646 research outputs found
Proof Theory of Finite-valued Logics
The proof theory of many-valued systems has not been investigated to an extent comparable to the work done on axiomatizatbility of many-valued logics. Proof theory requires appropriate formalisms, such as sequent calculus, natural deduction, and tableaux for classical (and intuitionistic) logic. One particular method for systematically obtaining calculi for all finite-valued logics was invented independently by several researchers, with slight variations in design and presentation. The main aim of this report is to develop the proof theory of finite-valued first order logics in a general way, and to present some of the more important results in this area. In Systems covered are the resolution calculus, sequent calculus, tableaux, and natural deduction. This report is actually a template, from which all results can be specialized to particular logics
Knowing-How and the Deduction Theorem
In his seminal address delivered in 1945 to the Royal Society Gilbert Ryle considers a special case of knowing-how, viz., knowing how to reason according to logical rules. He argues that knowing how to use logical rules cannot be reduced to a propositional knowledge. We evaluate this argument in the context of two different types of formal systems capable to represent knowledge and support logical reasoning: Hilbert-style systems, which mainly rely on axioms, and Gentzen-style systems, which mainly rely on rules. We build a canonical syntactic translation between appropriate classes of such systems and demonstrate the crucial role of Deduction Theorem in this construction. This analysis suggests that one's knowledge of axioms and one's knowledge of rules under appropriate conditions are also mutually translatable. However our further analysis shows that the epistemic status of logical knowing-how ultimately depends on one's conception of logical consequence: if one construes the logical consequence after Tarski in model-theoretic terms then the reduction of knowing-how to knowing-that is in a certain sense possible but if one thinks about the logical consequence after Prawitz in proof-theoretic terms then the logical knowledge-how gets an independent status. Finally we extend our analysis to the case of extra-logical knowledge-how representable with Gentzen-style formal systems, which admit constructive meaning explanations. For this end we build a typed sequential calculus and prove for it a ``constructive'' Deduction Theorem interpretable in extra-logical terms. We conclude with a number of open questions, which concern translations between knowledge-how and knowledge-that in this more general semantic setting
Knowing-How and the Deduction Theorem
In his seminal address delivered in 1945 to the Royal Society Gilbert Ryle considers a special case of knowing-how, viz., knowing how to reason according to logical rules. He argues that knowing how to use logical rules cannot be reduced to a propositional knowledge. We evaluate this argument in the context of two different types of formal systems capable to represent knowledge and support logical reasoning: Hilbert-style systems, which mainly rely on axioms, and Gentzen-style systems, which mainly rely on rules. We build a canonical syntactic translation between appropriate classes of such systems and demonstrate the crucial role of Deduction Theorem in this construction. This analysis suggests that one's knowledge of axioms and one's knowledge of rules under appropriate conditions are also mutually translatable. However our further analysis shows that the epistemic status of logical knowing-how ultimately depends on one's conception of logical consequence: if one construes the logical consequence after Tarski in model-theoretic terms then the reduction of knowing-how to knowing-that is in a certain sense possible but if one thinks about the logical consequence after Prawitz in proof-theoretic terms then the logical knowledge-how gets an independent status. Finally we extend our analysis to the case of extra-logical knowledge-how representable with Gentzen-style formal systems, which admit constructive meaning explanations. For this end we build a typed sequential calculus and prove for it a ``constructive'' Deduction Theorem interpretable in extra-logical terms. We conclude with a number of open questions, which concern translations between knowledge-how and knowledge-that in this more general semantic setting
Neutrality and Many-Valued Logics
In this book, we consider various many-valued logics: standard, linear,
hyperbolic, parabolic, non-Archimedean, p-adic, interval, neutrosophic, etc. We
survey also results which show the tree different proof-theoretic frameworks
for many-valued logics, e.g. frameworks of the following deductive calculi:
Hilbert's style, sequent, and hypersequent. We present a general way that
allows to construct systematically analytic calculi for a large family of
non-Archimedean many-valued logics: hyperrational-valued, hyperreal-valued, and
p-adic valued logics characterized by a special format of semantics with an
appropriate rejection of Archimedes' axiom. These logics are built as different
extensions of standard many-valued logics (namely, Lukasiewicz's, Goedel's,
Product, and Post's logics). The informal sense of Archimedes' axiom is that
anything can be measured by a ruler. Also logical multiple-validity without
Archimedes' axiom consists in that the set of truth values is infinite and it
is not well-founded and well-ordered. On the base of non-Archimedean valued
logics, we construct non-Archimedean valued interval neutrosophic logic INL by
which we can describe neutrality phenomena.Comment: 119 page
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