344 research outputs found
An Optimal Game Theoretical Framework for Mobility Aware Routing in Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Selfish behaviors are common in self-organized Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs) where nodes belong to different authorities. Since cooperation of
nodes is essential for routing protocols, various methods have been proposed to
stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes. In order to provide sufficient
incentives, most of these methods pay nodes a premium over their actual costs
of participation. However, they lead to considerably large overpayments.
Moreover, existing methods ignore mobility of nodes, for simplicity. However,
owing to the mobile nature of MANETs, this assumption seems unrealistic. In
this paper, we propose an optimal game theoretical framework to ensure the
proper cooperation in mobility aware routing for MANETs. The proposed method is
based on the multi-dimensional optimal auctions which allows us to consider
path durations, in addition to the route costs. Path duration is a metric that
best reflects changes in topology caused by mobility of nodes and, it is widely
used in mobility aware routing protocols. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism
is optimal in that it minimizes the total expected payments. We provide
theoretical analysis to support our claims. In addition, simulation results
show significant improvements in terms of payments compared to the most popular
existing methods
Auction-based schemes for multipath routing in selfish networks
We study multipath routing with traffic assignment in selfish networks. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, an optimal and strategy-proof scheme, known as optimal auction-based multipath routing (OAMR), is developed. However, OAMR is computationally expensive and cannot run in real time when the network size is large. Therefore, we propose sequential auction-based multipath routing (SAMR). SAMR handles routing requests sequentially using some greedy strategies. In particular, with reference to the Ausubel auction, we develop a water-draining algorithm to assign the traffic of a request among its available paths and determine the payment of the transmission in approximately constant time. Our simulation results show that SAMR can rapidly compute the allocations and payments of requests with small sacrifice on the system cost. Moreover, various sequencing strategies for sequential auction are also investigated. © 2013 IEEE.published_or_final_versio
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Game theory for dynamic spectrum sharing cognitive radio
This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and was awarded by Brunel University on 21 June 2010.âGame Theoryâ is the formal study of conflict and cooperation. The theory is based on a set of tools that have been developed in order to assist with the modelling and analysis of individual, independent decision makers. These actions potentially affect any decisions, which are made by other competitors. Therefore, it is well suited and capable of addressing the various issues linked to wireless communications. This work presents a Green Game-Based Hybrid Vertical Handover Model. The model is used for heterogeneous wireless networks, which combines both dynamic (Received Signal Strength and Node Mobility) and static (Cost, Power Consumption and Bandwidth) factors. These factors control the handover decision process; whereby the mechanism successfully eliminates any unnecessary handovers, reduces delay and overall number of handovers to 50% less and 70% less dropped packets and saves 50% more energy in comparison to other mechanisms. A novel Game-Based Multi-Interface Fast-Handover MIPv6 protocol is introduced in this thesis as an extension to the Multi-Interface Fast-handover MIPv6 protocol. The protocol works when the mobile node has more than one wireless interface. The protocol controls the handover decision process by deciding whether a handover is necessary and helps the node to choose the right access point at the right time. In addition, the protocol switches the mobile nodes interfaces âONâ and âOFFâ when needed to control the mobile nodeâs energy consumption and eliminate power lost of adding another interface. The protocol successfully reduces the number of handovers to 70%, 90% less dropped packets, 40% more received packets and acknowledgments and 85% less end-to-end delay in comparison to other Protocols. Furthermore, the thesis adapts a novel combination of both game and auction theory in dynamic resource allocation and price-power-based routing in wireless Ad-Hoc networks. Under auction schemes, destinations nodes bid the information data to access to the data stored in the server node. The server will allocate the data to the winner who values it most. Once the data has been allocated to the winner, another mechanism for dynamic routing is adopted. The routing mechanism is based on the source-destination cooperation, power consumption and source-compensation to the intermediate nodes. The mechanism dramatically increases the sellerâs revenue to 50% more when compared to random allocation scheme and briefly evaluates the reliability of predefined route with respect to data prices, source and destination cooperation for different network settings. Last but not least, this thesis adjusts an adaptive competitive second-price pay-to-bid sealed auction game and a reputation-based game. This solves the fairness problems associated with spectrum sharing amongst one primary user and a large number of secondary users in a cognitive radio environment. The proposed games create a competition between the bidders and offers better revenue to the players in terms of fairness to more than 60% in certain scenarios. The proposed game could reach the maximum total profit for both primary and secondary users with better fairness; this is illustrated through numerical results
Dual Auction Mechanism for Transaction Forwarding and Validation in Complex Wireless Blockchain Network
In traditional blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to
full nodes (i.e., miners) regardless of the contribution of forwarding
behaviors of light nodes. However, the lack of forwarding incentive reduces the
willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the
energy-constrained Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET). This paper proposes a novel
dual auction mechanism to allocate transaction fees for forwarding and
validation behaviors in the wireless blockchain network. The dual auction
mechanism consists of two auction models: the forwarding auction and the
validation auction. In the forwarding auction, forwarding nodes use Generalized
First Price (GFP) auction to choose transactions to forward. Besides,
forwarding nodes adjust the forwarding probability through a no-regret
algorithm to improve efficiency. In the validation auction, full nodes select
transactions using Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism to construct the block.
We prove that the designed dual auction mechanism is Incentive Compatibility
(IC), Individual Rationality (IR), and Computational Efficiency (CE).
Especially, we derive the upper bound of the social welfare difference between
the social optimal auction and our proposed one. Extensive simulation results
demonstrate that the proposed dual auction mechanism decreases energy and
spectrum resource consumption and effectively improves social welfare without
sacrificing the throughput and the security of the wireless blockchain network
Resource Allocation and Pricing in Secondary Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks
The paradigm shift from static spectrum allocation to a dynamic one has opened many challenges that need to be addressed for the true vision of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) to materialize. This dissertation proposes novel solutions that include: spectrum allocation, routing, and scheduling in DSA networks. First, we propose an auction-based spectrum allocation scheme in a multi-channel environment where secondary users (SUs) bid to buy channels from primary users (PUs) based on the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR). The channels are allocated such that i) the SUs get their preferred channels, ii) channels are re-used, and iii) there is no interference. Then, we propose a double auction-based spectrum allocation technique by considering multiple bids from SUs and heterogeneity of channels. We use virtual grouping of conflict-free buyers to transform multi-unit bids to single-unit bids. For routing, we propose a market-based model where the PUs determine the optimal price based on the demand for bandwidth by the SUs. Routes are determined through a series of price evaluations between message senders and forwarders. Also, we consider auction-based routing for two cases where buyers can bid for only one channel or they could bid for a combination of non-substitutable channels. For a centralized DSA, we propose two scheduling algorithms-- the first one focuses on maximizing the throughput and the second one focuses on fairness. We extend the scheduling algorithms to multi-channel environment. Expected throughput for every channel is computed by modelling channel state transitions using a discrete-time Markov chain. The state transition probabilities are calculated which occur at the frame/slot boundaries. All proposed algorithms are validated using simulation experiments with different network settings and their performance are studied
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