Superintelligence as a Cause or Cure for Risks of Astronomical Suffering

Discussions about the possible consequences of creating superintelligence have included the possibility of existential risk, often understood mainly as the risk of human extinction. We argue that suffering risks (s-risks) , where an adverse outcome would bring about severe suffering on an astronomical scale, are risks of a comparable severity and probability as risks of extinction. Preventing them is the common interest of many different value systems. Furthermore, we argue that in the same way as superintelligent AI both contributes to existential risk but can also help prevent it, superintelligent AI can both be a suffering risk or help avoid it. Some types of work aimed at making superintelligent AI safe will also help prevent suffering risks, and there may also be a class of safeguards for AI that helps specifically against s-risks

Designing for change: mash-up personal learning environments

Institutions for formal education and most work places are equipped today with at least some kind of tools that bring together people and content artefacts in learning activities to support them in constructing and processing information and knowledge. For almost half a century, science and practice have been discussing models on how to bring personalisation through digital means to these environments. Learning environments and their construction as well as maintenance makes up the most crucial part of the learning process and the desired learning outcomes and theories should take this into account. Instruction itself as the predominant paradigm has to step down. The learning environment is an (if not 'the�) important outcome of a learning process, not just a stage to perform a 'learning play'. For these good reasons, we therefore consider instructional design theories to be flawed. In this article we first clarify key concepts and assumptions for personalised learning environments. Afterwards, we summarise our critique on the contemporary models for personalised adaptive learning. Subsequently, we propose our alternative, i.e. the concept of a mash-up personal learning environment that provides adaptation mechanisms for learning environment construction and maintenance. The web application mash-up solution allows learners to reuse existing (web-based) tools plus services. Our alternative, LISL is a design language model for creating, managing, maintaining, and learning about learning environment design; it is complemented by a proof of concept, the MUPPLE platform. We demonstrate this approach with a prototypical implementation and a – we think – comprehensible example. Finally, we round up the article with a discussion on possible extensions of this new model and open problems

The Problem of Spite

Spite is one of the most negative emotions. It ranges from the ruthless, malicious, and enormously destructive, to the trivial and seemingly harmless. Yet all spiteful acts seem to lack rational justification and to be preoccupied solely with the intent to harm—even at the risk of harm to oneself. To rid ourselves of this nasty emotion, I propose a solution which involves the elimination of the deep underlying causes that root spite within us. Drawing upon the emotion theories of Robert Solomon and Max Scheler, this thesis describes spite as an emotion, analyses what is wrong with spite, and proposes what needs to be done about spite. I argue that while spite may be an inherent human trait, it is a dysfunctional emotion that serves no conceivable good and only incites damage

An exploratory study of factors influencing make-or-buy of sales activities

Purpose This paper aims to explore how sales managers make resourcing decisions with particular focus on their perceptions of outsourcing. Design/methodology/approach This paper is based on in-depth interviews with 29 senior sales managers from a variety of industry sectors based in the UK. All had more than five years’ experience of making resourcing decisions. Findings The findings are that resourcing decisions are prompted by cost pressure, the need to access skills or to improve flexibility. Outsourcing preferences are strongly moderated by perceived reputational risk. Availability of suitable suppliers and the ability to manage outsourcing are also practical moderators. Research limitations/implications The sample was purposeful in identifying and accessing senior respondents in substantial companies with extensive experience, but it was not random. Practical implications Respondents reported a lack of information available when making resourcing decisions; the model proposed provides a framework by which sales managers can identify the factors which should be taken into account and the information they need to make objective evaluations of resourcing options. Originality/value It has been acknowledged in prior literature that there is relatively little outsourcing of sales activities. This is the first exploratory study of the perceptions of sales managers about resourcing options and the first conceptualisation of how sales resourcing decisions are made

Medicine is not science

ABSTRACT: Abstract Most modern knowledge is not science. The physical sciences have successfully validated theories to infer they can be used universally to predict in previously unexperienced circumstances. According to the conventional conception of science such inferences are falsified by a single irregular outcome. And verification is by the scientific method which requires strict regularity of outcome and establishes cause and effect. Medicine, medical research and many “soft” sciences are concerned with individual people in complex heterogeneous populations. These populations cannot be tested to demonstrate strict regularity of outcome in every individual. Neither randomised controlled trials nor observational studies in medicine are science in the conventional conception. Establishing and using medical and other “soft science” theories cannot be scientific. It requires conceptually different means: requiring expert judgement applying all available evidence in the relevant available factual matrix. The practice of medicine is observational. Prediction of outcomes for the individual requires professional expertise applying available medical knowledge and evidence. Expertise in any profession can only be acquired through experience. Prior cases are the fundament of knowledge and expertise in medicine. Case histories, studies and series can provide knowledge of extremely high reliability applicable to establishing reliable general theories and falsifying others. Their collation, study and analysis should be a priority in medicine. Their devaluation as evidence, the failure to apply their lessons, the devaluation of expert professional judgement and the attempt to emulate the scientific method are all historic errors in the theory and practice of modern medicine

Imprisonment and the Right to Freedom of Movement

Government’s use of imprisonment raises distinctive moral issues. Even if government has broad authority to make and to enforce law, government may not be entitled to use imprisonment as a punishment for all the criminal laws it is entitled to make. Indeed, there may be some serious crimes that it is wrong to punish with imprisonment, even if the conditions of imprisonment are humane and even if no adequate alternative punishments are available

Getting Conspiratorial: Review of: Conspiracy Culture: From Kennedy to the X-files by Peter Knight

Peter Knight begins his foray into the conspiratorial corners of popular culture with the following provocation: conspiracy theories are no longer the “delusional rantings” of the fringe elements in society, but rather constitute “many people’s normal way of thinking about who they are and how the world works.” Conspiracy theories, in his view, reflect a general skepticism of governmental authority, covert actions, “official” versions of history, and, more broadly, express a philosophical anxiety about agency and causality in these postmodern, poststructural times—and he argues that this skepticism is largely justified

Knowing How One Knows

In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous