784 research outputs found
Satisfaction Equilibrium: A General Framework for QoS Provisioning in Self-Configuring Networks
This paper is concerned with the concept of equilibrium and quality of
service (QoS) provisioning in self-configuring wireless networks with
non-cooperative radio devices (RD). In contrast with the Nash equilibrium (NE),
where RDs are interested in selfishly maximizing its QoS, we present a concept
of equilibrium, named satisfaction equilibrium (SE), where RDs are interested
only in guaranteing a minimum QoS. We provide the conditions for the existence
and the uniqueness of the SE. Later, in order to provide an equilibrium
selection framework for the SE, we introduce the concept of effort or cost of
satisfaction, for instance, in terms of transmit power levels, constellation
sizes, etc. Using the idea of effort, the set of efficient SE (ESE) is defined.
At the ESE, transmitters satisfy their minimum QoS incurring in the lowest
effort. We prove that contrary to the (generalized) NE, at least one ESE always
exists whenever the network is able to simultaneously support the individual
QoS requests. Finally, we provide a fully decentralized algorithm to allow
self-configuring networks to converge to one of the SE relying only on local
information.Comment: Accepted for publication in Globecom 201
Quality-Of-Service Provisioning in Decentralized Networks: A Satisfaction Equilibrium Approach
This paper introduces a particular game formulation and its corresponding
notion of equilibrium, namely the satisfaction form (SF) and the satisfaction
equilibrium (SE). A game in SF models the case where players are uniquely
interested in the satisfaction of some individual performance constraints,
instead of individual performance optimization. Under this formulation, the
notion of equilibrium corresponds to the situation where all players can
simultaneously satisfy their individual constraints. The notion of SE, models
the problem of QoS provisioning in decentralized self-configuring networks.
Here, radio devices are satisfied if they are able to provide the requested
QoS. Within this framework, the concept of SE is formalized for both pure and
mixed strategies considering finite sets of players and actions. In both cases,
sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the SE are presented.
When multiple SE exist, we introduce the idea of effort or cost of satisfaction
and we propose a refinement of the SE, namely the efficient SE (ESE). At the
ESE, all players adopt the action which requires the lowest effort for
satisfaction. A learning method that allows radio devices to achieve a SE in
pure strategies in finite time and requiring only one-bit feedback is also
presented. Finally, a power control game in the interference channel is used to
highlight the advantages of modeling QoS problems following the notion of SE
rather than other equilibrium concepts, e.g., generalized Nash equilibrium.Comment: Article accepted for publication in IEEE Journal on Selected Topics
in Signal Processing, special issue in Game Theory in Signal Processing. 16
pages, 6 figure
Bayesian Rationality in Satisfaction Games
We introduce a new paradigm for game theory -- Bayesian satisfaction. This
novel approach is a synthesis of the idea of Bayesian rationality introduced by
Aumann, and satisfaction games. The concept of Bayesian rationality for which,
in part, Robert Aumann was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2005, is concerned with
players in a game acting in their own best interest given a subjective
knowledge of the other players' behaviours as represented by a probability
distribution. Satisfaction games have emerged in the engineering literature as
a way of modelling competitive interactions in resource allocation problems
where players seek to attain a specified level of utility, rather than trying
to maximise utility. In this paper, we explore the relationship between
optimality in Aumann's sense (correlated equilibria), and satisfaction in
games. We show that correlated equilibria in a satisfaction game represent
stable outcomes in which no player can increase their probability of
satisfaction by unilateral deviation from the specified behaviour. Thus, we
propose a whole new class of equilibrium outcomes in satisfaction games which
include existing notions of equilibria in such games. Iterative algorithms for
computing such equilibria based on the existing ideas of regret matching are
presented and interpreted within the satisfaction framework. Numerical examples
of resource allocation are presented to illustrate the behaviour of these
algorithms. A notable feature of these algorithms is that they almost always
find equilibrium outcomes whereas existing approaches in satisfaction games may
not.Comment: Appears at the 14th Workshop on Optimization and Learning in
Multiagent Systems Workshop (OptLearnMAS 2023). Held as part of the Workshops
at the AAMAS 2023 Conferenc
Individual Telecommunications Tariffs in Chinese Communities: History as a Mirror of the Future, and Relevance for Mobile Service Development in China
This paper addresses the mobile service pricing and affordability issues in China. Taking history as a mirror, it shows individual tariffs existed at the dawn of telephony. A vision of future mobile services with individual tariffs are formalized which will suit specially well the culture of communities rooted in Chinese traditions. An analysis of current tariff conditions in China, and of technologies developments worldwide, shows community-based indiviudal tariifs will speed up the diffusion of moible services to the majority of populations and benefit both economically and sociologically the development in China
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