Privacy Management and Optimal Pricing in People-Centric Sensing

With the emerging sensing technologies such as mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things (IoT), people-centric data can be efficiently collected and used for analytics and optimization purposes. This data is typically required to develop and render people-centric services. In this paper, we address the privacy implication, optimal pricing, and bundling of people-centric services. We first define the inverse correlation between the service quality and privacy level from data analytics perspectives. We then present the profit maximization models of selling standalone, complementary, and substitute services. Specifically, the closed-form solutions of the optimal privacy level and subscription fee are derived to maximize the gross profit of service providers. For interrelated people-centric services, we show that cooperation by service bundling of complementary services is profitable compared to the separate sales but detrimental for substitutes. We also show that the market value of a service bundle is correlated with the degree of contingency between the interrelated services. Finally, we incorporate the profit sharing models from game theory for dividing the bundling profit among the cooperative service providers.Comment: 16 page

Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201

BeneWinD: An Adaptive Benefit Win–Win Platform with Distributed Virtual Emotion Foundation

In recent decades, online platforms that use Web 3.0 have tremendously expanded their goods, services, and values to numerous applications thanks to its inherent advantages of convenience, service speed, connectivity, etc. Although online commerce and other relevant platforms have clear merits, offline-based commerce and payments are indispensable and should be activated continuously, because offline systems have intrinsic value for people. With the theme of benefiting all humankind, we propose a new adaptive benefit platform, called BeneWinD, which is endowed with strengths of online and offline platforms. Furthermore, a new currency for integrated benefits, the win–win digital currency, is used in the proposed platform. Essentially, the proposed platform with a distributed virtual emotion foundation aims to provide a wide scope of benefits to both parties, the seller and consumer, in online and offline settings. We primarily introduce features, applicable scenarios, and services of the proposed platform. Different from previous systems and perspectives, BeneWinD can be combined with Web 3.0 because it deliberates based on the decentralized or distributed virtual emotion foundation, and the virtual emotion feature and the detected virtual emotion information with anonymity are open to everyone who wants to participate in the platform. It follows that the BeneWinD platform can be connected to the linked virtual emotion data block or win–win digital currency. Furthermore, crucial research challenges and issues are addressed in order to make great contributions to improve the development of the platform

A Stackelberg Game Approach Towards Socially-Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing (Online report)

Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently recruit sufficient number of mobile users, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal incentive mechanism of a crowdsensing service provider. We apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the participation level of the mobile users and the optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service provider using backward induction. In order to motivate the participants, the incentive is designed by taking into account the social network effects from the underlying mobile social domain. For example, in a crowdsensing-based road traffic information sharing application, a user can get a better and accurate traffic report if more users join and share their road information. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory incentive as well as the uniform incentive mechanisms. To fit into practical scenarios, we further formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze the interaction between the crowdsensing service provider and mobile users, where the social structure information (the social network effects) is uncertain. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the mobile users. Numerical results corroborate the fact that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level and greater revenue of the crowdsensing service provider. In addition, the social structure information helps the crowdsensing service provider to achieve greater revenue gain.Comment: Submitted for possible journal publication. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1711.0105

MODELING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN MOBILE WIRELESS NETWORKS

We envision that in the near future, just as Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), radios and radio resources in a wireless network can also be provisioned as a service to Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), which we refer to as Radio-as-a-Service (RaaS). In this thesis, we present a novel auction-based model to enable fair pricing and fair resource allocation according to real-time needs of MVNOs for RaaS. Based on the proposed model, we study the auction mechanism design with the objective of maximizing social welfare. We present an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) based auction mechanism for obtaining optimal social welfare. To reduce time complexity, we present a polynomial-time greedy mechanism for the RaaS auction. Both methods have been formally shown to be truthful and individually rational. Meanwhile, wireless networks have become more and more advanced and complicated, which are generating a large amount of runtime system statistics. In this thesis, we also propose to leverage the emerging deep learning techniques for spatiotemporal modeling and prediction in cellular networks, based on big system data. We present a hybrid deep learning model for spatiotemporal prediction, which includes a novel autoencoder-based deep model for spatial modeling and Long Short-Term Memory units (LSTMs) for temporal modeling. The autoencoder-based model consists of a Global Stacked AutoEncoder (GSAE) and multiple Local SAEs (LSAEs), which can offer good representations for input data, reduced model size, and support for parallel and application-aware training. Mobile wireless networks have become an essential part in wireless networking with the prevalence of mobile device usage. Most mobile devices have powerful sensing capabilities. We consider a general-purpose Mobile CrowdSensing(MCS) system, which is a multi-application multi-task system that supports a large variety of sensing applications. In this thesis, we also study the quality of the recruited crowd for MCS, i.e., quality of services/data each individual mobile user and the whole crowd are potentially capable of providing. Moreover, to improve flexibility and effectiveness, we consider fine-grained MCS, in which each sensing task is divided into multiple subtasks and a mobile user may make contributions to multiple subtasks. More specifically, we first introduce mathematical models for characterizing the quality of a recruited crowd for different sensing applications. Based on these models, we present a novel auction formulation for quality-aware and fine- grained MCS, which minimizes the expected expenditure subject to the quality requirement of each subtask. Then we discuss how to achieve the optimal expected expenditure, and present a practical incentive mechanism to solve the auction problem, which is shown to have the desirable properties of truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency. In a MCS system, a sensing task is dispatched to many smartphones for data collections; in the meanwhile, a smartphone undertakes many different sensing tasks that demand data from various sensors. In this thesis, we also consider the problem of scheduling different sensing tasks assigned to a smartphone with the objective of minimizing sensing energy consumption while ensuring Quality of SenSing (QoSS). First, we consider a simple case in which each sensing task only requests data from a single sensor. We formally define the corresponding problem as the Minimum Energy Single-sensor task Scheduling (MESS) problem and present a polynomial-time optimal algorithm to solve it. Furthermore, we address a more general case in which some sensing tasks request multiple sensors to re- port their measurements simultaneously. We present an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation as well as two effective polynomial-time heuristic algorithms, for the corresponding Minimum Energy Multi-sensor task Scheduling (MEMS) problem. Numerical results are presented to confirm the theoretical analysis of our schemes, and to show strong performances of our solutions, compared to several baseline methods

Living Innovation Laboratory Model Design and Implementation

Living Innovation Laboratory (LIL) is an open and recyclable way for multidisciplinary researchers to remote control resources and co-develop user centered projects. In the past few years, there were several papers about LIL published and trying to discuss and define the model and architecture of LIL. People all acknowledge about the three characteristics of LIL: user centered, co-creation, and context aware, which make it distinguished from test platform and other innovation approaches. Its existing model consists of five phases: initialization, preparation, formation, development, and evaluation. Goal Net is a goal-oriented methodology to formularize a progress. In this thesis, Goal Net is adopted to subtract a detailed and systemic methodology for LIL. LIL Goal Net Model breaks the five phases of LIL into more detailed steps. Big data, crowd sourcing, crowd funding and crowd testing take place in suitable steps to realize UUI, MCC and PCA throughout the innovation process in LIL 2.0. It would become a guideline for any company or organization to develop a project in the form of an LIL 2.0 project. To prove the feasibility of LIL Goal Net Model, it was applied to two real cases. One project is a Kinect game and the other one is an Internet product. They were both transformed to LIL 2.0 successfully, based on LIL goal net based methodology. The two projects were evaluated by phenomenography, which was a qualitative research method to study human experiences and their relations in hope of finding the better way to improve human experiences. Through phenomenographic study, the positive evaluation results showed that the new generation of LIL had more advantages in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.Comment: This is a book draf

Smart Communities: From Sensors to Internet of Things and to a Marketplace of Services

Our paper was inspired by the recent Society 5.0 initiative of the Japanese Government that seeks to create a sustainable human-centric society by putting to work recent advances in technology: sensor networks, edge computing, IoT ecosystems, AI, Big Data, robotics, to name just a few. The main contribution of this work is a vision of how these technological advances can contribute, directly or indirectly, to making Society 5.0 reality. For this purpose we build on a recently-proposed concept of Marketplace of Services that, in our view, will turn out to be one of the cornerstones of Society 5.0. Instead of referring to Society 5.0 directly, throughout the paper we shall define a generic Smart Community that implements a subset of the goals of Society 5.0. We show how digital technology in conjunction with the Marketplace of services can contribute to enabling and promoting sustainable Smart Communities. Very much like Society 5.0, our Smart Community can provide a large number of di verse and evolving human-centric services offered as utilities and sold on a metered basis. The services offered by the Smart Community can be synthesized, using the latest technology (e.g. 3D printing, robotics, Big Data analytics, AI, etc.), from a hierarchy of raw resources or other services. The residents of the Smart Community can purchase as much or as little of these services as they find suitable to their needs and are billed according to a pay-as-you-go business model