146 research outputs found
Evaluating the Security of Merkle-Damgård Hash Functions and Combiners in Quantum Settings
In this work, we evaluate the security of Merkle-Damgård (MD) hash functions and their combiners (XOR and concatenation combiners) in quantum settings. Two main quantum scenarios are considered, including the scenario where a substantial amount of cheap quantum random access memory (qRAM) is available and where qRAM is limited and expensive to access. We present generic quantum attacks on the MD hash functions and hash combiners, and carefully analyze the complexities under both quantum scenarios. The considered securities are fundamental requirements for hash functions, including the resistance against collision and (second-)preimage. The results are consistent with the conclusions in the classical setting, that is, the considered resistances of the MD hash functions and their combiners are far less than ideal, despite the significant differences in the expected security bounds between the classical and quantum settings. Particularly, the generic attacks can be improved significantly using quantum computers under both scenarios. These results serve as an indication that classical hash constructions require careful security re-evaluation before being deployed to the post-quantum cryptography schemes
Functional Graph Revisited: Updates on (Second) Preimage Attacks on Hash Combiners
This paper studies functional-graph-based (second) preimage attacks against hash combiners. By exploiting more properties of cyclic nodes of functional graph, we find an improved preimage attack against the XOR combiner with a complexity of , while the previous best-known complexity is . Moreover, we find the first generic second-preimage attack on Zipper hash with an optimal complexity of
The Sum Can Be Weaker Than Each Part
International audienceIn this paper we study the security of summing the outputs of two independent hash functions, in an effort to increase the security of the resulting design, or to hedge against the failure of one of the hash functions. The exclusive-or (XOR) combiner H1(M)⊕H2(M) is one of the two most classical combiners, together with the concatenation combiner H1(M) H2(M). While the security of the concatenation of two hash functions is well understood since Joux's seminal work on multicollisions, the security of the sum of two hash functions has been much less studied. The XOR combiner is well known as a good PRF and MAC combiner, and is used in practice in TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1. In a hash function setting, Hoch and Shamir have shown that if the compression functions are modeled as random oracles, or even weak random oracles (i.e. they can easily be inverted – in particular H1 and H2 offer no security), H1 ⊕ H2 is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to the birthday bound. In this work, we focus on the preimage resistance of the sum of two narrow-pipe n-bit hash functions, following the Merkle-Damgård or HAIFA structure (the internal state size and the output size are both n bits). We show a rather surprising result: the sum of two such hash functions, e.g. SHA-512 ⊕ Whirlpool, can never provide n-bit security for preimage resistance. More precisely, we present a generic preimage attack with a complexity of O(2 5n/6). While it is already known that the XOR combiner is not preserving for preimage resistance (i.e. there might be some instantiations where the hash functions are secure but the sum is not), our result is much stronger: for any narrow-pipe functions, the sum is not preimage resistant. Besides, we also provide concrete preimage attacks on the XOR combiner (and the concatenation combiner) when one or both of the compression functions are weak; this complements Hoch and Shamir's proof by showing its tightness for preimage resistance. Of independent interests, one of our main technical contributions is a novel structure to control simultaneously the behavior of independent hash computations which share the same input message. We hope that breaking the pairwise relationship between their internal states will have applications in related settings
Decentralized Threshold Signatures with Dynamically Private Accountability
Threshold signatures are a fundamental cryptographic primitive used in many
practical applications. As proposed by Boneh and Komlo (CRYPTO'22), TAPS is a
threshold signature that is a hybrid of privacy and accountability. It enables
a combiner to combine t signature shares while revealing nothing about the
threshold t or signing quorum to the public and asks a tracer to track a
signature to the quorum that generates it. However, TAPS has three
disadvantages: it 1) structures upon a centralized model, 2) assumes that both
combiner and tracer are honest, and 3) leaves the tracing unnotarized and
static. In this work, we introduce Decentralized, Threshold, dynamically
Accountable and Private Signature (DeTAPS) that provides decentralized
combining and tracing, enhanced privacy against untrusted combiners (tracers),
and notarized and dynamic tracing. Specifically, we adopt Dynamic Threshold
Public-Key Encryption (DTPKE) to dynamically notarize the tracing process,
design non-interactive zero knowledge proofs to achieve public verifiability of
notaries, and utilize the Key-Aggregate Searchable Encryption to bridge TAPS
and DTPKE so as to awaken the notaries securely and efficiently. In addition,
we formalize the definitions and security requirements for DeTAPS. Then we
present a generic construction and formally prove its security and privacy. To
evaluate the performance, we build a prototype based on SGX2 and Ethereum
New Attacks on the Concatenation and XOR Hash Combiners
We study the security of the concatenation combiner for two independent iterated hash functions with -bit outputs that are built using the Merkle-Damgård construction. In 2004 Joux showed that the concatenation combiner of hash functions with an -bit internal state does not offer better collision and preimage resistance compared to a single strong -bit hash function. On the other hand, the problem of devising second preimage attacks faster than against this combiner has remained open since 2005 when Kelsey and Schneier showed that a single Merkle-Damgård hash function does not offer optimal second preimage resistance for long messages.
In this paper, we develop new algorithms for cryptanalysis of hash combiners and use them to devise the first second preimage attack on the concatenation combiner. The attack finds second preimages faster than for messages longer than and has optimal complexity of . This shows that the concatenation of two Merkle-Damgård hash functions is not as strong a single ideal hash function.
Our methods are also applicable to other well-studied combiners, and we use them to devise a new preimage attack with complexity of on the XOR combiner of two Merkle-Damgård hash functions. This improves upon the attack by Leurent and Wang (presented at Eurocrypt 2015) whose complexity is (but unlike our attack is also applicable to HAIFA hash functions).
Our algorithms exploit properties of random mappings generated by fixing the message block input to the compression functions of and . Such random mappings have been widely used in cryptanalysis, but we exploit them in new ways to attack hash function combiners
07381 Abstracts Collection -- Cryptography
From 16.09.2007 to 21.09.2007 the Dagstuhl Seminar 07381 ``Cryptography\u27\u27 was held
in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
Compression from Collisions, or Why CRHF Combiners Have a Long Output
A black-box combiner for collision resistant hash functions (CRHF)
is a construction which given black-box access to two hash functions is
collision resistant if at least one of the components is
collision resistant.
In this paper we prove a lower bound on the output length of black-box
combiners for CRHFs. The bound we prove is basically tight as it is
achieved by a recent construction of Canetti et al [CRYPTO'07]. The
best previously known lower bounds only ruled out a very restricted
class of combiners having a very strong security reduction: the
reduction was required to output collisions for both underlying
candidate hash-functions given a single collision for the combiner
(Canetti et al [CRYPTO'07] building on Boneh and Boyen [CRYPTO'06] and
Pietrzak [EUROCRYPT'07]).
Our proof uses a lemma similar to the elegant ``reconstruction lemma''
of Gennaro and Trevisan [FOCS'00], which states that any function
which is not one-way is compressible (and thus uniformly random
function must be one-way). In a similar vein we show that a function
which is not collision resistant is compressible. We also borrow
ideas from recent work by Haitner et al. [FOCS'07], who show that one
can prove the reconstruction lemma even relative to some very powerful
oracles (in our case this will be an exponential time
collision-finding oracle)
Cryptanalysis of LFSR-based Pseudorandom Generators - a Survey
Pseudorandom generators based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) are a traditional building block for cryptographic stream ciphers. In this report, we review the general idea for such generators, as well as the most important techniques of cryptanalysis
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