41,730 research outputs found
Information Processing, Computation and Cognition
Computation and information processing are among the most fundamental notions in cognitive science. They are also among the most imprecisely discussed. Many cognitive scientists take it for granted that cognition involves computation, information processing, or both â although others disagree vehemently. Yet different cognitive scientists use âcomputationâ and âinformation processingâ to mean different things, sometimes without realizing that they do. In addition, computation and information processing are surrounded by several myths; first and foremost, that they are the same thing. In this paper, we address this unsatisfactory state of affairs by presenting a general and theory-neutral account of computation and information processing. We also apply our framework by analyzing the relations between computation and information processing on one hand and classicism and connectionism/computational neuroscience on the other. We defend the relevance to cognitive science of both computation, at least in a generic sense, and information processing, in three important senses of the term. Our account advances several foundational debates in cognitive science by untangling some of their conceptual knots in a theory-neutral way. By leveling the playing field, we pave the way for the future resolution of the debatesâ empirical aspects
Computation vs. Information Processing: Why Their Difference Matters to Cognitive Science
Since the cognitive revolution, itâs become commonplace that cognition involves both computation and information processing. Is this one claim or two? Is computation the same as information processing? The two terms are often used interchangeably, but this usage masks important differences. In this paper, we distinguish information processing from computation and examine some of their mutual relations, shedding light on the role each can play in a theory of cognition. We recommend that theorists of cognition be explicit and careful in choosing\ud
notions of computation and information and connecting them together. Much confusion can be avoided by doing so
Can biological quantum networks solve NP-hard problems?
There is a widespread view that the human brain is so complex that it cannot
be efficiently simulated by universal Turing machines. During the last decades
the question has therefore been raised whether we need to consider quantum
effects to explain the imagined cognitive power of a conscious mind.
This paper presents a personal view of several fields of philosophy and
computational neurobiology in an attempt to suggest a realistic picture of how
the brain might work as a basis for perception, consciousness and cognition.
The purpose is to be able to identify and evaluate instances where quantum
effects might play a significant role in cognitive processes.
Not surprisingly, the conclusion is that quantum-enhanced cognition and
intelligence are very unlikely to be found in biological brains. Quantum
effects may certainly influence the functionality of various components and
signalling pathways at the molecular level in the brain network, like ion
ports, synapses, sensors, and enzymes. This might evidently influence the
functionality of some nodes and perhaps even the overall intelligence of the
brain network, but hardly give it any dramatically enhanced functionality. So,
the conclusion is that biological quantum networks can only approximately solve
small instances of NP-hard problems.
On the other hand, artificial intelligence and machine learning implemented
in complex dynamical systems based on genuine quantum networks can certainly be
expected to show enhanced performance and quantum advantage compared with
classical networks. Nevertheless, even quantum networks can only be expected to
efficiently solve NP-hard problems approximately. In the end it is a question
of precision - Nature is approximate.Comment: 38 page
Modal Considerations on Information Processing and Computation in the Nervous System
We can characterize computationalism very generally as a complex thesis with two main parts: the thesis that the brain (or the nervous system) is a computational system and the thesis that neural computation explains cognition. As Piccinini and Bahar (2012) point out, over the last six decades, computationalism has been the mainstream theory of cognition. Nevertheless, there is still substantial debate about which type of computation explains cognition, and computationalism itself still remains controversial. My aim in this paper is to make two main contributions to the debate about the first subthesis of computationalism, i.e. that the brain is a computational system. First, I want to offer an accurate elucidation of the notion relevant for understanding computationalism (the notion of computation) and clarify the relation between computation and information as well as the relations between both computation and information processing and the nervous system. Second, I want to argue against a peculiar form of computationalism: the thesis that neural processes are constitutively computational in some sense; that neural processes cannot be realized by a system that is not in some sense computational. I will call this thesis "modal computationalism". In particular, I want to argue that neural processing can be realized by a system that is not a sui generis computer (i. e., a computing system that is neither digital nor analog) and by a system that is not a generic computer (a computer in the most general sense: one that includes digital, analog, and any other kind of computation). Actual neural processing is presumed to be computational in these two senses (Piccinini and Bahar 2012). I will argue that, even if this is true, neural processing can be realized by a computing system that is not of the same kind as those that perform actual neural processing and even by a system that is not computational at all.Fil: Wajnerman Paz, Abel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones CientĂficas y TĂ©cnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentin
Towards a shared ontology: a generic classification of cognitive processes in conceptual design
Towards addressing ontological issues in design cognition research, this paper presents the first generic classification of cognitive processes investigated in protocol studies on conceptual design cognition. The classification is based on a systematic review of 47 studies published over the past 30 years. Three viewpoints on the nature of design cognition are outlined (search, exploration and design activities), highlighting considerable differences in the concepts and terminology applied to describe cognition. To provide a more unified view of the cognitive processes fundamentally under study, we map specific descriptions of cognitive processes provided in protocol studies to more generic, established definitions in the cognitive psychology literature. This reveals a set of 6 categories of cognitive process that appear to be commonly studied and are therefore likely to be prevalent in conceptual design: (1) long-term memory; (2) semantic processing; (3) visual perception; (4) mental imagery processing; (5) creative output production and (6) executive functions. The categories and their constituent processes are formalised in the generic classification. The classification provides the basis for a generic, shared ontology of cognitive processes in design that is conceptually and terminologically consistent with the ontology of cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In addition, the work highlights 6 key avenues for future empirical research: (1) the role of episodic and semantic memory; (2) consistent definitions of semantic processes; (3) the role of sketching from alternative theoretical perspectives on perception and mental imagery; (4) the role of working memory; (5) the meaning and nature of synthesis and (6) unidentified cognitive processes implicated in conceptual design elsewhere in the literature
Systems, interactions and macrotheory
A significant proportion of early HCI research was guided by one very clear vision: that the existing theory base in psychology and cognitive science could be developed to yield engineering tools for use in the interdisciplinary context of HCI design. While interface technologies and heuristic methods for behavioral evaluation have rapidly advanced in both capability and breadth of application, progress toward deeper theory has been modest, and some now believe it to be unnecessary. A case is presented for developing new forms of theory, based around generic âsystems of interactors.â An overlapping, layered structure of macro- and microtheories could then serve an explanatory role, and could also bind together contributions from the different disciplines. Novel routes to formalizing and applying such theories provide a host of interesting and tractable problems for future basic research in HCI
Recommended from our members
Attentional capture by meaning: A multi-level modelling study
We present a computational study of attentional capture by meaning, based on Barnard et al's key-distractor attentional blink task. We highlight a sequence of models, from an abstract black-box to a structurally detailed white-box model. Each of these models reproduces the major findings from the key-distractor blink task. We argue that such multi-level modelling gives greater confidence in the theoretical position encapsulated by these models
Design: One, but in different forms
This overview paper defends an augmented cognitively oriented generic-design
hypothesis: there are both significant similarities between the design
activities implemented in different situations and crucial differences between
these and other cognitive activities; yet, characteristics of a design
situation (related to the design process, the designers, and the artefact)
introduce specificities in the corresponding cognitive activities and
structures that are used, and in the resulting designs. We thus augment the
classical generic-design hypothesis with that of different forms of designing.
We review the data available in the cognitive design research literature and
propose a series of candidates underlying such forms of design, outlining a
number of directions requiring further elaboration
- âŠ