Zero-one laws with respect to models of provability logic and two Grzegorczyk logics

It has been shown in the late 1960s that each formula of first-order logic without constants and function symbols obeys a zero-one law: As the number of elements of finite models increases, every formula holds either in almost all or in almost no models of that size. Therefore, many properties of models, such as having an even number of elements, cannot be expressed in the language of first-order logic. Halpern and Kapron proved zero-one laws for classes of models corresponding to the modal logics K, T, S4, and S5 and for frames corresponding to S4 and S5. In this paper, we prove zero-one laws for provability logic and its two siblings Grzegorczyk logic and weak Grzegorczyk logic, with respect to model validity. Moreover, we axiomatize validity in almost all relevant finite models, leading to three different axiom systems

Robot Consciousness: Physics and Metaphysics Here and Abroad

Interest has been renewed in the study of consciousness, both theoretical and applied, following developments in 20th and early 21st-century logic, metamathematics, computer science, and the brain sciences. In this evolving narrative, I explore several theoretical questions about the types of artificial intelligence and offer several conjectures about how they affect possible future developments in this exceptionally transformative field of research. I also address the practical significance of the advances in artificial intelligence in view of the cautions issued by prominent scientists, politicians, and ethicists about the possible dangers of such sufficiently advanced general intelligence, including by implication the search for extraterrestrial intelligence

Human reasoning and cognitive science

In the late summer of 1998, the authors, a cognitive scientist and a logician, started talking about the relevance of modern mathematical logic to the study of human reasoning, and we have been talking ever since. This book is an interim report of that conversation. It argues that results such as those on the Wason selection task, purportedly showing the irrelevance of formal logic to actual human reasoning, have been widely misinterpreted, mainly because the picture of logic current in psychology and cognitive science is completely mistaken. We aim to give the reader a more accurate picture of mathematical logic and, in doing so, hope to show that logic, properly conceived, is still a very helpful tool in cognitive science. The main thrust of the book is therefore constructive. We give a number of examples in which logical theorizing helps in understanding and modeling observed behavior in reasoning tasks, deviations of that behavior in a psychiatric disorder (autism), and even the roots of that behavior in the evolution of the brain

On the Existence of Characterization Logics and Fundamental Properties of Argumentation Semantics

Given the large variety of existing logical formalisms it is of utmost importance to select the most adequate one for a specific purpose, e.g. for representing the knowledge relevant for a particular application or for using the formalism as a modeling tool for problem solving. Awareness of the nature of a logical formalism, in other words, of its fundamental intrinsic properties, is indispensable and provides the basis of an informed choice. One such intrinsic property of logic-based knowledge representation languages is the context-dependency of pieces of knowledge. In classical propositional logic, for example, there is no such context-dependence: whenever two sets of formulas are equivalent in the sense of having the same models (ordinary equivalence), then they are mutually replaceable in arbitrary contexts (strong equivalence). However, a large number of commonly used formalisms are not like classical logic which leads to a series of interesting developments. It turned out that sometimes, to characterize strong equivalence in formalism L, we can use ordinary equivalence in formalism L0: for example, strong equivalence in normal logic programs under stable models can be characterized by the standard semantics of the logic of here-and-there. Such results about the existence of characterizing logics has rightly been recognized as important for the study of concrete knowledge representation formalisms and raise a fundamental question: Does every formalism have one? In this thesis, we answer this question with a qualified “yes”. More precisely, we show that the important case of considering only finite knowledge bases guarantees the existence of a canonical characterizing formalism. Furthermore, we argue that those characterizing formalisms can be seen as classical, monotonic logics which are uniquely determined (up to isomorphism) regarding their model theory. The other main part of this thesis is devoted to argumentation semantics which play the flagship role in Dung’s abstract argumentation theory. Almost all of them are motivated by an easily understandable intuition of what should be acceptable in the light of conflicts. However, although these intuitions equip us with short and comprehensible formal definitions it turned out that their intrinsic properties such as existence and uniqueness, expressibility, replaceability and verifiability are not that easily accessible. We review the mentioned properties for almost all semantics available in the literature. In doing so we include two main axes: namely first, the distinction between extension-based and labelling-based versions and secondly, the distinction of different kind of argumentation frameworks such as finite or unrestricted ones

Computational complexity theory and the philosophy of mathematics

Computational complexity theory is a subfield of computer science originating in computability theory and the study of algorithms for solving practical mathematical problems. Amongst its aims is classifying problems by their degree of difficulty — i.e., how hard they are to solve computationally. This paper highlights the significance of complexity theory relative to questions traditionally asked by philosophers of mathematics while also attempting to isolate some new ones — e.g., about the notion of feasibility in mathematics, the P≠NP problem and why it has proven hard to resolve, and the role of non-classical modes of computation and proof