3,206 research outputs found
A tight security reduction in the quantum random oracle model for code-based signature schemes
Quantum secure signature schemes have a lot of attention recently, in
particular because of the NIST call to standardize quantum safe cryptography.
However, only few signature schemes can have concrete quantum security because
of technical difficulties associated with the Quantum Random Oracle Model
(QROM). In this paper, we show that code-based signature schemes based on the
full domain hash paradigm can behave very well in the QROM i.e. that we can
have tight security reductions. We also study quantum algorithms related to the
underlying code-based assumption. Finally, we apply our reduction to a concrete
example: the SURF signature scheme. We provide parameters for 128 bits of
quantum security in the QROM and show that the obtained parameters are
competitive compared to other similar quantum secure signature schemes
Wave: A New Family of Trapdoor One-Way Preimage Sampleable Functions Based on Codes
We present here a new family of trapdoor one-way Preimage Sampleable
Functions (PSF) based on codes, the Wave-PSF family. The trapdoor function is
one-way under two computational assumptions: the hardness of generic decoding
for high weights and the indistinguishability of generalized -codes.
Our proof follows the GPV strategy [GPV08]. By including rejection sampling, we
ensure the proper distribution for the trapdoor inverse output. The domain
sampling property of our family is ensured by using and proving a variant of
the left-over hash lemma. We instantiate the new Wave-PSF family with ternary
generalized -codes to design a "hash-and-sign" signature scheme which
achieves existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks
(EUF-CMA) in the random oracle model. For 128 bits of classical security,
signature sizes are in the order of 15 thousand bits, the public key size in
the order of 4 megabytes, and the rejection rate is limited to one rejection
every 10 to 12 signatures.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1706.0806
Security of signed ELGamal encryption
Assuming a cryptographically strong cyclic group G of prime order q and a random hash function H, we show that ElGamal encryption with an added Schnorr signature is secure against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, in which an attacker can freely use a decryption oracle except for the target ciphertext. We also prove security against the novel one-more-decyption attack. Our security proofs are in a new model, corresponding to a combination of two previously introduced models, the Random Oracle model and the Generic model. The security extends to the distributed threshold version of the scheme. Moreover, we propose a very practical scheme for private information retrieval that is based on blind decryption of ElGamal ciphertexts
The problem with the SURF scheme
There is a serious problem with one of the assumptions made in the security
proof of the SURF scheme. This problem turns out to be easy in the regime of
parameters needed for the SURF scheme to work.
We give afterwards the old version of the paper for the reader's convenience.Comment: Warning : we found a serious problem in the security proof of the
SURF scheme. We explain this problem here and give the old version of the
paper afterward
Quantum Cryptography Beyond Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum cryptography is the art and science of exploiting quantum mechanical
effects in order to perform cryptographic tasks. While the most well-known
example of this discipline is quantum key distribution (QKD), there exist many
other applications such as quantum money, randomness generation, secure two-
and multi-party computation and delegated quantum computation. Quantum
cryptography also studies the limitations and challenges resulting from quantum
adversaries---including the impossibility of quantum bit commitment, the
difficulty of quantum rewinding and the definition of quantum security models
for classical primitives. In this review article, aimed primarily at
cryptographers unfamiliar with the quantum world, we survey the area of
theoretical quantum cryptography, with an emphasis on the constructions and
limitations beyond the realm of QKD.Comment: 45 pages, over 245 reference
A Distinguisher-Based Attack on a Variant of McEliece's Cryptosystem Based on Reed-Solomon Codes
Baldi et \textit{al.} proposed a variant of McEliece's cryptosystem. The main
idea is to replace its permutation matrix by adding to it a rank 1 matrix. The
motivation for this change is twofold: it would allow the use of codes that
were shown to be insecure in the original McEliece's cryptosystem, and it would
reduce the key size while keeping the same security against generic decoding
attacks. The authors suggest to use generalized Reed-Solomon codes instead of
Goppa codes. The public code built with this method is not anymore a
generalized Reed-Solomon code. On the other hand, it contains a very large
secret generalized Reed-Solomon code. In this paper we present an attack that
is built upon a distinguisher which is able to identify elements of this secret
code. The distinguisher is constructed by considering the code generated by
component-wise products of codewords of the public code (the so-called "square
code"). By using square-code dimension considerations, the initial generalized
Reed-Solomon code can be recovered which permits to decode any ciphertext. A
similar technique has already been successful for mounting an attack against a
homomorphic encryption scheme suggested by Bogdanoc et \textit{al.}. This work
can be viewed as another illustration of how a distinguisher of Reed-Solomon
codes can be used to devise an attack on cryptosystems based on them.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1203.668
Fundamental Finite Key Limits for One-Way Information Reconciliation in Quantum Key Distribution
The security of quantum key distribution protocols is guaranteed by the laws
of quantum mechanics. However, a precise analysis of the security properties
requires tools from both classical cryptography and information theory. Here,
we employ recent results in non-asymptotic classical information theory to show
that one-way information reconciliation imposes fundamental limitations on the
amount of secret key that can be extracted in the finite key regime. In
particular, we find that an often used approximation for the information
leakage during information reconciliation is not generally valid. We propose an
improved approximation that takes into account finite key effects and
numerically test it against codes for two probability distributions, that we
call binary-binary and binary-Gaussian, that typically appear in quantum key
distribution protocols
Linking Classical and Quantum Key Agreement: Is There "Bound Information"?
After carrying out a protocol for quantum key agreement over a noisy quantum
channel, the parties Alice and Bob must process the raw key in order to end up
with identical keys about which the adversary has virtually no information. In
principle, both classical and quantum protocols can be used for this
processing. It is a natural question which type of protocols is more powerful.
We prove for general states but under the assumption of incoherent
eavesdropping that Alice and Bob share some so-called intrinsic information in
their classical random variables, resulting from optimal measurements, if and
only if the parties' quantum systems are entangled. In addition, we provide
evidence that the potentials of classical and of quantum protocols are equal in
every situation. Consequently, many techniques and results from quantum
information theory directly apply to problems in classical information theory,
and vice versa. For instance, it was previously believed that two parties can
carry out unconditionally secure key agreement as long as they share some
intrinsic information in the adversary's view. The analysis of this purely
classical problem from the quantum information-theoretic viewpoint shows that
this is true in the binary case, but false in general. More explicitly, bound
entanglement, i.e., entanglement that cannot be purified by any quantum
protocol, has a classical counterpart. This "bound intrinsic information"
cannot be distilled to a secret key by any classical protocol. As another
application we propose a measure for entanglement based on classical
information-theoretic quantities.Comment: Accepted for Crypto 2000. 17 page
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