Gist and Verbatim in Narrative Memory

A major concern regarding the study of narratives regards how they are indexed and retrieved. This is a question which touches on the structure of human memory in general. Indeed, if narratives capture the substance of human thought, then data that we have already collected regarding human memory is of central importance to the computational study of narrative. Fuzzy Trace Theory assumes that memory for narrative is simultaneously stored at multiple levels of abstraction and, whenever possible, decision-makers interpret a stimulus qualitatively and therefore operate on a simple - typically categorical - "gist" representation. Here, we present a computational model of Fuzzy Trace Theory applied to explain the impact of changes in a narrative upon risky-choice framing effects. Overall, our theory predicts the outcome of 20 experimental effects using only three basic assumptions: 1) preference for lowest level of gist, that is, categorical processing; 2) decision options that fall within the same categorical description are then interpreted using finer-grained (ordinal or verbatim) distinctions; and 3) once the options are mentally represented, decision preferences are generated on the basis of simple positive vs. negative valences stored in long-term memory (e.g., positive value for human lives). A fourth assumption - that negatively-valenced decision options are preferentially converted to positive decision options - is used when categories are not otherwise comparable

Retrieval of episodic versus generic information: Does the order of recall affect the amount and accuracy of details reported by children about repeated events?

Children (N = 157) 4- to 8-years old participated 1 (single) or 4 times (repeated) in an interactive event. Across each condition, half were questioned a week later about the only or a specific occurrence of the event (Depth-first), and then about what usually happens. Half were prompted in the reverse order (Breadth-first). Children with repeated experience who first were asked about what usually happens reported more event-related information overall than those asked about an occurrence first. All children used episodic language when describing an occurrence; however children with repeated-event experience used episodic language less often when describing what usually happens than did those with single experience. Accuracy rates did not differ between conditions. Implications for theories of repeated-event memory are discussed

Children’s episodic and generic reports of alleged abuse

With the present data, we explored the relations between the language of interviewer questions, children’s reports, and case and child characteristics in forensic interviews. Results clearly indicated that the type of questions posed by interviewers – either probing generic or episodic features of an event – was related to the specificity of information reported by children. Further, interviewers appeared to adjust their questioning strategies based on the frequency of the alleged abuse. Children alleging single instances of abuse were asked more episodic questions than those alleging multiple abuses. In contrast, children alleging multiple incidents of abuse were asked a greater proportion of generic questions. Given that investigators often seek forensically-relevant episodic information, it is recommended that training for investigators focus on recognition of prompt selection tendencies and developing strategies for posing non-suggestive, episodically focused questions

Children’s ability to recall unique aspects of one occurrence of a repeated event

Preschool and school-age children’s memory and source monitoring were investigated by questioning them about one occurrence of a repeated lab event (n = 39). Each of the four occurrences had the same structure, but with varying alternatives for the specific activities and items presented. Variable details had a different alternative each time; hi/lo details presented the identical alternative three times and changed once. New details were present in one occurrence only and thus had no alternatives. Children more often confused variable, lo, and new details across occurrences than hi details. The 4- to 5-year-oldchildren were less accurate than 7- to 8-year-old children at attributing details to the correct occurrence when specifically asked. Younger children rarely recalled new details spontaneously, whereas 50% of the older children did and were above chance at attributing them to their correct occurrence. Results are discussed with reference to script theory, fuzzy-trace theory and the source-monitoring framework

Telling a good story: The effects of memory retrieval and context processing on eyewitness suggestibility

Witnesses are likely to describe a crime many times before testifying or encountering misinformation about that crime. Research examining the effect of retrieval on later suggestibility has yielded mixed results. LaPaglia and Chan manipulated whether misinformation was presented in a narrative or misleading questions, and they found that retrieval increased suggestibility when misinformation was presented in a narrative, but reduced suggestibility when the same misinformation was presented in questions. In the current study, we aimed to address why these differences occurred. Specifically, we examined whether contextual detail and narrative coherence during misinformation exposure influenced the relation between retrieval and suggestibility. Participants watched a robbery video and some were questioned about the event afterwards. They were then exposed to misinformation presented in a narrative (Experiment 1) or questions (Experiment 2) before taking a final memory test. Testing enhanced suggestibility when the misinformation phase reinstated contextual information of the event, but not when the misinformation phase included few contextual details–regardless of whether the misinformation was in a narrative or questions. In Experiment 3, disrupting narrative coherence by randomizing the order of contextual information eliminated retrieval-enhanced suggestibility. Therefore, context processing during the post-event information phase influences whether retrieval enhances or reduces eyewitness suggestibility

The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox

The lottery paradox involves a set of judgments that are individually easy, when we think intuitively, but ultimately hard to reconcile with each other, when we think reflectively. Empirical work on the natural representation of probability shows that a range of interestingly different intuitive and reflective processes are deployed when we think about possible outcomes in different contexts. Understanding the shifts in our natural ways of thinking can reduce the sense that the lottery paradox reveals something problematic about our concept of knowledge. However, examining these shifts also raises interesting questions about how we ought to be thinking about possible outcomes in the first place

Misinformation and Need for Cognition: How They Affect False Memories

The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of false memories and Need for Cognition (NFC). The relationship was examined using a typical misinformation paradigm where participants viewed a video clip which depicted a museum burglary and were later presented with an auditory narrative that contained misleading information about the video they previously saw. Half of the participants were exposed to warnings of misinformation. Additionally, the effect of question type (e.g., central, peripheral, and neutral) was taken into account. A main effect for NFC was found indicating that high NFC individuals had fewer false memories for the originally witnessed event than low NFC individuals. It was also found that memory for central details was better than for peripheral details. Furthermore, an interaction between warning and question type showed that when a warning was present, memory for the misleading peripheral details was stronger. Overall, the results demonstrate that there is a difference between high and low NFC individuals and the way memory is processed in the misinformation paradigm. Additionally, the results of this study reaffirm the notion that post-event information can hinder an eyewitness’s memory for an original event

Age and Amount of Experience on Children’s Representations of Repeated Events

The current study examined how children’s event representations changed with increasing experience with an event. There were 81 children (40 4-to-5-year-olds, and 41 7-to-8-year-olds) who participated in either 2 (n = 41) or 4 (n = 40) repeated event sessions, which consisted of activities such as playing a counting game, and/or doing a puzzle. Event sessions included three different item types; variable items (which changed at every occurrence), fixed items (which stayed constant throughout the event), and new items (which only occurred once throughout the series). Children were interviewed 5-7- days following their last event session using free-recall, as well as specific questioning phases (where they were asked about every item in the series). Increasing experience aided in recalling more fixed items, but was detrimental to recall of variable and new items. Older children had a better ability to recall fixed and variable items, but not necessarily new items than younger children. Results are discussed with reference to script and fuzzy trace theories, as well as the source-monitoring framework

The representation of spatial mental models in long-term memory

This thesis is concerned with how people understand and remember spatial information derived from verbal descriptions. The thesis distinguishes between three different ways of representing spatial information in working memory. The first way is to represent the surface form of the source from which the spatial information is derived (the language of a description). The second is to represent the structure of the situation derived from that source (a spatial mental model). The third is to represent the perceptual characteristics of the situation from a particular perspective (a visual image). Considerable evidence exists that people construct and manipulate spatial mental models in working memory. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the claim that mental models are represented in long-term memory. An outline of the spatial mental modeling processes required to understand a simple spatial description is proposed. It is proposed that spatial mental modeling is comprised of three processing stages. Firstly, comprehension processes are required to access the linguistic meaning of information presented in spatial description. Secondly, construction processes are required to build up a representation of the spatial structure of the situation derived from the language of the description. Thirdly, consultation processes are required to monitor construction and to access information from the spatial mental model. Nine experiments are reported which investigate evidence for and against the view that people remember the construction and consultation of a spatial mental model. In the final chapter this evidence is reviewed and a 'sketch' of a processing theory of memory for spatial descriptions is proposed. It is argued that memory for a spatial mental model is a product of the interaction between construction and consultation processes over a period of time rather than a simple 'copy' of a completed working memory spatial mental model