National Security Space Launch

The United States Space Force’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, formerly known as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, was first established in 1994 by President William J. Clinton’s National Space Transportation Policy. The policy assigned the responsibility for expendable launch vehicles to the Department of Defense (DoD), with the goals of lowering launch costs and ensuring national security access to space. As such, the United States Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) started the EELV program to acquire more affordable and reliable launch capability for valuable U.S. military satellites, such as national reconnaissance satellites that cost billions per satellite. In March 2019, the program name was changed from EELV to NSSL, which reflected several important features: 1.) The emphasis on “assured access to space,” 2.) transition from the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine used on the Atlas V to a US-sourced engine (now scheduled to be complete by 2022), 3.) adaptation to manifest changes (such as enabling satellite swaps and return of manifest to normal operations both within 12 months of a need or an anomaly), and 4.) potential use of reusable launch vehicles. As of August 2019, Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, SpaceX, and United Launch Alliance (ULA) have all submitted proposals. From these, the U.S. Air Force will be selecting two companies to fulfill approximately 34 launches over a period of five years, beginning in 2022. This paper will therefore first examine the objectives for the NSSL as presented in the 2017 National Security Strategy, Fiscal Year 2019, Fiscal Year 2020, and Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA), and National Presidential Directive No. 40. The paper will then identify areas of potential weakness and gaps that exist in space launch programs as a whole and explore the security implications that impact the NSSL specifically. Finally, the paper will examine how the trajectory of the NSSL program could be adjusted in order to facilitate a smooth transition into new launch vehicles, while maintaining mission success, minimizing national security vulnerabilities, and clarifying the defense acquisition process.No embargoAcademic Major: EnglishAcademic Major: International Studie

Spartan Daily, November 7, 2013

Volume 141, Issue 31https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/1450/thumbnail.jp

India’s Cybersecurity Landscape: The Roles of the Private Sector and Public-Private Partnership

Are public–private partnerships an appropriate means of dealing with underdeveloped cybersecurity-related institutions in India? Whereas the government lacks the resources and expertise to develop new templates, monitor industry behaviors, and enforce laws, trade associations are likely to have more experience and well-focused priorities in these areas

Spartan Daily April 17, 2012

Volume 138, Issue 39https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/1038/thumbnail.jp

Spartan Daily September 6, 2012

Volume 139, Issue 5https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/1321/thumbnail.jp

Agenda for change: strategic choices for the next government

The next government has a primary requirement to be well briefed on the challenges inherent in Australia’s strategic circumstances and the policy options available to it. ASPI is publishing this report to layout our strategic choices and to provide recommendations. Contributors are Peter Jennings on strategic policy, Mark Thomson and Andrew Davies on defence, Anthony Bergin and Kristy Bryden on homeland security, Russell Trood on foreign policy and Ryan Stokes on economic security. This body of ideas makes a compelling contribution to the discussions which ought always to characterise the Australian strategic and defence debate