3,610 research outputs found

    On the Reduction of Grounding to Essence

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    In a recent article, Fabrice Correia explores the project of reducing the notion of grounding to that of essence. He then goes on to provide several candidate definitions and test each of them against a number of objections. His final take on the situation is, roughly, that two of the definitions can handle all of the considered objections. The aim of this paper is to re-evaluate Correia's conclusions in the light of two sources of insights: Firstly, I will argue that one of the objections treated by Correia has been somewhat underestimated, and that it still constitutes a threat against definitions of grounding in terms of essence. Secondly, there are at least two further objections that should be considered by the advocate of such definitions. As I will show, one of them can be neutralized; but the other one is more serious and suggests a clear dialectical edge to an operationalist definition

    Dispositional Expressions

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    THE EXPRESSION OF MODALITY IN IRANIAN SIGN LANGUAGE (ZEI)

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    This dissertation uses data from Zaban Eshareh Irani, Iranian Sign Language, to investigate the linguistic strategies for the expression of modality in this language. Manual and facial markers of modality are recognized and analyzed based on their form and the semantic domain each covers. Vander Auwera and Plungian (1998) offered a semantic map for categorization of different modals across languages. According to their framework, modality can be classified into two vast domains of possibility and necessity. Based on the source of the modal force then, each modality domain is categorized into three groups of participant-external, participant-internal and epistemic. In this dissertation, ZEI modal markers are discussed based on different discursive contexts in which they appear, and then categorized within Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) framework. Apart from a discursive semantic analysis of ZEI modals, I try to develop a cognitive approach towards understanding facial channel in signed languages as opposed to the manual one. Facial markers have always been analyzed as important parts of signed languages\u27 grammar. Three distinct facial markers are explained as markers of modality, both with and without accompanying a manual marker. Applying a cognitive grammar approach to modality (Langacker 1991, 2008, 2013), I show that facial markers are the main indicators of epistemic modality in ZEI. Facial markers are also involved in non-epistemic (effective) modality, for example by marking the degree of modality force

    A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts

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    This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and criticisms are most welcome via email. The text introduces the conceptual (internalism, externalism), quantitative (probabilism) and logical perspectives (logics for reasoning about probabilities by Fagin, Halpern, Megiddo and MEL by Banerjee, Dubois) for the framework

    A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts

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    This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and criticisms are most welcome via email. Starting with a thorough discussion of the conceptual embedding in existing schools of thought and liter- ature we develop a framework that aims to be empirically adequate yet scalable to epistemic states where an agent might testify to uncertainly believe a propositional formula based on the acceptance that a propositional formula is possible, called accepted truth. The familiarity of human agents with probability assignments make probabilism particularly appealing as quantitative modelling framework for defeasible reasoning that aspires empirical adequacy for gradual belief expressed as credence functions. We employ the inner measure induced by the probability measure, going back to Halmos, interpreted as estimate for uncertainty. Doing so omits generally requiring direct probability assignments testi�ed as strength of belief and uncertainty by a human agent. We provide a logical setting of the two concepts uncertain belief and accepted truth, completely relying on the the formal frameworks of 'Reasoning about Probabilities' developed by Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo and the 'Metaepistemic logic MEL' developed by Banerjee and Dubois. The purport of Probabilistic Uncertainty is a framework allowing with a single quantitative concept (an inner measure induced by a probability measure) expressing two epistemological concepts: possibilities as belief simpliciter called accepted truth, and the agents' credence called uncertain belief for a criterion of evaluation, called rationality. The propositions accepted to be possible form the meta-epistemic context(s) in which the agent can reason and testify uncertain belief or suspend judgement

    A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts

    Get PDF
    This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and criticisms are most welcome via email. The text introduces the conceptual (internalism, externalism), quantitative (probabilism) and logical perspectives (logics for reasoning about probabilities by Fagin, Halpern, Megiddo and MEL by Banerjee, Dubois) for the framework

    A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts

    Get PDF
    This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and criticisms are most welcome via email. Starting with a thorough discussion of the conceptual embedding in existing schools of thought and liter- ature we develop a framework that aims to be empirically adequate yet scalable to epistemic states where an agent might testify to uncertainly believe a propositional formula based on the acceptance that a propositional formula is possible, called accepted truth. The familiarity of human agents with probability assignments make probabilism particularly appealing as quantitative modelling framework for defeasible reasoning that aspires empirical adequacy for gradual belief expressed as credence functions. We employ the inner measure induced by the probability measure, going back to Halmos, interpreted as estimate for uncertainty. Doing so omits generally requiring direct probability assignments testi�ed as strength of belief and uncertainty by a human agent. We provide a logical setting of the two concepts uncertain belief and accepted truth, completely relying on the the formal frameworks of 'Reasoning about Probabilities' developed by Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo and the 'Metaepistemic logic MEL' developed by Banerjee and Dubois. The purport of Probabilistic Uncertainty is a framework allowing with a single quantitative concept (an inner measure induced by a probability measure) expressing two epistemological concepts: possibilities as belief simpliciter called accepted truth, and the agents' credence called uncertain belief for a criterion of evaluation, called rationality. The propositions accepted to be possible form the meta-epistemic context(s) in which the agent can reason and testify uncertain belief or suspend judgement

    Cognitive Grammar in Literature

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    This is the first book to present an account of literary meaning and effects drawing on our best understanding of mind and language in the form of a Cognitive Grammar. The contributors provide exemplary analyses of a range of literature from science fiction, dystopia, absurdism and graphic novels to the poetry of Wordsworth, Hopkins, Sassoon, Balassi, and Dylan Thomas, as well as Shakespeare, Chaucer, Barrett Browning, Whitman, Owen and others. The application of Cognitive Grammar allows the discussion of meaning, translation, ambience, action, reflection, multimodality, empathy, experience and literariness itself to be conducted in newly valid ways. With a Foreword by the creator of Cognitive Grammar, Ronald Langacker, and an Afterword by the cognitive scientist Todd Oakley, the book represents the latest advance in literary linguistics, cognitive poetics and literary critical practice

    An Everettian Account of Modality

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    In this thesis I propose that if Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM) is correct, then ordinary-objects contained within Everettian worlds ground the truth of nomic de re modal statements in a desirable way. Guided by desiderata set out following a brief assessment of notable modal accounts, I outline one way in which an Everettian account of objective de re modality can be formulated. By applying Eternalism and a formulation of Worm Theory to branching EQM with overlapping worlds, I arrive at an Everettian account of modality whereby concrete ordinary-objects – perduring ‘Branching-Worms’ – ground the truth of de re modal statements, in virtue of having parts which exemplify properties that the modal statement asserts of the ordinary-objects. I conclude that the Everettian modal account I have outlined requires further development in certain areas but hopefully shows some promise as a contending account of modality

    Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics

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    This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal μ\mu-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's "criterial" identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of Ω\Omega-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the interaction between epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, epistemic set theory, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebraic automata to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. The hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{2} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, and \textbf{11}. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides four models of hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory
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