1,969 research outputs found
Grounded Concept Development Using Introspective Atoms
In this paper we present a system that uses its underlying
physiology, a hierarchical memory and a collection of memory
management algorithms to learn concepts as cases and to
build higher level concepts from experiences represented as
sequences of atoms. Using a memory structure that requires
all base memories to be grounded in introspective atoms, the
system builds a set of grounded concepts that must all be
formed from and applied to this same set of atoms. All interaction the system has with its environment must be represented by the system itself and therefore, given a complete ability to perceive its own physiological and mental processes,can be modeled and recreated
Modeling Human Infant Learning in Embodied Artificial Entities to Produce Grounded Concepts
I present a system for concept development in an artificial
entity. The concept development is designed
around the foundations of human cognition while at
the same time remaining grounded in the agent or
robotâs own perception of its world
The Microstructure of Experience
I argue that experiences can have microphenomenal structures, where the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible microphenomenal properties. After explaining what it means to ascribe a microstructure to experience, I defend the thesis against its principal philosophical challenge, discuss how the thesis interacts with other philosophical issues about experience, and consider our prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm
Consciousness and Causal Emergence: ĆÄntarakáčŁita Against Physicalism
In challenging the physicalist conception of consciousness advanced by CÄrvÄka materialists such as Báčhaspati, the Buddhist philosopher ĆÄntarakáčŁita addresses a series of key issues about the nature of causality and the basis of cognition. This chapter considers whether causal accounts of generation for material bodies are adequate in explaining how conscious awareness comes to have the structural features and phenomenal properties that it does. Arguments against reductive physicalism, it is claimed, can benefit from an understanding of the structure of phenomenal consciousness that does not eschew causal-explanatory reasoning. Against causal models that rely on the concept of potentiality, the Buddhist principle of âdependent arisingâ underscores a dynamic conception of efficient causality, which allows for elements defined primarily in terms of their capacity for sentience and agency to be causally efficacious
The roots of self-awareness
In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account-by way of suggestions for how to build a genuinely self-referring artificial agent-and a biological account, via a discussion of the role of somatoception in supporting and structuring self-awareness more generally. Central to the account is a discussion of the necessary motivational properties of self-representing mental tokens, in light of which we offer a novel definition of self-representation. We also discuss the role of such tokens in organizing self-specifying information, which leads to a naturalized restatement of the guarantee that introspective awareness is immune to error due to mis-identification of the subject
Two conceptions of the mind
Since the cognitive revolution during the last century the mind has been conceived of as being computer-like. Like a computer, the brain was assumed to be a physical structure (hardware) upon which a computational mind (software) was built. The mind was seen as a collection of independent programs which each have their own specific tasks, or modules. These modules took sensory input data and transduced it into language-like representations which were used in mental computations. Recently, a new conception of the mind has developed, grounded cognition. According to this model, sensory stimulus is saved in the original format in which it was received and recalled using association mechanisms. Rather than representations being language-like they are instead multimodal. The manipulation of these multimodal representations requires processing distributed throughout the brain. A new holistic model for mental architecture has developed in which the concerted activity of the brain\u27s modal systems produces functional systems which are intimately codependent with one another. The purpose of this thesis is to explore both the modular and multimodal theories of mental architecture. Each will be described in detail along with their supporting paradigms, cognitivism and grounded cognition. After my expositions I will offer support for my own position regarding these two theories before suggesting avenues for future research
The Logical and Epistemological Foundations of Sociology in the Philosophy of F.S.C Northrop
The University of Kansas has long historical connections with Central America and the many Central
Americans who have earned graduate degrees at KU. This work is part of the Central American Theses
and Dissertations collection in KU ScholarWorks and is being made freely available with permission of the
author through the efforts of Professor Emeritus Charles Stansifer of the History department and the staff of
the Scholarly Communications program at the University of Kansas Librariesâ Center for Digital Scholarship.Filmer S. C. Northrop was born in 1883* Studied at Beloit, Yale and the
University of London Imperial College of Science and Technology. He
was professor of Law and Philosophy at Yale. Published The Logic of
the Sciences and the Humanities and The Meeting of East and West*
among many books and articles. An expert in epistemology, his method
of analysis is a search for the discovery of the first principles of
knowledge and the rigorous logical relationship between those principles
and the whole body of doctrine. It provides a method of thinking as
much as it provides a system of thoughts.
This dissertation explores those elements of Northrop's philosophy which
deserve the attention of sociologists. His philosophical ideas about the
logical and epistemological categories of knowledge provide the social
scientist with the training to think deductively and to avoid the
misunderstandings derived from the use of common sense language,
disregarding logical and conceptual distinctions. This systematic study
offers the opportunity to gain a fertile system of thought, and consider
the new theory of the social sciences as a portion of it
The knowledge argument
Frank Jacksonâs knowledge argument is a very influential piece of reasoning that seeks to show that colour experiences constitute an insoluble problem for science. This argument is based on a thought experiment concerning Mary. She is a vision scientist who has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision but has never had colour experiences. According to Jackson, upon seeing coloured objects, Mary acquires new knowledge that escapes her complete scientific knowledge. He concludes that there are facts concerning colour experiences that scientific knowledge can neither describe nor explain. Specifically, these facts involve the occurrence of certain non-physical properties of experiences that he calls qualia. The present research considers whether a plausible formulation of the hypothesis that science can accommodate colour experiences is threatened by a version of the knowledge argument. The specific formulation of this problem has two motivations. Firstly, before investigating whether the knowledge argument raises a problem for the claim that science can account for colour experiences, we need a plausible formulation of this claim. I argue that the idea that science can accommodate colour experiences can be formulated as the modest reductionism hypothesis. Roughly speaking, this is the hypothesis that a science that can be explanatory interfaced with current physics of ordinary matter can account for conscious experiences. Secondly, an unintelligible premise figures in Jacksonâs version the knowledge argument. Namely, it is assumed that Mary possesses a complete (future or possible) scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, the type of strategy involved in Jacksonâs argument can be used to target modest reductionism. By considering contemporary psychophysics and neuroscience, I characterise Maryâs scientific knowledge. First, this characterisation is intelligible. In fact, it is elaborated on the basis of descriptions and explanations of colour experiences involved in current physics and neuroscience. Second, a supporter of modest reductionism can assume that the scientific knowledge ascribed to Mary might account for colour experiences. The main conclusion of the present research is that our version of the knowledge argument fails to threaten the modest reductionism hypothesis. In fact, I endorse what can be called the âtwo ways of thinkingâ reply to the knowledge argument. According to this response, the knowledge argument shows that there are different ways of thinking about colour experiences. One way of thinking is provided by scientific knowledge. The other way of thinking is provided by our ordinary conception of colour experiences. However, the existence of these two ways of thinking does not imply the existence of facts and properties that escape scientific knowledge. It might be the case that the ordinary way of thinking about colour experience concerns facts and properties described and explained by science. The principal conclusion of the research results from two investigations. The first line of research aims to reveal and evaluate the implicit assumptions that figure in the knowledge argument. The main body of the research is dedicated to this task. The principal result of this investigation is that the knowledge argument must rely on an account of introspective knowledge of colour experiences. I argue that an inferential model of introspection provides such account. On this model, Maryâs capacity to hold beliefs about her colour experiences when she sees coloured objects requires her mastery of colour concepts. The second main investigation seeks to justify the two ways of thinking strategy. As many opponents and supporters have recently started to realise, this strategy might be charged with being ad hoc. I offer a distinctive justification of this reply to the knowledge argument. Assuming the account of introspection mentioned above, the existence of visual recognitional colour concepts might justify this strategy. A person possesses these concepts when she is able to determine the colours of objects simply by having visual experiences
Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology
This thesis articulates an analytic version of the ontology of idealism, according to which universal phenomenal consciousness is all there ultimately is, everything else in nature being reducible to patterns of excitation of this consciousness. The thesisâ key challenge is to explain how the seemingly distinct conscious inner lives of different subjectsâsuch as you and meâcan arise within this fundamentally unitary phenomenal field. Along the way, a variety of other challenges are addressed, such as: how we can reconcile idealism with the fact that we all inhabit a common external world; why this world unfolds independently of our personal volition or imagination; why there are such tight correlations between measured patterns of brain activity and reports of experience; etc.
The core idea of this thesis can be summarized thus: we, as well as all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of universal phenomenal consciousness, analogously to how a person with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) manifests multiple disjoint centers of subjectivity also called âalters.â We, and all other living organisms, are surrounded by the transpersonal phenomenal activity of universal consciousness, which unfolds beyond the dissociative boundary of our respective alter. The inanimate world we perceive around us is the extrinsic appearanceâi.e. the phenomenal image imprinted from across our dissociative boundaryâof this activity. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other alters
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