2,710 research outputs found
Smart Grid Security: Threats, Challenges, and Solutions
The cyber-physical nature of the smart grid has rendered it vulnerable to a
multitude of attacks that can occur at its communication, networking, and
physical entry points. Such cyber-physical attacks can have detrimental effects
on the operation of the grid as exemplified by the recent attack which caused a
blackout of the Ukranian power grid. Thus, to properly secure the smart grid,
it is of utmost importance to: a) understand its underlying vulnerabilities and
associated threats, b) quantify their effects, and c) devise appropriate
security solutions. In this paper, the key threats targeting the smart grid are
first exposed while assessing their effects on the operation and stability of
the grid. Then, the challenges involved in understanding these attacks and
devising defense strategies against them are identified. Potential solution
approaches that can help mitigate these threats are then discussed. Last, a
number of mathematical tools that can help in analyzing and implementing
security solutions are introduced. As such, this paper will provide the first
comprehensive overview on smart grid security
Modeling and performance evaluation of stealthy false data injection attacks on smart grid in the presence of corrupted measurements
The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional
anomaly detection techniques used in the energy system state estimators. In
this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be constructed blindly, i.e.,
without system knowledge, including topological connectivity and line reactance
information. Our analysis reveals that existing FDI attacks become detectable
(consequently unsuccessful) by the state estimator if the data contains grossly
corrupted measurements such as device malfunction and communication errors. The
proposed sparse optimization based stealthy attacks construction strategy
overcomes this limitation by separating the gross errors from the measurement
matrix. Extensive theoretical modeling and experimental evaluation show that
the proposed technique performs more stealthily (has less relative error) and
efficiently (fast enough to maintain time requirement) compared to other
methods on IEEE benchmark test systems.Comment: Keywords: Smart grid, False data injection, Blind attack, Principal
component analysis (PCA), Journal of Computer and System Sciences, Elsevier,
201
PMU Placement in Electric Transmission Networks for Reliable State Estimation against False Data Injection Attacks
Currently the false data injection (FDI) attack bring direct challenges in synchronized phase measurement unit (PMU) based network state estimation in wide-area measurement system (WAMS), resulting in degraded system reliability and power supply security. This paper assesses the performance of state estimation in electric cyber-physical system (ECPS) paradigm considering the presence of FDI attacks. The adverse impact on network state estimation is evaluated through simulations for a range of FDI attack scenarios using IEEE 14-bus network model. In addition, an algorithmic solution is proposed to address the issue of additional PMU installation and placement with cyber security consideration and evaluated for a set of standard electric transmission networks (IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus and 57-bus network). The numerical result confirms that the FDI attack can significantly degrade the state estimation and the cyber security can be improved by an appropriate placement of a limited number of additional PMUs
Protection Against Graph-Based False Data Injection Attacks on Power Systems
Graph signal processing (GSP) has emerged as a powerful tool for practical
network applications, including power system monitoring. By representing power
system voltages as smooth graph signals, recent research has focused on
developing GSP-based methods for state estimation, attack detection, and
topology identification. Included, efficient methods have been developed for
detecting false data injection (FDI) attacks, which until now were perceived as
non-smooth with respect to the graph Laplacian matrix. Consequently, these
methods may not be effective against smooth FDI attacks. In this paper, we
propose a graph FDI (GFDI) attack that minimizes the Laplacian-based graph
total variation (TV) under practical constraints. In addition, we develop a
low-complexity algorithm that solves the non-convex GDFI attack optimization
problem using ell_1-norm relaxation, the projected gradient descent (PGD)
algorithm, and the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). We then
propose a protection scheme that identifies the minimal set of measurements
necessary to constrain the GFDI output to high graph TV, thereby enabling its
detection by existing GSP-based detectors. Our numerical simulations on the
IEEE-57 bus test case reveal the potential threat posed by well-designed
GSP-based FDI attacks. Moreover, we demonstrate that integrating the proposed
protection design with GSP-based detection can lead to significant hardware
cost savings compared to previous designs of protection methods against FDI
attacks.Comment: This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication.
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False data injection attack detection in smart grid
Smart grid is a distributed and autonomous energy delivery infrastructure that constantly monitors the operational state of its overall network using smart techniques and state estimation. State estimation is a powerful technique that is used to determine the overall operational state of the system based on a limited set of measurements collected through metering systems. Cyber-attacks pose serious risks to a smart grid state estimation that can cause disruptions and power outages resulting in huge economical losses and are therefore a big concern to a reliable national grid operation. False data injection attacks (FDIAs), engineered on the basis of the knowledge of the network configuration, are difficult to detect using the traditional data detection mechanisms. These detection schemes have been found vulnerable and failed to detect these FDIAs. FDIAs specifically target the state data and can manipulate the state measurements in such a way that these false measurements appear real to the main control systems. This research work explores the possibility of FDIA detection using state estimation in a distributed and partitioned smart grid. In order to detect FDIAs we use measurements for residual-based testing which creates an objective function; and the probability of erroneous data is determined from this residual test. In this test, a preset threshold is determined based on the prior history of the state data. FDIA cases are simulated within a smart grid considering that the Chi-square detection state estimator fails in identifying such attacks. We compute the objective function using the standard weighted least problem and then test the objective function against the value in the Chi-square table. The gain matrix and the Jacobian matrix are computed. The state variables are computed in the form of a voltage magnitude. The state variables are computed after the inception of an attack to assess these state magnitude results. Different sizes of partitioning are used to improve the overall sensitivity of the Chi-square results. Our additional estimator is based on a Kalman estimation that consists of the state prediction and state correction steps. In the first step, it obtains the state and matrix covariance prediction, and in the second step, it calculates the Kalman gain and the state and matrix covariance update steps. The set of points is created for the state vector x at a time instant t. The initial vector and covariance matrix are based on a priori knowledge of the historical estimates. A set of sigma points is estimated by the state update function. Sigma points refer to the minimal set of sampling points that are selected and transformed using nonlinear function, and the new mean and the covariance are formed out of these transformed points. The idea behind this is that it is easier to compute a Gaussian distribution than an arbitrary nonlinear function. The filter gain, the mean and the covariance are used to estimate the next state. Our simulation results show that the combination of Kalman estimation and distributed state estimation improves the overall stability index and vulnerability assessment score of the smart grid. We built a stability index table for a smart grid based on the state estimates value after the inception of an FDIA. The vulnerability assessment score of the smart grid is based on common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) and state estimates under the influence of an FDIA. The simulations are conducted in the MATPOWER program and different electrical bus systems such as IEEE 14, 30, 39, 118 and 300 are tested. All the contributions have been published in reputable journals and conferences.Doctor of Philosoph
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