Modeling electricity prices: international evidence

This paper analyses the evolution of electricity prices in deregulated markets. We present a general model that simultaneously takes into account the possibility of several factors: seasonality, mean reversion, GARCH behaviour and time-dependent jumps. The model is applied to equilibrium spot prices of electricity markets from Argentina, Australia (Victoria), New Zealand (Hayward), NordPool (Scandinavia), Spain and U.S. (PJM) using daily data. Six different nested models were estimated to compare the relative importance of each factor and their interactions. We obtained that electricity prices are mean-reverting with strong volatility (GARCH) and jumps of time-dependent intensity even after adjusting for seasonality. We also provide a detailed unit root analysis of electricity prices against mean reversion, in the presence of jumps and GARCH errors, and propose a new powerful procedure based on bootstrap techniques

Governance-technology co-evolution and misalignment in the electricity industry

This paper explores some reasons why the alignment between governance and technology in infrastructures may be unstable or not easy to achieve. Focusing on the electricity industry, we claim that the decentralization of governance – an essential step towards a decentralized technical coordination - may be hampered by if deregulation magnifies behavioural uncertainties and asset specificities; and that in a technically decentralized system, political demand for centralized coordination may arise if the players are able to collude and lobby, and if such practices lead to higher electricity rates and lower efficiency. Our claims are supported by insights coming from approaches as diverse as transaction cost economics, the competence-based view of the firm, and political economy.Governance; Technology; Coherence; Competence; Transaction costs; Regulation.

Developping patterns as a mechanism for assisting the management of knowledge in the context of conducting organisational change

International audienceIn a business environment that is constantly evolving the management of knowledge is becoming increasingly important. In particular the shareability and repeatability of experience gained in change situations can prove an invaluable tool for the evolving enterprise. We advocate the use of the pattern paradigm as a means to capture and disseminate this type of knowledge. The patterns that we propose are organisational design proposals, where particular emphasis is placed on representing two complementary aspects of change: the ways in which an enterprise can conduct change (the process of change), and the possible states to which this change leads the enterprise (the product of change). Our approach to pattern development is based (a) on the existence of a pattern template and (b) on a cooperative and discussant way of working, so as to ensure that a maximum of knowledge relevant to the domain of interest is captured. The approach is illustrated with examples from a study of change management in the electricity sector, where it is currently being applied

Sustainable Development Report: Blockchain, the Web3 & the SDGs

This is an output paper of the applied research that was conducted between July 2018 - October 2019 funded by the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and conducted by the Research Institute for Cryptoeconomics at the Vienna University of Economics and Business and RCE Vienna (Regional Centre of Expertise on Education for Sustainable Development).Series: Working Paper Series / Institute for Cryptoeconomics / Interdisciplinary Researc

Municipal Aggregation and Retail Competition in the Ohio Energy Sector

We study incumbency advantage in a dynamic game with incomplete information between an incumbent and a voter. The incumbent knows the true state of the world, e.g., the severity of an economic recession or the level of criminal activities, and can choose the quality of his policy. This quality and the state of the world determine the policy outcome, i.e., the economic growth rate or the number of crimes committed. The voter only observes the policy outcome and then decides whether to reelect the incumbent or not. Her preferences are such that she would reelect the incumbent under full information if and only if the state of the world is above a given threshold level. In equilibrium, the incumbent is reelected in more states of the world than he would be under full information. In particular, he chooses inefficient policies and generates mediocre policy outcomes whenever the voter's induced belief distribution will be such that her expected utility of reelecting the incumbent exceeds her expected utility of electing the opposition candidate. Hence, there is an incumbency advantage through inefficient policies. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the prediction that reelection concerns may induce incumbents to generate mediocre outcomes

Sustainable Development Report: Blockchain, the Web3 & the SDGs

This is an output paper of the applied research that was conducted between July 2018 - October 2019 funded by the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and conducted by the Research Institute for Cryptoeconomics at the Vienna University of Economics and Business and RCE Vienna (Regional Centre of Expertise on Education for Sustainable Development).Series: Working Paper Series / Institute for Cryptoeconomics / Interdisciplinary Researc

MODELING ELECTRICITY PRICES: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

This paper analyses the evolution of electricity prices in deregulated markets. We present a general model that simultaneously takes into account the possibility of several factors: seasonality, mean reversion, GARCH behaviour and time-dependent jumps. The model is applied to equilibrium spot prices of electricity markets from Argentina, Australia (Victoria), New Zealand (Hayward), NordPool (Scandinavia), Spain and U.S. (PJM) using daily data. Six different nested models were estimated to compare the relative importance of each factor and their interactions. We obtained that electricity prices are mean-reverting with strong volatility (GARCH) and jumps of time-dependent intensity even after adjusting for seasonality. We also provide a detailed unit root analysis of electricity prices against mean reversion, in the presence of jumps and GARCH errors, and propose a new powerful procedure based on bootstrap techniques.

GATS and the electricity and water sectors

This paper discusses the impact of the GATS agreement of the World Trade Organisation on the electricity and water sectors