and on the network level as a reverse proxy. Then, we explain how the authentication credentials that are transmitted for the user login, i.e. the password, and for session tracking, i.e. the session cookie, can be complemented by browser-stored and user-based secrets respectively. This way, an attacker can not hijack user accounts only by phishing the user's password because an additional browser-based secret is required for login. Also, the class of well-known session hijacking attacks is mitigated because a secret only known by the user must be provided in order to perform critical actions. In the next step, we explore alternative approaches to static authentication credentials. Our approach implements a trusted UI and a mutually authenticated session using signatures as a means to authenticate requests. This way, it establishes a trusted path between the user and the web application without exchanging reusable authentication credentials. As a downside, this approach requires support on the client side and on the server side in order to provide maximum protection. Another approach avoids client-side support but can not implement a trusted UI and is thus susceptible to phishing and clickjacking attacks. Our approaches described so far increase the security level of all web communication at all time. This is why we investigate adaptive security policies that fit the actual risk instead of permanently restricting all kinds of communication including non-critical requests. We develop a smart browser extension that detects when the user is authenticated on a website meaning that she can be impersonated because all requests carry her identity proof. Uncritical communication, however, is released from restrictions to enable all intended web features. Finally, we focus on attacks targeting a web application's control-flow integrity. We explain them thoroughly, check whether current web application frameworks provide means for protection, and implement two approaches to protect web applications: The first approach is an extension for a web application framework and provides protection based on its configuration by checking all requests for policy conformity. The second approach generates its own policies ad hoc based on the observed web traffic and assuming that regular users only click on links and buttons and fill forms but do not craft requests to protected resources.Das heutige World Wide Web ist eine verteilte Plattform für Anwendungen aller Art: von einfachen Webseiten über Online Banking, E-Mail, multimediale Unterhaltung bis hin zu intelligenten vernetzten Häusern und Städten. Seine Ursprünge liegen allerdings in einem einfachen Netzwerk zur Übermittlung statischer Inhalte auf der Basis von Hypertexten. Diese Ursprünge lassen sich noch immer im verwendeten Kommunikationsprotokoll HTTP identifizieren. In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir die Sicherheitsanforderungen moderner Web-Anwendungen und zeigen, dass HTTP diese Anforderungen nicht erfüllen kann. Zu diesen Anforderungen gehören die Authentifikation von Benutzern und Anwendungen, die Integrität und Vertraulichkeit von Nachrichten, Kontrollflussintegrität und die gegenseitige Autorisierung von Anwendungen. Wir untersuchen die Web-Protokolle auf den unteren Netzwerk-Schichten und zeigen, dass auch sie nicht die Sicherheitsanforderungen erfüllen können. Unsere Analyse zeigt, dass das grundlegende Problem in der Verbindungslosigkeit von HTTP zu finden ist. Allerdings hat die Geschichte gezeigt, dass ein Neustart mit einem verbesserten Protokoll keine Option für ein gewachsenes System wie das World Wide Web ist. Aus diesem Grund beschäftigt sich diese Arbeit mit unseren Beiträgen zu sicherer Web-Kommunikation auf der Basis des existierenden verbindungslosen HTTP. Wir beginnen mit der Beschreibung von Session Fixation-Angriffen, die bereits vor der eigentlichen Anmeldung des Benutzers an der Web-Anwendung beginnen und im Erfolgsfall die temporäre Übernahme des Benutzerkontos erlauben. Wir präsentieren drei Gegenmaßnahmen, die je nach Eingriffsmöglichkeiten in die Web-Anwendung umgesetzt werden können. Als nächstes gehen wir auf das Problem ein, dass Zugangsdaten im WWW sowohl zwischen den Teilnehmern zu Authentifikationszwecken kommuniziert werden als auch für jeden, der Kenntnis dieser Daten erlangt, wiederverwendbar sind. Unsere Ansätze binden das Benutzerpasswort an ein im Browser gespeichertes Authentifikationsmerkmal und das sog. Session-Cookie an ein Geheimnis, das nur dem Benutzer und der Web-Anwendung bekannt ist. Auf diese Weise kann ein Angreifer weder ein gestohlenes Passwort noch ein Session-Cookie allein zum Zugriff auf das Benutzerkonto verwenden. Darauffolgend beschreiben wir ein Authentifikationsprotokoll, das vollständig auf die Übermittlung geheimer Zugangsdaten verzichtet. Unser Ansatz implementiert eine vertrauenswürdige Benutzeroberfläche und wirkt so gegen die Manipulation derselben in herkömmlichen Browsern. Während die bisherigen Ansätze die Sicherheit jeglicher Web-Kommunikation erhöhen, widmen wir uns der Frage, inwiefern ein intelligenter Browser den Benutzer - wenn nötig - vor Angriffen bewahren kann und - wenn möglich - eine ungehinderte Kommunikation ermöglichen kann. Damit trägt unser Ansatz zur Akzeptanz von Sicherheitslösungen bei, die ansonsten regelmäßig als lästige Einschränkungen empfunden werden. Schließlich legen wir den Fokus auf die Kontrollflussintegrität von Web-Anwendungen. Bösartige Benutzer können den Zustand von Anwendungen durch speziell präparierte Folgen von Anfragen in ihrem Sinne manipulieren. Unsere Ansätze filtern Benutzeranfragen, die von der Anwendung nicht erwartet wurden, und lassen nur solche Anfragen passieren, die von der Anwendung ordnungsgemäß verarbeitet werden können

Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels

Professor Lubin\u27s contribution is Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels, pp. 203-225. Existing legal literature would have us assume that espionage operations and “below-the-threshold” cyber operations are doctrinally distinct. Whereas one is subject to the scant, amorphous, and under-developed legal framework of espionage law, the other is subject to an emerging, ever-evolving body of legal rules, known cumulatively as cyber law. This dichotomy, however, is erroneous and misleading. In practice, espionage and cyber law function as communicating vessels, and so are better conceived as two elements of a complex system, Information Warfare (IW). This paper therefore first draws attention to the similarities between the practices – the fact that the actors, technologies, and targets are interchangeable, as are the knee-jerk legal reactions of the international community. In light of the convergence between peacetime Low-Intensity Cyber Operations (LICOs) and peacetime Espionage Operations (EOs) the two should be subjected to a single regulatory framework, one which recognizes the role intelligence plays in our public world order and which adopts a contextual and consequential method of inquiry. The paper proceeds in the following order: Part 2 provides a descriptive account of the unique symbiotic relationship between espionage and cyber law, and further explains the reasons for this dynamic. Part 3 places the discussion surrounding this relationship within the broader discourse on IW, making the claim that the convergence between EOs and LICOs, as described in Part 2, could further be explained by an even larger convergence across all the various elements of the informational environment. Parts 2 and 3 then serve as the backdrop for Part 4, which details the attempt of the drafters of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 to compartmentalize espionage law and cyber law, and the deficits of their approach. The paper concludes by proposing an alternative holistic understanding of espionage law, grounded in general principles of law, which is more practically transferable to the cyber realmhttps://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/1220/thumbnail.jp

Aeronautical engineering: A continuing bibliography with indexes (supplement 289)

This bibliography lists 792 reports, articles, and other documents introduced into the NASA scientific and technical information system in Mar. 1993. Subject coverage includes: design, construction and testing of aircraft and aircraft engines; aircraft components, equipment, and systems; ground support systems; and theoretical and applied aspects of aerodynamics and general fluid dynamics